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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

JOHN GERARD RUGGIE examines the new world order rhetoric of the United States in the post-cold war world. Not dismissing it as mere rhetoric, he shows that it expresses deep-rooted American ideas about desirable ways of organizing the international system that have played both instrumental and aspirational roles since the United States became a world power.

WILLIAM F. CONNELLY, JR., and JOHN J. PITNEY, JR., find that House Republicans are becoming more confrontational, though not necessarily more conservative. They argue that the strategic environment of the 1994 midterm election may be moving in the GOP's favor and also speculate that large Republican gains in 1994 would bring them costs as well as benefits.

DALE BAUM and JAMES L. HAILEY reevaluate Lyndon Baines Johnson's controversial victory in the 1948 Texas senatorial runoff election. They demonstrate that "second efforts" on LBJ's behalf proved to be of no unusal help to him in the runoff and that the statewide result hinged on the combination of LBJ's success and his opponent's failure to mobilize former supporters for the second round of balloting.

NANCY L. SCHWARTZ examines the debate on electoral reform in Israel. Stressing unique features of Israeli political culture, she argues that dividing Israel into geographic districts for electing representatives will not necessarily increase democracy or political legitimacy.

NIKOLAOS ZAHARIADIS analyzes the effects of Yugoslav Macedonian nationalism on Greek foreign policy. His findings enhance the theoretical understanding of small-state foreign policy behavior and emphasize the importance of symbols and ideas as sources of interstate disputes.

DIANA EVANS examines congressional oversight of the bureaucracy. She argues that previous approaches to oversight overstate the importance of reelection in Congress members' oversight behavior. She offers an alternative view and demonstrates its usefulness with two case studies.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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Third Try at World Order? America and Multilateralism after the Cold War

JOHN GERARD RUGGIE

Times of change are also times of confusion. Words lose their familiar meaning, and our footing becomes unsure on what was previously firm terrain. Today, political leaders and commentators alike seek to grasp the new international role of the United States. "Now is the unipolar moment," a triumphalist commentator crows. "There is but one first-rate power and no prospect in the immediate future of any power to rival it."[1] But a senior U.S. foreign policy official demurs: "We simply don't have the leverage, we don't have the influence, the inclination to use military force. We don't have the money to bring to bear the kind of pressure that will produce positive results any time soon."[2] On Sunday morning talk shows Beltway pundits repeat, as if chanting a mantra, that it is necessary for this country to articulate a new set of interests that are deemed vital and sufficiently compelling to mobilize the country behind sustained foreign policy

[1] Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70 (Winter 1990/91): 24–25.

[2] Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff, in what were intended as not-for-attribution remarks to reporters and diplomats; the remarks caused a public outcry and were disavowed by Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Cited in *New York Newsday*, 6 June 1993.

JOHN GERARD RUGGIE is professor of political science and dean of the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. His books include *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Practice of an International Form.*

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efforts. But short of repelling external threats to the United States, there is little consensus about which foreign policy objectives qualify or how best to pursue them; it seems far easier to deny the centrality of purported interests than to affirm them.

On close inspection, however, a striking element of continuity can be seen amid this fog of befuddlement: the foreign policy impulses of the United States at cold war's end have evoked the rhetoric and some of the actions of American leaders at the end of World Wars I and II. In this article, I first describe the ideational basis of this rhetoric and action. I then make the case that the continued expression of these ideas is neither coincidental nor habitual, but reflects deeply embedded factors in the American sense of community itself.

Consider some recent instances. In the security realm, President George Bush heralded the promise of "a new world order," in which self-determination, cooperative deterrence, and joint action against aggression would come to hold greater sway.[3] In the economic realm, the Bush administration redoubled America's commitment to liberalizing international trade through the ongoing Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and by launching negotiations for a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico. The Clinton administration, in its only overarching doctrinal statement to date, committed itself to strengthening and enlarging the community of major market democracies.[4] Moreover, it successfully concluded the two sets of trade negotiations begun by its predecessors. In security affairs, though the Clinton team's early enthusiasm for "assertive multilateralism"[5] was soon tempered by reality on the ground in Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti, U.S. urging prompted the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to use force for the first time ever in its entire history by launching limited airstrikes against Bosnian Serb targets. Moreover, through NATO, the United States has sought to extend, in the words of President Bill Clinton, "the fabric of transatlantic prosperity and security" into Central and Eastern Europe

[3] See, in particular, "Address to Joint Session of Congress," 11 September 1990, *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, November/December 1990, just before the Gulf war; and "Address to Congress on End of the Gulf War," reprinted in *New York Times*, 7 March 1991.

[4] "From Containment to Enlargement," Remarks of Anthony Lake, assistant to the president for National Security Affairs, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 21 September 1993.

[5] United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations Madeleine K. Albright, "Address to the Council on Foreign Relations Conference on Cooperative Security and the United Nations," 11 June 1993.

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and possibly Russia.[6] And a long awaited presidential policy directive on United Nations peacekeeping represents the administration's desire to bring multilateral objectives into closer alignment with multilateral capabilities more than it does a mere retreat.[7]

The particulars differ, to be sure, in some ways substantially, but the general thrust of these initiatives is surprisingly resonant with the world order agendas of Woodrow Wilson in 1919 and Franklin Roosevelt in 1945. Both supported national self-determination. Both expressed an aversion to the bilateral alliances on which countries had relied historically, preferring instead more comprehensive and institutionalized security arrangements: a League of Nations in 1919 and a universal security system through the United Nations in 1945. And both favored the reduction of state-imposed barriers to the flow of international economic transactions as well as uniform rules to govern trade and monetary relations. Thus, at the end of each global conflagration in the twentieth century—the two world wars and the cold war—American administrations have enunciated and, at least in some measure, have sought to act upon a vision premised on essentially similar ideas.

The expression of these ideas at times of fundamental international disjuncture is neither coincidental nor simply habitual. They are ideas not only about threats and how to meet them, or opportunities and how to exploit them. More than that, they are ideas about what constitutes from an American vantage a desirable world order. As such, they inextricably reflect America's own collective self-concept—the deep ideational repository that American leaders have drawn upon, since the United States become a major world power, when reconstructing the international order has been at stake.

To explore this line of argument further and to assess its efficacy for current debates about the appropriate framing of American foreign policy after the cold war, we need to address three questions: What are the underlying principles of world order embodied in this set of ideas? Why have American leaders invoked this vision, as opposed to some other, at these three critical historical junctures? And does the vision offer any guide for the future? The subsequent sections of this article take up each question in turn.

[6] "A New Security—Built on Integration," Excerpts from President Clinton's public address in Brussels at the time of the NATO summit, as reprinted in the *Washington Post*, 10 January 1994. It goes without saying that the success of neither is foreordained.

[7] Office of Public Information, The White House, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," May 1994 (declassified version of Presidential Decision Directive 25).

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The Meanings of Multilateralism

In the cloister of academic specialists, these world order principles are known as multilateralism. There is unavoidable ambiguity in defining this term, which must be clarified if its role in shaping U.S. foreign policy is to be fully appreciated. The ambiguity has several roots.

First, the dictionary meaning of the term multilateral—pertaining to relations among three or more parties—encompasses the necessary but not sufficient condition of its meaning in the conduct of international relations. The sufficient condition concerns the principles on the basis of which relations are organized among those parties. In its pure form, a multilateral order embodies rules of conduct that are commonly applicable to countries, as opposed to discriminating among them, based on situational exigencies or particularistic preferences. Therefore, such an order entails a greater degree of indivisibility among the declared interests of countries than its alternative forms, making it easier to pursue those interests through joint action. And it permits each country to calculate its gains and losses from international transactions in the aggregate, across a broad array of relations and partners, as opposed to requiring case-by-case reciprocity.[8]

More specifically, in its pure form a multilateral security order would entail equal protection under a common security umbrella—an arrangement typically referred to as collective security. Sir Arthur Salter more than a half-century ago described collective security as a potential universal alliance "against the *unknown* enemy."[9] And he should have added, in behalf of the *unknown* victim.[10] The counterpart principle in economic relations prescribes an international economic order in which exclusive blocs or differential treatment of trading partners and

[8] The concept and the history of multilateralism are sketched out more fully in John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution" in Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

[9] Arthur Salter, *Security* (London: Macmillan, 1939), 155. (Emphasis in original.)

[10] The institutional difference between bilateral alliances and collective security schemes can be put schematically: in both instances, state A is pledged to come to the aid of state B if B is attacked by C. In a collective security scheme, however, A is also pledged to come to the aid of C if C is attacked by B. Consequently, as G. F. Hudson points out, "A cannot regard itself as the ally of B more than of C because theoretically it is an open question whether, if an act of war should occur, B or C would be the aggressor. In the same way B has indeterminate obligations toward A and C, and C towards A and B, and so on with a vast number of variants as the system is extended to more and more states." G. F. Hudson, "Collective Security and Military Alliances" in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., *Diplomatic Investigations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 176–177.

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currencies are forbidden, and in which point-of-entry barriers to transactions are minimized.[11] A commitment to national self-determination and universal human rights rounds out the pure form of the multilateralist vision.

Not merely definitionally, but also in practice, these organizing principles are far more decisive than the question of numbers alone. For example, economic historians consider the bilateral trade agreements that U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull concluded in the 1930s to have differed significantly from those of Hjalmar Schacht, the architect of Nazi Germany's economic order. The Hullean kind was intended to produce an expansion of open and largely nondiscriminatory trade relations, and so are deemed to have been compatible with multilateralism. In contrast, Schacht sought to create exclusive and discriminatory trading blocs built up from bilateral deals none of which held for any other party or under any other circumstances except those for which they were negotiated or on which they were imposed. The Schachtian scheme, therefore, was antithetical to multilateralism.[12] Similarly, Bismarck's League of the Three Emperors of 1873 was a traditional alliance, unrelated to multilateral organizing principles, despite having had three members. But Franklin Roosevelt's concept for a postwar security order may be termed multilateral because, as the historian Warren Kimball has noted, the president wanted to avoid "old-fashioned, exclusive spheres-of-influence/power-politics relationships, by which he meant both Metternichian coalitions against change and geopolitical Bismarckian alliances."[13]

A second source of ambiguity attending the concept of multilateralism is that, as with any set of principles, its pure form expresses aspirations, not specific commitments and detailed blueprints for action. Consequently, there is constant questioning by critics of how "real" the principles are in the first place. For example, the League of Nations' collective security provisions are closely associated with Woodrow Wilson. Contrary to subsequent caricatures, however, Wilson had no illusion about their feasibility in the short run. In a revealing letter to Colonel Edward House written in March 1918 he stated:

[11] See Richard N. Gardner, *Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy* (Oxford, England: The Clarendon Press, 1956), chap. 1.

[12] See William Diebold, Jr., "The History of the Issues" in Diebold, ed., *Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Canada in U.S. Trade Policy* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1988).

[13] Warren F. Kimball, *The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 104.

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> My own conviction, as you know, is that the administrative constitution of the League must *grow* and not be made; that we must *begin* with solemn covenants . . . but that the methods of carrying those mutual pledges out should be left to develop of itself, case by case. . . . The United States Senate would never ratify any treaty which put the force of the United States at the disposal of any such group or body. Why begin at the impossible end when there is a possible end and it is feasible to plant a system which will slowly but surely ripen into fruition?[14]

Events would prove, of course, that Wilson's strategy turned out to be a recipe for defeat. It gave adversaries license to attribute worst case scenarios to the proposed League while providing supporters with little to go on beyond his promise and oratory and while satisfying the practical security needs of no one. Yet, a roughly analogous approach has characterized America's commitment to the principles of national self-determination and universal human rights. Most observers would agree that U.S. commitment to these principles has been "real," even though it has not determined actual behavior on every occasion.

A third source of ambiguity is that both the substantive policy agenda as well as the rhetoric of multilateralism have shifted over time, as policy makers have learned from past mistakes or simply seek to defuse political criticism. The interwar period produced several key substantive lessons. Isolationism and protectionism were both construed as public "bads" to be avoided in the future. But so too was the League of Nations. Indeed, according to one recent study of the Dumbarton Oaks conference, where the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China devised plans for the United Nations, "so fully was the League perceived to have failed . . . that its main role in the planning for the conference—as, indeed, at the conference itself—was to serve as an example of what the new organization ought not to do."[15] In short, the substantive meaning of multilateralism in the context of universal security organizations changed to reflect historical experience.

Rhetorically, the term multilateralism has never had much appeal in political circles to describe security relations. After World War II, collective security was the politically correct locution from 1945 into the Eisenhower years—though it always meant arrangements far looser than a pure collective security system, and as invoked by John Foster

[14] Cited in Thomas J. Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 149. (Emphases in original.)

[15] Robert C. Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 1.

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Dulles to describe the "pactomania" of the 1950s, it was largely verbal window-dressing. The Clinton administration was unusual by arriving in office as self-proclaimed multilateralists, even in security affairs. But after bruising accusations of having "sub-contracted" American foreign policy to the United Nations in Somalia, its UN ambassador sought quickly to jettison the term: "Multilateralism is a word for policy wonks," she declared, "so let's not use it anymore."[16] The current euphemism of choice appears to be cooperative security.

A final source of ambiguity in using the concept of multilateralism is that it can refer both to the overall order of relations among countries in the manner described above and also to specific organizations that are active within them. The United States throughout this century has helped to establish numerous multilateral organizations, beginning with the League of Nations and the International Labor Organization in 1919, and the United Nations in 1945. Membership in these organizations, almost by definition, constrains unilateral degrees of freedom to some extent and over some range of issues. But rarely if ever has America's multilateral world order agenda included endowing formal multilateral organizations with significant independent powers. Woodrow Wilson's ultimate hopes for the League may have come closest. Franklin Roosevelt harbored no such desires for the United Nations. George Bush used the United Nations effectively to build consensus and legitimacy prior to the war against Iraq, but actual military operations in the Gulf war remained under U.S. command. The Clinton administration tried to assign certain coercive peacemaking efforts to the United Nations but scaled back its objectives with alacrity when the UN proved unprepared and domestic support faltered.

Moreover, within the multilateral organizations that have mattered, the United States has always sought to protect its interests. Thus, it insisted on a veto in the United Nations Security Council every bit as much as the Soviets did. Voting in the major international financial institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank—was and remains weighted, with the United States still having the largest single share. The GATT has barely existed as a formal organization, though it is expected, at long last, soon to be folded into a World Trade Organization. And the "O" in NATO is a forum, a secretariat, and a U.S. dominated military command structure, not

[16] Madeleine K. Albright on the *MacNeil-Lehrer Newshour*, 30 August 1993. The most consistent line of criticism has come, not surprisingly, from unilateralists: see, for example, William Safire, "The U.N. Entraps Clinton," *New York Times*, 30 August 1993; and "Clinton on Carrots and Sticks" with the subtitle "Hello, multi; farewell, uni," *New York Times*, 20 September 1993.

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an autonomous body providing security to its members. None of this should occasion surprise, given the preponderance of power the United States has wielded throughout this century. Smaller countries, such as Canada or Denmark, and to some extent even a larger but poorer country like India, identify multilateralism much more closely with creating strong multilateral organizations. Constituencies holding that view have existed in the United States, but they have never been in a position to shape U.S. policy.

Thus, the American vision as to what constitutes a desirable world order has been clear and consistent, and it embodies certain key multilateral principles: movement toward greater openness, greater nondiscrimination of treatment, and more extensive opportunities to realize joint gains. It does not include endowing multilateral organizations with extensive autonomy. The Wilsonian variant was potentially the most far-reaching but also the most problematical. The post-1945 version was more realistic—which is to say that its transformational aspirations, while not abandoned, were informed by a greater appreciation of the realities of extant international politics—and also more successful. The final shape—and the fate—of the reemergence of this agenda after the cold war remains to be determined.

At the same time, it is also the case that this world order agenda has been consistently contested. The debate frequently has been characterized as a titanic struggle between the forces of internationalism and isolationism. That depiction may be rhetorically useful for the multilateralist cause, but it is not entirely accurate. Even in 1919 the so-called irreconcilables in the United States Senate who opposed League membership were small in number, and they could not have prevailed on their own. By 1944, with the nomination of Thomas E. Dewey, the presidential wing of the Republican party had moved firmly into the internationalist camp; the congressional wing followed suit when it took control of the Senate in 1946, elevating Arthur Vandenberg to the chairmanship of the important Foreign Relations committee. Today, it is nearly impossible, beyond the confines of a quirky think tank or two, to find any influential source of outright isolationism.

Instead, the major opposition to multilateralism all along has come from two related and sometimes identical groups. The first is comprised of policy makers and analysts of the realist persuasion. The second may be termed unilateralists. Both reject categorically the communitarian streak that is inherent in multilateralism.

The tradition of *realpolitik* views international relations as an unchanging and never-ending quest for power and advantage, making balance-of-power politics the only viable institutional response. Realism

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is interest-driven, and interests ultimately are defined by threats to national security. Realism's primary objection to the multilateralist world order vision is precisely the latter's more principled and aspirational basis for organizing international relations, which it views as hopelessly – and dangerously – naive. For their part, unilateralists dislike American participation in multilateral arrangements, because they consider them to be unnecessary constraints on America's degrees of freedom. Such arrangements, unilateralists believe, could make it impossible for the United States to act when it should, or they could compel the United States to act when its own cost-benefit calculus dictates that it should not. Variants or combinations of these views have been held by such influential figures as Henry Cabot Lodge, Republican of Massachusetts, who led the Senate fight against the League of Nations; George Kennan, a chief architect of the postwar policy of containment, who not only objected to the United Nations but also to NATO on the grounds that they entailed "legalistic" as opposed to what he called "a particularized" approach to security commitments; former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in his criticisms of both the Bush and Clinton administrations' flirtations with multilateral involvements; and current Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole, author of the proposed "peace powers act," which would severely restrict U.S. military and financial participation in United Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking operations.

Given this weighty opposition, the resilience of the multilateral world order agenda across three defining international moments in this century makes even more perplexing what is already a very puzzling question: Why this and not some other set of architectural principles?

Novus Ordo Seclorum

One possible explanation is simply that the United States has been a world power throughout the twentieth century and thus has had both worldwide interests and capabilities. As a leading theorist of *realpolitik* has written, "England claimed to bear the white man's burden; France spoke of her *mission civilisatrice.* In like spirit, we [the United States] say that we act to make and maintain world order. . . . For countries at the top, this is predictable behavior."[17] In other words, America's world order agenda is merely the velvet glove cloaking its iron fist of power.

[17] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 200.

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At some level that answer is surely correct. Without a preponderance of power the United States would have had neither the inclination nor the capability to try to shape the international system. But to the extent it is possible to know such things, other leading powers would have pursued very different world order designs. Had either Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union ended up as the world's hegemon after World War II, for instance, there is no indication that their intentions included creating anything remotely like the international order that came to prevail. Politically, Germany's "new order" consisted of an imperial design. Economically, the Nazi scheme of bilateralist, tributary, and state-controlled trade pacts and monetary clearing arrangements no doubt would have been extended geographically to complement its political objectives. The Soviet Union presumably would have extended its political control through a restored Comintern, while instituting administered economic relations among its subject economies. Indeed, even if Britain had become the hegemon, things would have differed in some respects. Colonialism as a political institution would have continued longer. And while monetary relations probably would have been organized similarly, simply based on sterling instead of the dollar, British imperial preferences would have remained a central feature in international trade, possibly forcing others to carve out discriminatory trading blocs for themselves. Finally, Europe certainly would have been integrated by a German or a Soviet imperium, but in a very different fashion than exists via the European Union today. In a British-run system, Europe most probably would have returned to prewar multipolarity and the continued existence of separate national economies.

Thus, the fact that the United States, as the leading world power, has had world-wide interests and capabilities may explain that it has pursued outward impulses, but it tells us nothing about the institutional form those impulses have taken. We still require an explanation of why this particular leading power did things in this particular way.

Another possible explanation holds that the American political reform agenda abroad has simply been a natural by-product of corresponding agendas at home. The domestic roots of Woodrow Wilson's international program have long been explored by historians. Emphases differ, but they are not incompatible. The more conventional interpretation stresses Wilson's academic and practical interests in constitutional government and public administration, producing a legal/institutional platform of rational governance in domestic and interna-

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tional affairs alike.[18] A more recent study depicts Wilson's "new diplomacy" as an outgrowth of his commitment to progressive politics and social justice at home.[19] Similarly, there is little dispute that some of Franklin Roosevelt's international initiatives sought to give expression to the socioeconomic objectives as well as the administrative and legal instrumentalities associated with the New Deal.[20]

This explanation is plausible for the economic and social realms, where, indeed, it is reinforced by changes in the structure of the American economy after the turn of the century. The United States was becoming the world's leading economy. The New York financial sector, as well as some sectors of manufacturers in the Northeast and Midwest, were becoming increasingly internationally oriented, as the cotton-exporting South had been for some time. Accordingly, sociopolitical coalitional possibilities changed, creating both pressure and opportunities for new foreign policy postures.[21]

But it is not clear how this explanation accounts for U.S. multilateral initiatives in the security sphere. Why would a system of bilateral alliances have been incompatible with Wilson's domestic progressive politics? Why would the desire to create an international economic and social context that was consistent with the New Deal have led FDR to abandon the regional "four policemen" scheme—wherein the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China would each take primary responsibility for their respective spheres—that he initially preferred for the postwar security order in favor of a universal security organization?

Wilson may have been ideologically predisposed against bilateral alliances, favoring collective security on principled grounds. But they were "American principles," he assured the Senate in a 1917 speech, and his audience gave him a rousing ovation.[22] Roosevelt was more

[18] See, for example, Lloyd E. Ambrosius, *Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and, by the same author, *Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1991).

[19] Knock, *To End All Wars.*

[20] On the economic side, see Michael J. Hogan, "Revival and Reform: America's Twentieth-Century Search for a New Economic Order Abroad," *Diplomatic History* 8 (Fall 1984); and on the administrative/legal dimension, Anne-Marie Burley, "Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the Projection of the New Deal Regulatory State" in Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters.*

[21] See Jeff Frieden, "Sectoral Conflicts and U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1914–1940," *International Organization* 42 (Winter 1988).

[22] Cited in Knock, *To End All Wars*, 113.

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instrumental in this as in other matters. He dropped the regional approach because he feared that it might be used by Congress and the public at large as a pretext for America to shirk responsibility beyond its own hemisphere. He wanted above all to keep the United States involved, especially in Europe. Roosevelt surmised, as he explained to Anthony Eden in the spring of 1943, that "the only appeal which would be likely to carry weight with the United States public . . . would be one based upon a world-wide conception."[23] In short, even Roosevelt, for whom interest-based power politics were not personally abhorrent, felt the need to identify a set of loftier principles to secure domestic support for sustained engagement by the United States in international security affairs.

The question still remains, however, why would Wilson and FDR have thought that a multilateral world order vision was capable of playing that role? Wilson sought to build on, and Roosevelt believed it was necessary to find a way around, the long-standing American aversion to "entangling alliances." Because the United States is blessed by geographic isolation and an abundance of natural wealth, the traditional national interest calculus, so common in the more densely configured European international politics, had limited appeal to the American public—until it was too late and the United States was dragged into a war it had done little to prevent. The beliefs Wilson and Roosevelt drew upon instead were as old as the republic itself and as American as the one-dollar bill—on which is inscribed the Latin phrase *novus ordo seclorum*, a new order for the ages.[24]

A multilateral world order vision is singularly compatible with America's own collective self-concept. Indeed, the vision taps into the very idea of America itself. "Americans have always thought that their founding was special," the political theorist Tracy Strong reminds us, "and central to being an American."[25] To be British, or French, or Japanese typically is considered a matter of birth, not choice. In contrast, anyone can become an American. For that to be possible, however, the American sense of community necessarily entails, in Strong's

[23] Cited in Kimball, *The Juggler*, 96. Also see Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 434–435, 439, 508.

[24] The classic treatment of the origins of this problem in U.S. foreign policy remains Felix Gilbert, *To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961).

[25] Tracy B. Strong, "Taking the Rank with What is Ours: American Political Thought, Foreign Policy, and Questions of Rights" in Paula R. Newberg, ed., *The Politics of Human Rights* (New York: New York University Press, 1980), 34.

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words, "a universal or general foundation open in principle to everyone."[26] In short, America views itself as a willful community—"making a new nation out of literally any old nation that comes along," as G. K. Chesterton once remarked[27]—formed by the act of choice and premised on a universal organizing principle.

America's multilateralist agenda reflects the analogous idea: the willed formation of an international community based on "a universal or general foundation open in principle to everyone." Thus, in their institutional impetus, the twentieth century drives by the United States to remake the world—whether under the rubric of Wilson's Fourteen Points or Roosevelt's Four Freedoms—were logical extensions of America's sense of the nature of its own community. For Wilson and Roosevelt alike, the vision of a multilateral world order provided the evocative vocabulary and justificatory ideas without which they found it difficult to imagine that the United States, a continental and largely self-sufficient power, would engage in any sustained international efforts beyond those commercial or humanitarian in nature. International political involvement in the pursuit of principles which the United States was constituted to embody offered the most viable solution.

On a related plane, the pursuit of multilateral principles abroad also has had direct appeal to the more prosaic politics of ethnicity in America. As an astute political scientist has noted, "multilateralism favored everybody's homeland."[28] This feature became very useful after World War II, when the United States dispensed substantial economic and security assistance abroad, especially in Europe. The domestic ethnic politics of country-by-country allocations of aid and security guarantees at best would have been exceedingly complex and at worst highly divisive. As it was, a multilateral approach through the Marshall Plan and NATO made it possible to assist Europe as a whole—except where the Soviets would not permit it. That had the effect of transforming the domestic politics of particularistic ethnic preferences into more of a median voter issue, thereby avoiding interethnic rivalry and enhancing bipartisan support for the policy.

The close link between the foundational principle of America's sense of community and its multilateral approach to world order also helps

[26] Ibid., 50. Also see David Rieff, "A Global Culture?" *World Policy Journal* 10 (Winter 1993/94): 78, who draws a distinction between the "organic specificity" of, say, French, or Japanese culture and the "inorganic quality of the American cultural mix."

[27] Cited in Strong, "Taking the Rank," 50.

[28] Peter F. Cowhey, "Elect Locally—Order Globally: Domestic Politics and Multilateral Cooperation" in Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters*, 169.

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to account for the depths of the ideological antipathy and competition between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war. This was no mere geopolitical conflict conducted in accord with the dictates of power balancing. The Soviet Union challenged not only American interests but also America's collective sense of self. The Soviet Union no less than the United States claimed to embody universal rights. But the two views of rights were, of course, mutually exclusive, as were the world order designs they entailed. The contest had already begun in 1919. The Communist International was formed just before the opening of the Versailles peace conference, which was to draft the Covenant of the League of Nations. Adopting a manifesto addressed "To the Proletarians of the Whole World," the Bolshevik gathering denounced bourgeois democracy and parliamentarianism, defended the dictatorship of the proletariat, and, perhaps most importantly, constituted itself as the institutional vehicle toward what Lenin described as "the international republic of Soviets"—the Soviet version of world order.[29] Little came of this challenge in the interwar period, because the Soviet Union lacked the power to project its vision abroad. By 1947, however, the challenge, even if exaggerated, was real enough.[30]

When the outbreak of the cold war marginalized the security role of the United Nations and thwarted Roosevelt's attempted strategy of securing sustained U.S. involvement in world affairs through a universal security organization, Harry Truman soon discovered that it also provided an even more effective substitute. By invoking the communist menace, the Truman Doctrine, *Newsweek* wrote at the time, "had clearly put America into power politics to stay."[31] It even facilitated institutionalized U.S. involvement in Europe, which Roose-

[29] Edward Hallett Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, vol. 3 (New York: Macmillan, 1953), 123–125. Arno J. Mayer goes too far, however, in reading 1919 through the lenses of post-1945 cold war politics when he claims that "the allies drafted the charters of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the League of Nations with a view to immunizing the non-Bolshevik Left against the bacillus of the Bolshevik Revolution." See his *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918–1919* (New York: Knopf, 1967), 9. Knock's study, *To End All Wars*, shows that "the Bolsheviks played a primary role only insofar as the timing of the Fourteen Points was concerned" (p. 145), not in regard to their substance.

[30] The new standard work on the Soviet threat in the early postwar years and U.S. perceptions of it is Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992).

[31] Cited in David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 549. See also Thomas G. Paterson, *Meeting the Communist Threat* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), chaps. 1–5.

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velt feared would prove elusive. At the same time, that European involvement took on a peculiarly American form: not the old-fashioned system of bilateral alliances with the several West European countries favored by some realists, nor even the "dumb-bell" model favored by others, with the United States and Canada on the one side, Western Europe on the other, and Great Britain linking the two. Instead, it assumed the form of an imagined yet indivisible North Atlantic security community in which an attack on one would be considered an attack on all—which, of course, is *the* core element of collective security.

Perhaps no requiem for the cold war was more poignant, therefore, than the embrace of neo-Wilsonian constructs by the last Soviet President, Mikhail Gorbachev. Speaking at Stanford University in May 1990, he seemed to paraphrase Wilson's "Peace Without Victory" speech to the U.S. Senate in January 1917:

> I'm convinced that we stand on the threshold of revising the concept of alliance building. Until now, alliances have been built on a selective, and in fact discriminatory, basis. They were based on setting countries against each other. . . . But we are approaching a time when the very principle of alliance-building should become different. It should mean unity to create conditions for a life worthy of a human being.[32]

This was an especially graceful concession speech, signaling not merely a tactical retreat but the end of the cold war, because it endorsed the adversary's world order vision as valid common aspirational principles for the future.

The Third Try?

The central problem that faced U.S. foreign policy makers in 1919 and 1945 once again has become problematical: devising an overall strategic rationale to ensure continuous and active international engagement by the United States. Notwithstanding criticisms by both realists and unilateralists, multilateralism is likely to figure promi-

[32] "Gorbachev at Stanford: Excerpts from Address," *New York Times*, 5 June 1990. In his 1917 speech, Wilson had said: "I am proposing . . . that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. . . . When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection." Cited in Ambrosius, *Wilsonian Statecraft*, 80.

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nently in American foreign policy for the foreseeable future. This is due to at least four sets of reasons.

The first is simply the law of institutional inertia. There are now so many multilateral arrangements in place that multilateral issues are sure to remain on the American foreign policy agenda. The United Nations exists, as does NATO, the GATT, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and numerous other such bodies. Even if they were to accomplish little else, the domestic and international bureaucracies associated with these entities can be counted on to try and adapt them to new circumstances—as in the slogan designed to egg on NATO, "out of area, or out of business."

In many instances, however, considerably more than inertia is at work: the East European countries actively clamor for access to NATO and the European Union; all of the former centrally planned economies wish to be accommodated within the global multilateral trade and financial arrangements; the demand for peacekeeping services remains high, despite setbacks in Somalia and irresolute intervention in Bosnia; the world economy is more integrated than ever, requiring new rules of conduct; issues of global ecology continue to pose risks and surprises, requiring new forms of collaboration. The United States has interests in advancing the cause of multilateralism in several if not all of these areas.

Moreover, as the United States scales back its own global military commitments, it will try to persuade others to provide for more of their own security. So as to contain future intraregional conflicts, however, that effort is likely to involve multilateral arrangements wherever possible. Indeed, when U.S.-UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright sought to rid her administration of the political burden of multilateralist rhetoric, she proposed: "Let's call it burdensharing." In Europe this would have the effect of deepening and extending regional defense cooperation. In the Asia-Pacific region it could introduce it for the first time.

The final factor favoring variants of multilateralism as a key element of U.S. foreign policy after the cold war is the most intangible, but ultimately it may prove the most decisive: the evolving American sense of community itself. The American body politic is very different from what it was fifty years ago. Congress is more decentralized and also more actively involved in the foreign policy process. The role of "wise men" in foreign policy making has declined, and grassroots involvement in innumerable foreign policy issues has become the norm. Amer-

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ican society has become ethnically even more diverse than in the past, increasingly tugging in the direction of Latin America and Asia, not only Europe. The postwar social compact between state and society in America, which originated in the New Deal and which we might loosely term welfare capitalism, has become frayed. Finally, in some parts of the American community, the politics of accommodating differences stands challenged by a politics of difference.

No one yet fully understands the significance of these fragmenting tendencies for American domestic society, let alone for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. But it is hard to imagine that they will coalesce around some "organic specificity" as the basis for a future American collective identity.[33] If anything, they are more likely to reinforce the "inorganic" and willed quality of the American community, based on "a universal or general foundation open in principle to everyone." It seems inescapable, therefore, that the corresponding American tradition that shaped this nation's multilateral world order impulses in 1919 and 1945 will continue to resonate into the future.

Conclusion

America has never been and is not now a relative equal on a continent densely populated by potential adversaries—the European context for which balance-of-power theory and the principle of *raison d'état* were first invented. Therefore, ensuring sustained American involvement abroad, especially in security relations, has always been a more complicated affair than it is for most other countries. Wilson and Roosevelt sought to deal with the problem by framing the national interest within a world order vision that drew upon America's own sense of community. The problem was attenuated for Truman, not only by the Soviet military threat, but also because the anticommunist ideological impulse drew upon that same sense of community. This ideational and aspirational dimension is missing almost entirely from today's debates about American foreign policy after the cold war. So dominant are the interest-driven discourse of realism and the triumphalist discourse of unilateralism that even to raise it risks being dismissed as a neo-Wilsonian idealist.[34]

[33] Rieff, "A Global Culture?"

[34] See, for example, Robert W. Tucker, "The Triumph of Wilsonianism?" *World Policy Journal* 10 (Winter 1993/94).

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But the issue has little to do with idealism. Of course, America must define anew its vital interests. But for a power so great as the United States, interests are rarely determined by situational exigencies alone. More often than not, America enjoys the luxury of defining the content of its interests and deciding how best to pursue them. In the post-cold war world as before, Americans' sense of who they are and what kind of world they aspire to will shape the choice of ends and means. Max Weber expressed this relationship well: "very frequently," he wrote, "the 'world images' that have been created by 'ideas' have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest."[35]

It is no minor irony that Henry Kissinger, the dominant American figure in the pantheon of *realpolitik*, concedes this position in his recently published *magnum opus*. "In traveling along the road to world order for the third time in the modern era," he concludes, what he (mistakenly) calls American idealism "remains as essential as ever, perhaps even more so."[36] By idealism Kissinger intends to convey the animating force of the distinctly American communitarian tradition, grounded in the American experience itself, which I have described in this article. The critical task for foreign policy analysts and practitioners alike, therefore, is to adapt this tradition to the new international landscape. Only through such a combination can we hope, in Kissinger's words, "to bring about a usable definition of American interests."[37]*

[35] Cited in Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 280.

[36] Henry A. Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 834. By depicting this tradition as "idealism," Kissinger perpetuates a myth that was problematical even in 1919. According to the author of a joint biography of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson—whose positions Kissinger characterizes as "the hinge" of twentieth century American foreign policy—"categorizing Roosevelt as a realist and Wilson as an idealist is a half-truth. In domestic affairs the two men professed to reverse these positions; in foreign affairs, they were by no means polar opposites. In both realms Roosevelt continually proclaimed himself an idealist, appealed in even more exalted terms than Wilson to transcendent values, and scorned Wilson as the opposite of idealistic—as narrow, timid, and selfish. In both realms Wilson extolled what he called 'expediency,' argued for patience and caution, and rejected Roosevelt's approach as wrong-headedly and excessively idealistic—as quixotic and deluded." John Milton Cooper, *The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), xiv.

[37] Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 834.

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The Future of the House Republicans

WILLIAM F. CONNELLY, JR.
JOHN J. PITNEY, JR.

With each passing day, House Republicans are setting a new record. Between Abraham Lincoln and Dwight Eisenhower, neither party had ever served in the minority in the House for more than sixteen years at a time. But since losing a short-lived majority in the 1954 midterm, House Republicans have served in the minority for forty years. This unprecedented time in the wilderness has some remarkable features. Of 256 House Democrats, only three have ever served in the minority: Jamie Whitten (Mississippi), Jack Brooks (Texas), and Sidney Yates (Illinois). (Whitten is retiring in 1994.) Of 178 House Republicans, not one has ever served in the majority. Twenty-seven current members—thirteen Republicans and fourteen Democrats—had not even been born when the GOP last had a majority.

Despite this unique situation, political scientists have paid scant attention to the House GOP. We analyze how House Republicans are coping with their permanent minority status in light of the changing circumstances of the mid-1990s. We ask:

- In the 103rd Congress, how do the new Republicans compare with their seniors? How do the parties differ? Have relations between the parties improved or worsened?

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- Is the strategic environment for the midterm election—institutions, interests, individuals, and ideas—moving in the GOP's favor?
- What are the possible outcomes of the 1994 election? How would Republicans and Democrats react under different scenarios?
- What would House Republicans do if they won control of the House?

Until recently, the last question would have sounded odd. Since the election of 1958, the House Republicans have never even come within twenty-six seats of a majority; and in the wake of the 1992 election, many analysts foresaw more woes for the GOP. Lately, however, estimates of GOP midterm gains have been moving upward; and given the right constellation of forces, Republicans could win a majority within the next few elections.

This change would bring significant consequences. Obviously, Republican leaders and committee chairs would employ the House's majoritarian structure in support of different policy goals than the Democrats. And just as important, a shift in control might affect the lawmakers themselves. House Republicans have had no experience in chairing legislative committees or running the chamber's business; and according to House Democrats, they have become irresponsible. House Democrats have never had to serve in the minority; and according to House Republicans, they have become arrogant and dismissive of minority rights. Partisan animosity has grown deep and bitter, to the detriment of Congress. The institution might benefit if each side had experience both with the responsibility of governing and the burden of serving in the minority.

The 103rd Congress: Fact and Fiction

Before looking at the future, we need to correct some misconceptions about House Republicans in the current Congress. The first is that the GOP abruptly bolted to the right in 1993. When organizing for the 103rd Congress, House Republicans narrowly chose fiery challenger Dick Armey (Texas) over low-key incumbent Jerry Lewis (California) for the post of conference chairman. According to press reports, most of the forty-seven GOP freshmen backed Armey and thus gave him his victory margin. Late in 1993, the freshmen also helped Newt Gingrich (Georgia) secure enough commitments to ensure his election as the next GOP leader. Without question, the newcomers tended to favor the activist, confrontational tactics long championed

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TABLE 1

Republican Ideological Divisions in the House of Representatives, 1969–1993

Conservative Coalition Support Score	*1969*	*1979*	*1989*	*1991*	*1993*
85–100%	89 (47%)	104 (65%)	126 (76%)	130 (78%)	126 (72%)
70–84%	42 (22%)	31 (19%)	33 (20%)	23 (14%)	30 (17%)
55–69%	25 (13%)	9 (6%)	7 (4%)	11 (7%)	16 (9%)
Under 55%	33 (17%)	15 (9%)	10 (6%)	2 (1%)	3 (2%)
Total	189	159	176	166	175

The data come from *Congressional Quarterly*'s Conservative Coalition support scores. They have been normalized to take account of absences. That is, normalized scores equal support scores divided by the sum of support and opposition scores. Because of this normalization, the data and categories differ slightly from those used in earlier studies. Total numbers of GOP members differ slightly from other tables because these figures are based on membership at the *end* of each year.

by Armey and Gingrich. They wanted their leaders to mount a vigorous opposition to the Clinton agenda and to fight the House Democrats' procedural maneuvers.

They did not, however, transform the GOP's ideological makeup. The old "Rockefeller wing" had withered long ago; even "moderate" GOP figures such as Lewis and Minority Leader Bob Michel had staunchly conservative voting records.[1] Measured by *Congressional Quarterly*'s conservative coalition support scores (Table 1), the House Republicans' rightward shift was largely complete by the late 1980s: they were no more conservative in 1993 than in 1991.

A breakdown by seniority (Table 2) adds further detail. On social issues such as abortion and gay rights, the freshmen resembled members elected between 1980 and 1991; and they were only slightly more conservative on economic and foreign policy issues. The most senior House Republicans—those who first took office before the Reagan victory of 1980—were less conservative than the other two groups, but only by a small margin.

The second misconception is that the "monolithic" House Republicans show far more unity than the "unruly" Democrats. Notwithstanding a few issues such as the North American Free Trade

[1] Nicol Rae, *The Decline and Fall of the Liberal Republicans: From 1952 to the Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), esp. chap. 5; William F. Connelly, Jr. and John J. Pitney, Jr., *Congress' Permanent Minority? Republicans in the US House* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994), 59.

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TABLE 2

Ideology and Seniority Among House Republicans in 1993

	Year of Election		
	1992+	*1980–1991*	*Before 1980*
Mean scores	N = 48	N = 97	N = 30
CQ Conservative Coalition	89.2	87.2	84.6
NJ Economic Conservatism	88.3	86.6	86.2
NJ Social Conservatism	77.1	77.4	73.8
NJ Foreign Policy Conservatism	76.9	74.0	70.9

Sources: *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 18 December 1993, 3486–3487; *National Journal*, 22 January 1994, 180–189 (with corrections published on 29 January). The figures in the first column include Representative Rob Portman of Ohio, who won a 1993 special election to fill the seat vacated by Willis Gradison.

Agreement, the data belie this notion. In every year since 1982, the House Democrats' average party-unity score has exceeded that of the Republicans.[2] In 1993, 41 percent of House Democrats had party-unity scores of 95 or higher, compared with only 27 percent of Republicans.

As David Rohde has explained, the Democrats' relative unity has resulted in part from the departure of conservative white Southerners, together with the influx of African-Americans and Latinos, who show great loyalty on roll calls.[3] The rules of the game also help the majority party. Since the early 1980s, the Democrats have increasingly used restrictive rules to structure floor debates. To be sure, many restrictive rules have served merely to lubricate House business, but many others have had partisan purposes. By carefully deciding which amendments may reach the floor and which will languish, a majority can ensure that roll calls maximize its own unity and disrupt the minority.

Whereas minority-party leaders have little practical leverage over their followers, the majority leadership can employ powerful incentives to get its way. In the case of the 1993 reconciliation vote, *Congressional Quarterly* reported that when sweet reason fell short, "loyalists turned to hardball and threatened some senior members with loss of their committee or subcommittee chairmanships if they voted against the plan."[4] Democrats showed more unity over the Clinton plan (85 percent

[2] Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin, *Vital Statistics on Congress 1993–1994* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1994), 202; *CQ Weekly Report*, 18 December 1993, 3482–3483. Scores are normalized to eliminate the effect of absences.

[3] David W. Rohde, *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), chap. 3.

[4] George Hager and David S. Cloud, "Democrats Pull Off Squeaker In Approving Clinton Plan," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 29 May 1993, 1341.

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voting in favor) than Republicans showed over the alternative offer by John Kasich (77 percent voting in favor).

A third misconception, albeit one that is losing adherents, holds that "change-oriented" freshman Democrats will readily join with Republicans to break the status quo. But the Democratic class of 1992 has been extraordinarily loyal, with an average party unity score of 92 percent, compared with 89 percent for all House Democrats.[5] In spite of a few exceptions (for example, the controversy over the discharge petition), the majority party's freshmen have stood behind their leaders on procedural issues. Consequently, House Republicans have failed in their efforts to reduce the number of restrictive rules and to strengthen the modest recommendations of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress.

Together with the loss of the White House, the Democrats' continued strength has proved a great source of frustration for the House Republicans. Though they have not always agreed on what they support, they do know what they oppose—and they have largely been unable to stop it. Nevertheless, their morale is currently soaring because they believe, as Armey put it, "Political conditions are breaking in our favor."[6]

The 1994 Election: The Strategic Setting

As the 1994 election approaches, President Bill Clinton's troubles give hope to the House Republicans. Yet they still must grapple with their "permanent minority" dilemma, which rivals a Rubik's Cube in its complexity. Indeed, the Rubik's Cube provides a useful metaphor for sorting out the reasons behind the House Republicans' electoral fate.[7]

Rubik's Cube is a baffling three-dimensional puzzle. The challenge is to align all similarly colored squares on the same sides of the cube. Puzzlers frequently find that just when they have twisted the cube to get one side all of a single color, they have also simultaneously jumbled the remaining colors and sides. The House GOP's quandary is similarly perplexing. The Rubik's Cube metaphor enables us to sort through

[5] Kitty Cunningham, "With Democrat in White House, Partisanship Hits New High," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 18 December 1993, 3432–3434.

[6] Richard E. Cohen, "On the Edge," *National Journal*, 4 December 1993, 2888.

[7] Chapter 5 of our *Congress' Permanent Minority?* offers a more complete application of Rubik's Cube. We use the term "metaphor" rather than "model" in order to avoid any suggestion that our Rubik's Cube analysis is wholly comprehensive or predictive.

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the major elements House Republicans must consider when attempting to solve their forty-year puzzle. The roles of interests, institutions, and ideas correspond to the cube's three dimensions, and the actions of individuals constitute the hands twisting the cube.[8] Let us examine each element in the context of the 1994 election.

Interests

For our purposes, "interests" comprise the range of social and economic conditions underpinning American politics. Over time, the increasing complexity of American society and the proliferation of organized interests also affect the political marketplace.[9]

The current health care debate provides a case in point. The plethora of organized interests involved in health care has resulted from the growth of government and the fragmentation of interests in the health care. Democrats, as "the party of government" and the party of special interests, have benefited accordingly: in recent elections, they have reaped the great majority of health-related PAC contributions.[10] In the crucial midterm campaign, powerful House Democrats will forcefully remind these groups that the majority party controls their fate.

On the other hand, the proposed reforms could cause many interests to suffer. Under these conditions, the GOP's anti-government public philosophy may be helping it recruit congressional candidates. For example, about two-thirds of the three dozen physicians running for the House this year are Republicans.[11] And small-business interests that were once willing to give a look to the New Democrats are now vehemently opposing Clinton-style reforms. Health care may be bringing Main Street back to the GOP.

Such a development would be helpful, but not sufficient: a minority party must broaden its base. The politics of ethnicity thus poses special challenges for Republicans in the 1990s, because they have won only a small fraction of the black and Latino vote. Democrats currently

[8] If the definition of "environment" includes interests and ideas, then our metaphor has much in common with the models explained in Christopher J. Deering, *Congressional Politics* (Chicago: Dorsey, 1989); Barbara Sinclair, *Transformation of the U.S. Senate* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

[9] Johanthan Rauch documents the proliferation of interest groups in *Demosclerosis* (New York: Random House/Times Books, 1984), chap. 3.

[10] Larry Makinson, *Open Secrets: The Cash Constituents of Congress* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1992), 72–73.

[11] "Doctor-Candidates Say They Can Cure the Country's Ills," Associated Press, 16 May 1994.

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hold sixty-one of the sixty-five "majority-minority" districts, meaning that Republicans would have to win 58 percent of the remaining seats in order to control the House.[12] Republican Congressman Tom Bliley (R-Virginia) offers a lesson for his colleagues:

> Most Republicans abandoned the black vote, which was not very smart politically. An important rule in politics is never concede anything to your opponent, even if only to force him to protect his base. Besides, we need to represent all constituents. We should look at it as a long-term investment, even if we have little success with some groups during the first or second election.[13]

Most Republican politicians are committed to conservative positions on social issues, so it is a delicate task to woo ethnic-minority groups without alienating the GOP base. They must oppose quotas while supporting vigorous legal protection of equal opportunity.[14] They must support action against illegal immigration without offending naturalized citizens.

The politics of religion also concerns the GOP. The party cannot afford to neglect white evangelical or fundamentalist Christians who constituted 17 percent of the electorate in 1992, especially since they gave 66 percent of their vote to House Republican candidates.[15] Republicans may make major southern inroads this fall, in part because of support among religious conservatives. But polls yield a mixed picture of the religious right's overall political impact. According to a recent CBS/*New York Times* poll, 42 percent of Republicans said that the religious right would divide their party, compared with 34 percent who said that it would strengthen the GOP.[16] An NBC News/*Wall Street Journal* poll showed 27 percent of respondents less likely to vote for candidates associated with the religious right, compared with 16 percent more likely; at the same time, a *Los Angeles Times* poll showed that by margin of 38 percent to 12 percent, respondents thought that liberal feminists and gay activists are "the greater danger to society" than conservative religious/political groups.[17]

[12] "Majority-minority" districts are defined here as those where less than 50 percent of the population is non-Hispanic white. The definition includes the two Hawaii districts, which are majority Asian-American.

[13] Connelly and Pitney, *Congress' Permanent Minority?* 147.

[14] See Adam Meyerson, "Manna 2 Society: The Growing Conservatism of Black America," *Policy Review* 68 (Spring 1994): 4–8; and Meyerson's exchange with David Bositis and Peter Signorelli, *Policy Review* 69 (Summer 1994): 87–92.

[15] VRS (Voter Research and Surveys) release, general election, 3 November 1992.

[16] Richard L. Berke, "Christian Right Defies Categories," *New York Times*, 22 July 1994.

[17] Albert R. Hunt, "Christian Coalition's Problem Is Secular, Not Religious," *Wall Street Journal*, 28 July 1994; Ronald Brownstein, "Disaffected Americans May Spell Democrat Losses," *Los Angeles Times*, 28 July 1994.

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In summer 1994, leading Democrats launched a concerted attack against conservative Christian activists (or as the Democrats prefer, "the radical right"), hoping to drive a wedge between economic and social conservatives. The split could indeed widen if both sides take a rule-or-ruin attitude; however, there are some signs of accommodation. Christian Coalition Executive Director Ralph Reed says: "We don't seek to dominate, we seek to participate."[18] Former New Jersey Governor Tom Kean, a pro-choice moderate, has spoken warmly of his recent meeting with Iowa Democrats: "I knew that the audience contained around 600 representatives of the Christian Coalition. I expected to be booed for at least some of my thoughts, but I wasn't. . . . I made a point afterward of talking to some of the coalition delegates. What I found surprised me. I guess I expected zealots. Instead I found decent, everyday people."[19]

Decent, everyday people are the kind that Ross Perot purports to represent. No doubt there are many such people among the followers of Perot as well as Pat Robertson, but the alliance with religious conservatives could alienate the secular Perot voters. Conversely, Perot's personal eccentricities unnerve Christian conservatives, as well as people throughout the spectrum. The challenge for Republicans is to welcome the rank and file of both groups without becoming too closely linked with polarizing figures such as Robertson and Perot. *Wall Street Journal* columnist Paul Gigot speculates on what could happen if they succeed: "[A] rout could be on. That's because the religious right is strongest in the South, where Perot voters are fewest. And Perotians are strongest in New England, the Midwest and West, where the religious right is weakest. Together they could recreate the Reagan coalition."[20]

To become a majority, House Republicans must be pluralistic enough to appeal to disparate constituencies and yet unified enough to present coherent alternatives. The Constitution complicates this Catch-22 by the way it structures political institutions.

Institutions

In our Rubik's Cube metaphor, institutions encompass the constitutional structure of politics and policy making, including the separation of powers, bicameralism, and the federal or local orientation of con-

[18] William Schneider, "Swimming Against the Mainstream?" *National Journal*, 26 June 1994, 1550.

[19] Quoted in Republican National Committee briefing, 18 July 1994.

[20] Paul Gigot, "Perot Reaches Back to GOP — For Now," *Wall Street Journal*, 15 July 1994.

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gressional elections. Institutional structures affect the behavior of politicians and parties. While these basic characteristics of the American political system create dilemmas for any legislative party, they pose special challenges to the minority party, which must gain ground and not just defend the status quo.

Our constitutional system fosters both friction and fission. The friction results from the obstacles to rash action posed by the system's branches and layers. The fission consists of the system's openness, which allows for an energetic politics of ideas. The system curbs abuse of power while providing for its effective use; it limits change, yet permits constructive change. Lawmakers thus face twin temptations. Some chafe at the friction of the constitutional system. They dream of grand ideological battles on the model of the New Deal and are tempted by the system's potential for energy, or fission. In this, they echo the party government school of political science. Others, echoing the pluralist school of political science, welcome the system's built-in friction. The House Republicans have been wracked by conflict between the two sides, with the former lately gaining the upper hand.

During the Reagan and Bush administrations, the separation of powers put House Republicans in a bind: their alliance with the president made them the party of government, while the minority status in the House made them the party of opposition. Losing the White House changed their calculations. While it diminished their access to the executive branch and eliminated their role as sustainers of presidential vetoes, it also freed them from their often burdensome partisan loyalty to the White House. It has given House Republicans more control over their fate and more leeway to divest themselves of responsibility for legislating. While Newt Gingrich regretted the election of Bill Clinton, he said it amounted to the House GOP's "liberation from the tentacles" of the Bush White House. "We are a party that is more risk-taking in doing new things."[21]

Their support for NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) suggests that House Republicans are moved by principle as well as politics, by the desire to govern as well as oppose. Nevertheless, unified Democratic control of the White House and Congress encourages the House GOP to adopt a national strategy of confrontation and opposition. The key, in their eyes, is growing antipathy toward President Clinton. "I don't believe that any Democrat can escape the mantle of

[21] Cohen, "On the Edge," 2888.

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Clinton this year," concludes House Republican Conference Vice Chair Bill McCollum.[22] On health care reform, some House Republicans relish the prospect of forcing Clinton to eat his State of the Union veto threat, just as Democrats reveled in Bush's "read my lips" tax flip-flop.

Bicameralism adds a barrier to party unity. With their different constituencies and different legislative settings, House and Senate Republicans have long had a hard time acting in unison. Once again, the health issue illustrates the point. If the Senate Republicans reach a compromise, many House Republicans may perceive a sellout. If Republican senators scuttle the bill by uniting behind a filibuster, they will upstage the relatively powerless House GOP. To alleviate such conflicts, the two groups have taken some modest steps to pool their research resources and coordinate their policy messages. One leadership aide said that they had been "working at constructing a very integrated structure."[23] Ironically, a Republican capture of the Senate could upset this structure. As a majority, Senate Republicans may be more inclined toward "governing," that is, working with the White House to pass legislation; the "permanent minority" House Republicans will be inclined toward opposition.

Unlike their European counterparts, congressional parties do not choose their own members. Before listening to their own party, American lawmakers listen to their constituents and campaign supporters—and this is especially true with the minority party, which lacks any serious tools of discipline. Consequently, individual House Republicans often wander "off message." Fred Grandy (Iowa) played into President Clinton's hands by slamming the House GOP leadership effort to whip unity into their health care strategy. In 1994, the party suffered a rift over welfare reform. James Talent (Missouri) sharply criticized the plan backed by his party leadership and supported an alternative approach. According to Rick Santorum (Pennsylvania), who helped draft the GOP plan: "The problem with conservatives is that once they see they're in a position to win, they do something to ensure they lose."[24]

[22] Richard E. Cohen, "Hot Seats," *National Journal*, 9 July 1994, 1620.

[23] Susan B. Glasser, "Hill Republicans Struggle To Fill 'Research Gap' Resulting from Loss of White House," *Roll Call*, 18 January 1993, 6, 60.

[24] Eric Pianin, "Formerly United House Republicans Split Over Welfare Reform Package," *Washington Post*, 29 April 1994.

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Ideas

Our Rubik's Cube includes the notion that political ideas matter. Along with interests, ideas constitute the environment within which individuals and institutions function. If Republicans are right, the nation is ripe for an outsider revolt against the "nanny state." Some Republicans see the Clintons' plan as an attempt to lock into place the origins of a European-style welfare state; once built, it will be hard to dismantle. The Democrats' liberal activism may be uniting the GOP's economic conservatives and social conservatives, who could find common ground on the need for limited government.

Limited government may provide the unifying theme, if the rationale makes clear that: free markets are more efficient than large public bureaucracies, and bureaucratic centralization undermines self-government by supplanting community-building and character-building institutions: family, church, school, and voluntary associations. This core GOP message has time-honored roots in the Reagan Revolution, the Republicanism of Lincoln, and the ideas of Alexis de Tocqueville.[25]

House Republicans are also aware of the lingering anti-incumbent sentiment and the calls for congressional reform. They have drafted a detailed 120-page indictment of House Democratic hegemony entitled, "It's Long Enough," which blames institutional corruption on the Democrats' "permanent majority" rule. The GOP, however, is not content merely to play a negative endgame either against the House Democrats or President Clinton. The House Republican Conference is defining a detailed legislative agenda, titled "Contract With America," to be endorsed by all House Republican candidates. "As a Republican majority has moved from improbable to probable," said Armey, "we need to demonstrate the differences between our party and their party."[26]

In September 1994, the House Republicans will unveil this agenda in an event planned on the Capitol steps to gain maximum media exposure. They might not get all that they want. The irony is that losing the White House has helped the House Republicans present a united front against a Democratic president, but hinders them from getting attention for their ideas. At the end of 1993, columnist Morton

[25] William A. Schambra, "Toward the New Citizenship," *Policy Review* 69 (Summer 1994): 32–38.

[26] Richard E. Cohen, "A GOP Blueprint to Remodel the House," *National Journal*, 23 July 1994, 1754.

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Kondracke wrote, "The public seems largely unaware that Republicans have produced alternative programs on deficit reduction, crime, immigration and campaign finance."[27] As Bob Michel had warned several years before, the mainstream media slight Capitol Hill, frustrating House Republican attempts to win the battle of ideas.

Individuals

In our Rubik's Cube, individuals include party leaders and members, although we will focus on the former. Leaders matter, especially those who can manage party factionalism and help define party principles. Retiring House Republican Leader Bob Michel is known as a middleman among diverse factions. His heir apparent, Minority Whip Newt Gingrich, sees himself as a policy entrepreneur. The generational shift from Michel to Gingrich marks a change in style and outlook. Michel is the establishment man, favoring all-politics-is-local electoral strategies and responsible-partner-in-governing legislative strategies. Gingrich is a revolutionary, who speaks of grand national electoral strategies and bombthrowing legislative opposition. Each caricature underestimates its subject, and neither stereotype fits. But an effective party leader needs both approaches and sets of skills.

The new House Republican leaders embrace the politics of ideas, which is understandable, since Newt Gingrich and Dick Armey are both college professors. In 1993, Richard Cohen reported on leadership's seminars on health care:

> Armey sometimes displays his academic background. In a 14-page memorandum sent to House Republicans in early November, he drew an unflattering parallel between Clinton's health plan and President Carter's unsuccessful energy legislation. . . . His lessons included: "A plan based on faulty premises is inherently defeatable. . . . The side that controls the terms of debate controls the outcome of debate."[28]

Meanwhile Gingrich's actions sometimes clash with his obstructionist reputation. Early in his tenure as whip, he supported a pay-and-ethics agreement with the Democrats. More recently, he led the effort to pass NAFTA, a measure hailed as a Clinton success. Gingrich can play the responsible legislator when necessary, and many think that he

[27] Morton Kondracke, "GOP Rivals Clinton in New Ideas Dept., But Nobody Knows," *Roll Call*, 6 December 1993, 6.

[28] Cohen, "On the Edge," 2888.

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is mellowing with leadership responsibility. But while the institutional context may curb his revolutionary tendencies, Gingrich will not be a mere creature of institutional constraints.

The 1994 Election: Prospects and Scenarios

One thing is certain about the 1994 midterm election: House Republicans are much better off with Bill Clinton than George Bush. Except for the Depression year of 1934, every midterm election in this century has resulted in a net gain for the out-party. Since 1954, the ranks of the out-party have grown by 6.3 percent in the first midterm of an administration and 19.2 percent in the second.[29] So if 1994 is an average first midterm, Republicans will end up with 186 seats, 11 more than they won in 1992.

Reasons for GOP Hope

There are several reasons to believe that 1994 will prove a better-than-average midterm for the GOP. As suggested above, the first is the dubious state of the president's popularity, usually a key influence on the midterm outcome.[30] As of July, approval of President Clinton stood below 50 percent; and when voters were asked about their congressional voting intention, the Democrats held only a narrow lead.[31]

Second, voluntary departures from the House are breaking in the GOP's favor. Throughout the 1980s, Republicans were more likely than Democrats to retire or seek other office, so the GOP had to defend a disproportionate share of open seats.[32] In 1992, however, Democrats were slightly more likely to step down, and the 1994 midterm is shaping up the same way. As of early July, 10.9 percent of incumbent Democrats were voluntarily leaving, compared with 10.7 percent of Republicans, leaving thirty open Democratic seats to the

[29] The gain consists of the difference between the number of seats won in the presidential election year and those won in the midterm. It does not include changes due to special elections. These calculations count 1966 as the second midterm of the Kennedy-Johnson administration.

[30] Gary Jacobson ably summarizes the state of the research on this point in *The Politics of Congressional Elections*, 3rd. ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), 154.

[31] Brownstein, "Dissatisfied Americans."

[32] John B. Gilmour and Paul Rothstein, "Early Republican Retirement: A Cause of Democratic Dominance in the House of Representatives," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 18 (August 1993): 345–365.

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Republicans' nineteen.[33] Moreover, fourteen of the Democrats' open seats lie in the South, where Republicans are surging and President Clinton is slipping.

Third, the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) has faded to a moonshadow of its old self, in terms both of personnel and finance. Readers may wonder why we count this trend as an asset instead of a liability, but as we explain in *Congress' Permanent Minority?* the NRCC of the 1980s had become a bureaucratic nightmare that was arguably doing more harm than good. House Republicans benefit when resources flow directly to campaigns instead of getting lost in the party's troubled headquarters on First Street.

Reasons for GOP Caution

In light of these developments, some Republicans are talking about a gain of forty seats or more. Although such a pickup does lie within the realm of possibility, House Republicans would be well advised to speak softly. Inflated expectations can turn an otherwise creditable showing into a disappointment that hurts morale and causes contributors to shut their checkbooks. In both 1982 and 1990, Republican leaders suggested that they might actually gain seats in the midterm of a GOP presidency. When the party lost seats instead, the defeat seemed even greater than it was. If party leaders stick to conservative expectations for 1994, they will make it much easier to claim victory on election night.

And they have good cause to hedge their optimism with caution. Some Republicans have been betting on the wave of anti-incumbency that started in 1990 and soared in 1992. Because Democrats have far more incumbents, they figure, this wave can only help the GOP. But anti-incumbency may have crested. In 1992, nineteen House members lost primaries, the highest number in decades. As of mid-September of 1994, only two incumbents had gone down, and they both represent districts that Republicans cannot win.

Still, anti-incumbency may return. Suppose, then, that there arises a national movement to oust every sitting member of Congress, regardless of party. Suppose further that the resulting tide sweeps out every

[33] Authors' calculations from table in Rhodes Cook, "GOP Counting On Open Seats to Deliver Major Gains," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 9 July 1994, 1884. Note that the total number of Democratic open seats includes two in which incumbents lost primaries.

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lawmaker seeking reelection who won last time with less than 55.0 percent (Table 3). Fifty Democrats would lose. But so would forty-six Republicans, leaving the GOP with a net gain of only four. If the anti-incumbent tide only struck lawmakers whose previous total was less than 51.0 percent, Republicans would suffer a net loss of four seats.

This pattern has two causes. First, Democratic lawmakers have long tended to win by bigger margins than their Republican colleagues. Second, this disparity was especially wide in the large class of 1992, as a disproportionate number of Republican freshmen won by squeakers. Generalized anti-incumbency might not be the GOP's friend.

Even if many voters specifically turn against the Democrats, they might not all necessarily turn to the GOP instead. The 1992 election saw an unusual number of third-party and independent House candidates on the ballot; although only one was elected (Bernard Sanders of Vermont), many others took a significant share of the vote, which is why twenty House members won with less than 50 percent. By the spring of 1994, more third-party and independent candidates had filed with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) than by the same period in 1992.[34] Together with polling data that show voters are increasingly willing to look beyond the major parties,[35] this trend indicates that a good portion of any protest vote will go to minor candidates instead of Republicans.

To recapture the protest vote, the GOP has to give voters a reason to vote for Republicans instead of against Democrats. House Republican leaders understand this need, which helps explain why they are laboring on their reform agenda. As explained in the previous section, however, elements of the political Rubik's Cube may make it hard for them to achieve internal unity and gain media attention.

And the Democrats will do whatever it takes to defend their majority. In building their campaign war chests, not only can they use their legislative power to encourage Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions, but they can also gain from the drawing power of the presidency. Even a relatively unpopular chief executive can easily fill up a $1,000-a-head fundraising event.[36] The president could help even

[34] Tim Curran, "Flurry of Candidates Breaks Record of '92," *Roll Call*, 21 April 1994.

[35] Gordon S. Black and Benjamin D. Black, *The Politics of American Discontent: How a New Party Can Make Democracy Work Again* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1994), 179-180.

[36] Tim Curran, "Popularity Ratings Aside, the President's Still Hot Property on the Money Circuit for Democrats," *Roll Call*, 25 July 1994, 3.

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TABLE 3

Marginal Incumbents in 1994

Members with less than 55.0 percent in 1992 and who seek reelection.
(**Bold** indicates margins **less than 51.0 percent.**)

Republican		Democratic	
Franks (CT)	**43.7**	**Lehman (CA)**	**46.9**
Pryce (OH)	**44.1**	**Klein (NJ)**	**47.0**
Goodling (PA)	**45.3**	**Hamburg (CA)**	**47.6**
Calvert (CA)	**46.7**	**Volkmer (MO)**	**47.7**
Young (AK)	**46.8**	**Minge (MN)**	**47.8**
Pombo (CA)	**47.6**	**Harman (CA)**	**48.4**
Vucanovich (NV)	**47.9**	**Thurman (FL)**	**49.2**
Horn (CA)	**48.6**	**Byrne (VA)**	**50.0**
Lightfoot (IA)	**48.9**	**Marg-M (PA)**	**50.3**
Everett (AL)	**49.5**	**Peterson (MN)**	**50.4**
King (NY)	**49.6**	**Maloney (NY)**	**50.4**
Moorhead (CA)	**49.7**	**Hinchey (NY)**	**50.4**
Doolittle (CA)	**49.8**	**Williams (MT)**	**50.5**
Hutchinson (AR)	**50.2**	**Shepherd (UT)**	**50.5**
Dornan (CA)	**50.2**	**Brown (CA)**	**50.7**
Nussle (IA)	**50.2**	**Strickland (OH)**	**50.7**
Levy (NY)	**50.2**	**Gejdenson (CT)**	**50.8**
Inglis (NC)	**50.3**	**Inslee (WA)**	**50.8**
Blute (MA)	**50.4**	Schenk (CA)	51.1
Talent (MO)	**50.4**	Fazio (CA)	51.2
Linder (GA)	**50.5**	Hoagland (NE)	51.2
Baker (LA)	**50.6**	Mann (OH)	51.3
Buyer (IN)	51.0	Olver (MA)	51.5
Gilchrest (MD)	51.6	Glickman (KS)	51.7
Quinn (NY)	51.7	Hockb. (NY)	51.7
McKeon (CA)	51.9	Coleman (TX)	51.9
Greenwood (PA)	51.9	Furse (OR)	52.0
Baker (CA)	52.0	Holden (PA)	52.1
Shaw (FL)	52.0	Swift (WA)	52.1
Canady (FL)	52.1	Kreidler (WA)	52.1
Dickey (AR)	52.3	Meehan (MA)	52.2
Bachus (AL)	52.4	McHale (PA)	52.2
Hunter (CA)	52.9	Pallone (NJ)	52.3
Petri (WI)	52.9	Ackerman (NY)	52.4
Zeliff (NH)	53.1	McCloskey (IN)	52.5
Lazio (NY)	53.2	Levin (MI)	52.6
Franks (NJ)	53.3	Fingerhut (OH)	52.6
Istook (OK)	53.4	Gibbons (FL)	52.8
Bartlett (MD)	54.2	English (AZ)	53.0
Gallegly (CA)	54.3	Hoyer (MD)	53.0
Rohrabacher (CA)	54.5	Bonior (MI)	53.1
Rogers (KY)	54.6	Neal (MA)	53.1
McInnis (CO)	54.7	Brown (OH)	53.3
Taylor (NC)	54.7	Brooks (TX)	53.6
Collins (GA)	54.8	Kildee (MI)	53.7
Torkildsen (MA)	54.8	Johnson (GA)	53.8
		Stupak (MI)	53.9
		Lancaster (NC)	54.4
		LaFalce (NY)	54.5
		Cantwell (WA)	54.9

Source: Author's calculation from: *CQ Weekly Report*, 17 April 1993, 973–980.

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more by improving his popularity through some sudden and dramatic official action. Though there is no evidence that presidents have deliberately started international incidents for midterm political advantage—or that President Clinton would consider such a thing—fortune sometimes smiles on the White House party. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the Camp David Agreement of 1978 both helped the in-party by shifting public attention from contentious domestic issues to admirable White House leadership on the international stage. In September 1994, the seeds for potential autumn crises were growing in several world trouble spots: Rwanda, Bosnia, Korea, and Haiti.

A Scenario of Modest Gains

Democrats may well be able to hold down GOP gains. Still, Republicans can probably count on picking up at least ten to twenty seats, which will undoubtedly make them feistier. According to Armey: "We're going to be more assertive in saying our good ideas deserve attention and less patient with institutional barriers to our ideas."[37]

Would a modest GOP pickup change legislative outcomes? In 1993, *Congressional Quarterly* identified sixteen key votes on the House floor. A unified bloc of twenty additional Republicans would have changed the outcome of five of these votes: budget reconciliation, Resolution Trust Corporation, Somalia troop removal, campaign finance reform (rule), and the Penny-Kasich spending cut.[38] This figure may slightly overstate the potential impact of additional Republicans, because they probably would not all vote the same way, nor would the Democratic leadership be likely to bring measures to the floor when it thought the Democratic position would lose.

Even a gain of twenty seats, moreover, would not give Republicans the same effective control that they enjoyed in 1981, when they had 192 seats and Ronald Reagan held the presidency. In 1981, House Democrats had an average party-unity score of 75, a figure that was pulled down by conservative Southern Democrats. President Reagan and the House Republicans could pick off enough boll weevils to win key roll calls. By 1993, by contrast, the southerners had joined the Democratic mainstream, and the average Democratic party unity score

[37] Kevin Merida, "Rep. Armey Advances for the GOP," *Washington Post National Weekly*, 7–13 March 1994, 12.

[38] Authors' calculation from *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 18 December 1993, 3492–3495.

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TABLE 4

Potential Party Switchers

House Democrats who:
1. Are seeking reelection in 1994;
2. Had adjusted 1993 party unity scores under 80 percent; and
3. Represent districts won by George Bush in 1992.

	Bush %	*Party Unity*
Browder (AL)	48	77
Cramer (AL)	44	79
Deal (GA)	45	69
Skelton (MO)	38	72
Montgomery (MS)	58	72
Parker (MS)	50	61
Taylor (MS)	54	37
Hall (TX)	41	54
Edwards (TX)	41	77
Sarpalius (TX)	43	70
Laughlin (TX)	41	74
Stenholm (TX)	40	52
Orton (UT)	49	60
Pickett (VA)	48	77
Sisisky (VA)	47	75

had climbed to 89. Given both a more unified majority and a friend in the White House, the Democratic party leadership of the 104th Congress would be in a stronger position than Speaker Tip O'Neill was in the early days of Reagan. Still, a larger GOP Conference would pose problems for the Democrats, denying them some victories and forcing them to restrain the liberal agenda.

Coalition Government?

In a July 1994 newspaper interview, Newt Gingrich said that party forecasters were predicting a net gain of thirty-four seats, and added that he knew of six disaffected Democrats who have told him that they would switch parties to give the GOP a majority.[39] Although Gingrich did not name the members in question, two rules of thumb help us identify potential switchers. Those who represent districts carried by George Bush would probably not suffer at the polls for changing parties and could even see their victory margins go up. Those

[39] David E. Rosenbaum, "A Republican Who Sees Himself as a Revolutionary on the Verge of Victory," *New York Times*, 24 July 1994.

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who frequently break with the majority (that is, those with party-unity scores under 80 percent) would feel less uncomfortable on the GOP side than those who follow the Democratic line. Of the Democrats seeking reelection in 1994, fifteen meet these two criteria (Table 4).

If the Republicans got close to a majority, could they switch enough of these members to go over the top? To do so, they would have to surmount several obstacles. First, few Democrats would switch unless they knew that they were joining the winning side. As Tim Penny (D-Minnesota) has asked: "What would be the point of being the 201st Republican?"[40] Republicans have to create a bandwagon effect, which helps explain why they are already publicly talking about switchers. Such talk can be self-fulfilling: the more that fence-straddling Democrats hear about other potential switchers, the more confident they become about making the jump themselves.[41]

Second, "conservative" Democrats might regard themselves as too liberal for the GOP. As Charles Stenholm of Texas told Nicol Rae: "The Republicans are antigovernment. They believe that no government is the solution. I strongly disagree with that."[42]

Third, switchers would probably demand a price in the form of committee chairmanships. The more such positions the GOP would have to promise to switchers, the fewer there would be for those already in the party. After a point, the price might grow too high, especially for the senior Republicans, who would have to forgo coveted chairmanships.

Fourth, the Democratic majority would fight to keep wavering members in line. They could offer positive inducements, such as chairmanships or fast-track consideration of pet bills. And they could also make threats, which would carry great force if the Republican surge appeared to be only temporary. President Clinton would also weigh in with carrots and sticks. Although he might be amused at the idea of running a Truman-style 1996 campaign against a GOP House majority, he probably could not tolerate the prospect of GOP-dominated committees armed with investigative staff and subpoena power.

[40] Morton M. Kondracke, "Powell for Speaker? GOP Is Dreaming of House Control," *Roll Call*, 17 February 1994, 15.

[41] Steven J. Brams analyzes the bandwagon curve in *Rational Politics: Decisions, Games and Strategy* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1985), 195–198.

[42] Nicol Rae, *Southern Democrats* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 72.

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A Republican Majority

What would House Republicans do if they actually won a majority? In their 27 September event on the Capitol steps, GOP candidates pledged themselves to a list of reforms. "Three things will be on the list for sure," said Gingrich in an April interview, "One will be immediate passage of [a bill] that will subject Congress to the same laws that apply to other Americans. Two will be an audit of the House books for the past ten years. Three will be a reduction by one third of all committees and staff."[43] Gerald Solomon (New York), ranking Republican on the Rules Committee, has proposed a number of further procedural reforms, including: elimination of the joint referral of bills to two or more committees; abolition of proxy voting and one-third quorums; and a guarantee that party ratios on committees accurately reflect the party ratios in the House.[44] More important, the Republicans have stressed that they would open up floor procedure to improve deliberation and ensure accountability.

As a majority, House Republicans might find it a challenge to maintain their enthusiasm for reform. After decades of frustrations and slights, many would want to get even. When we asked Republican members what they have learned from the Democrats, one answered: "Don't play fair—When we take control, we should stack Ways and Means, Appropriations and Rules just as the Democrats have done." Such behavior would contradict the Republicans' longstanding arguments for reform, and so the desire to avoid the charge of hypocrisy might temper the thirst for vengeance. A more powerful corrective would be the prospect that the Democrats could regain control and strike back: such an expectation helped keep interparty peace during the 1940s and 1950s. Ever since then, the permanent majority status of one party has become unhealthy for the Congress and the nation.

What about more substantive changes in public policy? In preparation for the Capitol steps event, Republicans are working on a number of issue areas, including term limits, the balanced-budget amendment, tort reform, and regulatory reform.[45] Gingrich has articulated a broad vision underlying their efforts:

> Within this current climate, I believe we need to create a new system and new approach to government. We need to transform the current system through

[43] Joe Klein, "The House That Newt Will Build," *Newsweek*, 25 April 1994, 31.
[44] *Congressional Record*, daily ed., 30 January 1992, H148.
[45] Timothy J. Burger, "GOP Unveils Plan for 'First 100 Days'," *Roll Call*, 25 July 1994, 24.

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> a necessary revolution. This revolution is one of replacing the current welfare state and its side effects of destruction of family values, work ethic, and individual ability and responsibility. This revolution is truly necessary and not merely desirable. It must happen. Our Founding Fathers created a powerful system for each generation to have, to paraphrase Thomas Jefferson, its own necessary revolution.[46]

In turning these broad ideals into concrete legislation, the GOP will have to wrestle with a new challenge: a Republican majority will be more than a mere enlargement of the current minority. To maintain a stable hold on power, the party will have to reach beyond its traditional base, and accommodate a wider range of interests and views. Whatever form the new pluralism takes, it will bring new strains, as Gingrich has noted:

> [We] have to recognize that we have to get used to fighting ourselves at times and we have to recognize that we are in the business of conflict management. We are not in the business of conflict resolution. You only resolve conflicts by kicking people out and that means you become a minority. So, if you intend to be a majority, you have to be willing to live with a lot of conflict because that is the nature of a majority.[47]

Many conservatives think Gingrich is too ecumenical. Columnist Robert D. Novak said that Gingrich's cooperation with party moderates on health care reform was "chilling."[48] Of course, institutional responsibility has given Gingrich a broader perspective.

Even within conservative ranks, there may be a split between antideficit hawks and antitax hawks.[49] The former will want to put spending cuts ahead of tax cuts, while the latter will stress reduced taxation as a method of spurring economic growth. In seeking to unite the two wings, Gingrich would have to devise a plan for spending cuts that would at least equal the nominal forgone revenue resulting from tax cuts. At some point, the spending cuts might lose the support of Republicans whose districts would be especially hard hit. (Remember that forty House Republicans opposed the 1993 Kasich budget alternative.)

This new, diverse majority might be riven by internal animosities. In that case, no faction would trust the others with control of the

[46] *Congressional Record*, daily ed., 30 January 1992, H149.

[47] Newt Gingrich, Address to Southern Republican Leadership Conference, Raleigh, North Carolina, 30 March 1990 (photocopy).

[48] Robert D. Novak, "The New Newt," *Washington Post*, 10 March 1994.

[49] Tod Lindberg, "Capitol Gain; What Republicans Will Do If They Win the Congress," *Policy Review* 69 (Summer 1994): 28.

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party, and power would remain dispersed, as it has been throughout the GOP's time in the wilderness. On the other hand, House Republicans might decide that they would all be better off with strong, central leadership. As the Democrats learned under Nixon and Reagan, it is easier to reach such a conclusion under an assertive president of the opposite party.

Whatever the House Republicans disagree about, they would probably unite behind vigorous oversight of the Democratic administration. President Clinton could expect an upsurge in critical hearings and investigations led by figures such as Banking Committee Chairman Jim Leach (Iowa) and Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Archer (Texas).

A GOP House under a Democratic president? During the 1980s, such a combination seemed as fantastic as the idea that New York, Jersey City, and Los Angeles would elect Republican mayors all in the same year.

Closing Thoughts

Autumn 1994's health care showdown may provide House Republicans with an opportunity to convince the electorate that they represent a choice and not an echo. While offering an alternative of market-driven reform, Republicans are not inclined to compromise. They seem interested in making the 1994 midterm election a national referendum on their philosophy of limited government. Health care reform, they think, offers the ideal vehicle for presenting a clear choice between empowerment and entitlement.

Given the institutional context, and the array of interests and ideas in the health care debate, House Republican leaders favor a full-throated national opposition strategy. They believe that health care reform may align the Rubik's Cube in their favor at election time. But even if the House GOP does everything right on all the dimensions of the Rubik's Cube, it can still fall short of a majority in 1994 and beyond. The House Republicans are not entirely masters of their fate: an October surprise, among many other things, could easily scramble their cleverest plans.

Nevertheless, they need to see how the pieces of the puzzle fit together. Ideally House Republicans would appreciate the grounding of the legislative process in a pluralism of interest; they would understand the institutional constraints on action and ideas; they would empathize

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with their colleagues' electoral predicaments; and they would be aware of the power of ideas and attuned to the necessary balance of a governing philosophy. While 1994 may well be an important building year for House Republicans, they probably will not retake the speakership. In 1996, however, in coordination with a Republican presidential candidate who understands their permanent minority plight, they may finally reach the promised land.*

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Lyndon Johnson's Victory in the 1948 Texas Senate Race: A Reappraisal

DALE BAUM
JAMES L. HAILEY

Six days after the 1948 Texas senatorial runoff election, enigmatically amended returns produced what the winning candidate, Lyndon Baines Johnson, humorously referred to as his "87-vote landslide." Without his allegedly fraudulent victory over former Governor Coke Stevenson, LBJ probably would not have continued his political career; and his later influence over national politics as majority leader in the Senate, as vice-president, and finally as president, would have been lost. Accounts by historians of LBJ's razor-thin victory have invariably converged on the Thirteenth Precinct in the South Texas town of Alice in Jim Wells County, where 202 Mexican-American voters, some of whom were deceased or had been absent from the county on election day, reportedly lined up in alphabetical order at the very last minute to cast their ballots overwhelmingly for Johnson.[1]

[1] Lyndon Johnson's Speech, 7:30 P.M., 6 September 1948, KTBC, Austin, Texas; Robert A. Caro, *The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 303-350; Ronnie Dugger, *The Politician: The Life and Times of Lyndon Johnson – The Drive for Power, from the Frontier to Master of the Senate* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), 322-341; Robert Dallek, *Lone Star Rising: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1908-1960* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 298-348; Mary Kahl, *Ballot Box 13: How Lyndon Johnson Won His 1948 Senate Race by 87 Contested Votes* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1983); and June Welch, "The Texas Senatorial Election of 1948" (M.A. thesis, Texas Tech University, 1955). Political boss George B. Parr, Ballot Box 13, and LBJ

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By focusing a tight spotlight on Ballot Box 13, scholarly accounts of Johnson's victory have kept the underlying statewide trends and regional aberrations in the runoff election in the dark. Presented here is a quantitative analysis of Texas county voting returns that pinpoints localities of the state where LBJ or Stevenson ran far better in the runoff election than what might have been expected, given the divisions of the vote in the initial primary election. The contested runoff election, moreover, must be placed in the context of the battle royal between the white supremacist Texas Regulars and the pro-Harry S. Truman Texas Loyalists for control of the state Democratic party machinery. The infamous Box 13 was upheld by the State Democratic Election Committee by a close vote reflecting the acrimonious split between the two factions.

The contentiousness of the state's politics in 1948 left a legacy of distrust and suspicion that prompted some to depict the new Texas senator as Mephistophelean wheeler-dealer. This legacy inspired many hostile portrayals by historians of LBJ's rise to power. In the second volume of his impressive LBJ biography, Robert A. Caro inexplicably refuses to place LBJ's hairbreadth margin of victory into the larger context of Texas Democratic party factionalism. Caro views LBJ's success in 1948 as simply the product of character assassination, novel use of a campaign helicopter, and undisguised theft—not of only some two hundred votes, "but thousands—many thousands, in fact."[2]

Although Texas in 1948 was a one-party state with no clear-cut geographical divisions or battles between permanent factions, it fell short of the chaos of confused free-for-alls that plagued the electoral politics of many other southern states. In light of the outcome of the first or July primary, most contemporaries of the period regarded the prospect of a LBJ victory in the August runoff as highly unlikely, if not altogether impossible. Stevenson, an ultraconservative West Texas rancher, garnered 40 percent of the ballots cast or a 71,460 plurality over LBJ, who as the runner-up received 34 percent. George E. B. Peddy, a decorated World War II hero and a wealthy Houston attorney, captured a sizeable 20 percent. The remaining 7 percent of the ballots cast was split among eight minor candidates. Because Peddy had waged his campaign on anticommunist and pro-states' rights planks,

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were linked together in the popular American mind in the early 1950s by many accounts, including Gordon Schendel, "Something Is Rotten in the State of Texas," *Collier's*, 9 June 1951, 52-54.

[2] Robert A. Calvert and Arnoldo De Léon, *The History of Texas* (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1990), 367-368; Caro, *Means of Ascent*, 210-317, 395 (quotation).

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pundits theorized that in the runoff his supporters would flock to Stevenson, who while governor had sympathized with the anti-Franklin D. Roosevelt Texas Regulars and who by the summer of 1948 was flirting with the anti-Truman Dixiecrat party.[3]

Opposition in Texas in the 1940s to labor union activities and the early civil rights movement dictated that LBJ, a consistent supporter of President Roosevelt, would have to shift to the political right if he were to have a chance at winning a statewide election. Portraying Stevenson as a cold war isolationist and dupe of big northern labor unions, LBJ, who was a staunch pro-Truman Loyalist, compared Truman's civil rights program to a police state, supported the Taft-Hartley Act, and called for local control of off-shore oil lands. LBJ never doubted that his only chance of defeating Stevenson depended on winning over the bulk of the conservative Peddy voters. Twenty years later, when he occupied the White House, he reflected that he probably got "seventy or eighty percent of the votes that went to George Peddy"—an opinion that mirrored the conventional wisdom regarding his 1948 success. Popular belief and LBJ's own assumption about the configuration of his dramatic victory, however, are not supported by the evidence presented here.[4]

LBJ's indispensable pragmatism in the 1948 campaign could not cloak his popularity with most of his party's liberal-loyalist faction—a circumstance that predictably proved to be a liability among Peddy voters (see Table 1). According to the probabilities of voting behavior generated by the analysis of voting returns from the 252 Texas counties that held first and second primaries, Stevenson corralled the majority of Peddy voters, whereas LBJ captured slightly over one-fifth of them. The balance of the Peddy voters sat out the runoff balloting altogether. Because virtually none of Stevenson's original voters subsequently voted

[3] *Texas Almanac and State Industrial Guide, 1949–1950* (Dallas: A. H. Belo & Co., 1949), 465–467; Caro, *Means of Ascent*, 268–302; George Norris Green, *The Establishment in Texas Politics: The Primitive Years, 1938–1957* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1979), 112–113, and *A Liberal View of Texas Politics Since the 1930s* (Boston: American Press, 1981), 16.

[4] Dallek, *Lone Star Rising*, 287–289; Green, *A Liberal View of Texas Politics*, 18–19; Doris Kearns, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 100–101; Dugger, *The Politician*, 307–341, 319 (quotation). Because considerable deviations over specific issues existed among voters on both sides of the liberal-conservative continuum, it is not surprising that scholars have found no association between LBJ's 1948 runoff vote and support in the 1946 Democratic gubernatorial primary for Homer P. Rainey, the unsuccessful "liberal-labor-minority" candidate, or support in 1957 for Ralph Yarborough's senatorial candidacy. See Numan V. Bartley and Hugh D. Graham, *Southern Politics and the Second Reconstruction* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 42.

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TABLE 1

Estimated Relationships between Voting Patterns in the 1948 Texas Democratic Senatorial Primary Elections (in percentages of 1948 qualified voters)

	Voting Patterns in First Primary					*Percentage of 1948 Eligible Voters*
Voting Patterns in Second Primary	*Stevenson*	*Johnson*	*Peddy*	*All Others**	*Not Voting in First Primary*	
Stevenson	17.9	0	6.4	0	.1	24.4
Johnson	0	19.8	2.4	1.3	.9	24.4
Not Voting in Second Primary	5.6	.2	2.9	2.8	39.7	51.2
Percentage of 1948 Eligible Voters	23.5	20.0	11.7	4.1	40.7	100

* Votes cast for Myers, Clark, Collier, Davis, Cortéz, Saunders, Sledge, and Alford.

Note: The figures above represent percentages of qualified voters in Texas in 1948. Qualified voters in each county were calculated by adding to the number of adults paying 1948 poll taxes an additional 18 percent of their number in order to account for "exemptions." Exemptions from having to pay the $1.50 state (or optionally higher $1.75 county and state) poll tax consisted mostly of citizens over 60 years of age. This procedure yielded a statewide estimate of 2,029,710 eligible voters in 1948. Because Hansford and Kinney Counties (which failed to hold a runoff election) could not be included in the analysis, the marginal values of the above table sum to 2,027,189 eligible voters. The county voting returns were analyzed by multiple "ecological" regression, taking the percentages of qualified voters favoring Stevenson, Johnson, and not voting in the runoff, as the dependent variables. The independent variables, analyzed separately for each dependent variable, were the proportions of qualified voters voting in the first primary for Stevenson, Johnson, Peddy, eight minor candidates, and not voting in the first primary. The equations were then run *backwards*, predicting the vote in the first primary from the vote in the runoff. In both instances, the equations were "weighted" by the number of qualified voters in order to insure that larger counties would not be under-represented in the analysis. The pairs of corresponding cell entries within the two separately-generated contingency tables were then divided by two, yielding the average values that are displayed above. This is a valid operation because causality is not posited in either case; the aggregate vote in the first primary did not "cause" the vote in the second primary any more than the latter caused the former. This procedure eliminated from the tables a few logically but not statistically impossible estimates which fell below zero. Removing the statistical impossibilities by averaging, however, did not affect the accuracy of the estimates. For the multiple regression procedure employed here to generate the estimates of voter behavior, see Laura Irwin Langbein and Allan J. Lichtman, *Ecological Inference*, Sage University Paper series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, Series No. 07-010 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1984), 19–21. For the weighting procedure, see *SPSS-X User's Guide*, 3rd ed. (SPSS Inc., 1988), 186–187. Actual N = 252. For a general introduction to multiple linear regression, see Fred N. Kerlinger, *Foundations of Behavioral Research*, 3rd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1986), 531–536.

Source: The source for the number of poll taxes paid in each Texas county in 1948 and for the voting returns for the first and second 1948 Democratic senatorial primaries is the *Texas Almanac and State Industrial Guide* (Dallas: A. H. Belo & Co., 1949), 458–459, 465–467, and 474.

for LBJ, the only other opportunities for LBJ to pick up new supporters were among the ranks of Texans who had not voted in the first primary or had cast ballots for one of the eight minor candidates.

According to the estimates, less than one-third of the voters who had cast ballots in July for one of the eight minor candidates returned to vote in August (see Table 1). Virtually all of them who reappeared,

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however, apparently voted for LBJ. LBJ also outdistanced Stevenson in the competition to win the votes of citizens who had not voted in the first primary. Of the estimated number of July nonvoters who turned out and voted in the August runoff, about 90 percent favored LBJ. Yet his gains over Stevenson in attaining votes from supporters of minor candidates and former stay-at-home voters were not enough to offset the advantage Stevenson had achieved by making deeper inroads into Peddy's supporters.[5]

Capturing former Peddy voters thus proved not to be the key. Far more important in shaping the outcome was Stevenson's abysmal inability to mobilize his own supporters the second time around (see Table 1). An estimated 113,523 voters who had cast ballots for Stevenson in the first primary shunned the runoff balloting. By way of contrast, an estimated 4,054 Texans who had voted for LBJ in July failed to return to the polling places in August. The evidence presented here suggests that at least one contemporary of the period called the trend correctly. James V. Lovell, a political journalist for the Dallas *Times-Herald*, concluded after looking at the July and August county returns side by side that the Peddy vote was not "too great a factor in Johnson's comeback" and that Stevenson lost because "his workers failed to get as many voters to the polls in August as went in July." Lovell, an ardent LBJ partisan, was unable to persuade many others, including apparently LBJ himself, of the accuracy of his election post mortem.[6]

The quantitative evidence suggests that if Stevenson had mobilized just eight of every ten of his initial supporters, he would have won the Texas senatorial seat. His negligence in running an effective campaign during the month between the first and second primaries cost him the election. Or, conversely, LBJ's extraordinary feat in getting almost all of his July supporters to turn out and vote again for him in August earned him the Texas senatorship. Columnist Lovell's opinion, although discounted heavily because of the pro-LBJ stance of the Dallas

[5] Subtracting the number of ballots cast in the first primary from the total cast in the runoff in each of the forty-four counties where more votes were cast in the runoff than in the first primary and then adding up the differences yields the minimum number of Texans who voted in July but not in August: 16,883 voters. However, the actual number of initial nonvoters who subsequently turned out and voted could theoretically have been much larger. It is estimated here to have been as high as 20,272 voters (see Table 1 above).

[6] Undated and unidentified newspaper clippings (copies) in James V. Lovell to LBJ, 9 September 1948, Box 9, Pre-Presidential Confidential Files, Lyndon Johnson Papers, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin (cited hereafter as PPCF).

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Times-Herald, was on the mark: the record should show that Stevenson lost because he floundered in mobilizing his vote against the pressure of LBJ's energetic and persuasive campaign.[7]

The probabilities of voting behavior in Table 1 express sources of variance in the LBJ or Stevenson runoff vote that are due to the divisions of the electorate in the first primary. Therefore, if the estimated turnout percentages for LBJ in the runoff are subtracted from the actual LBJ runoff percentages, the remainders, or residual values, can be said to express sources of variance *other* than those due to the previous voting patterns in the first primary. Counties with the largest residual values are called outliers, which are in effect the data points that fall the greatest distances from the estimated state-wide trend (see Table 2).[8]

The outliers or most unpredictable counties can be grouped into two categories encompassing counties with an uncommonly high and low voter turnout in the runoff for LBJ and Stevenson (see Table 2). Within these groupings in turn are a few revealing geographical patterns. For example, LBJ ran surprisingly well in six adjoining East Texas piney woods counties near the Louisiana border (San Augustine, Sabine, Newton, Nacogdoches, Shelby, and Jasper) where Stevenson had been the runner up to Peddy, the local favorite, in the first primary. Here in the heart of Peddy territory, LBJ kicked off his second primary campaign, scored a major coupe d'etat in procuring the endorsement of Peddy's two brothers, and made almost superhuman efforts in stumping an area believed impervious to his candidacy.[9]

[7] Newspaper clippings (copies) in folders marked "1948 campaign clippings," Box 9, Johnson Papers, PPCF. The failure to take into account diverging rates of voter turnout between the July and August balloting has marred most analyses of the Stevenson-LBJ Senate race, although the fall-off in the total vote between the two elections always has been evident. When voter participation is ignored, it becomes deceptively easy to limit explanations of the runoff result to voters changing their minds between elections or having their votes changed over by fraud. See, for example, Caro, *Means of Ascent*, 303–317, and notes on 470–472.

[8] What constitutes an outlier varies from one study to the next, but here it is defined arbitrarily as a value falling two standard errors from the respective relationships between voting patterns presented in Table 1. The standard error of the estimate is essentially the standard deviation of the actual voting percentages from the values predicted by the regression line. For an introduction to multiple linear regression, see Fred N. Kerlinger, *Foundations of Behavioral Research*, 3rd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1986), 531–536. For studies of vote fraud in the historical literature that employ an analysis of residuals, see Lawrence N. Powell, "Correcting for Fraud: A Quantitative Reassessment of the Mississippi Ratification Election of 1868," *Journal of Southern History* 55 (November 1989): 633–658; and Dale Baum, "Pinpointing Apparent Fraud in the 1861 Texas Secession Referendum," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 22 (Autumn 1991): 201–221.

[9] Houston *Post*, 27 August 1948; Caro, *Means of Ascent*, 284–285.

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TABLE 2

"Outlier" Counties in the 1948 Senate Runoff Election: Based on Prior Voting in the First Primary (in percentages of 1948 county electorates)

Residual Values Falling Two Standard Errors Above or Below their Respective Regression Lines*

Group I: Abnormally High Turnout for LBJ and Stevenson				*Group II: Uncommonly Low Turnout for LBJ and Stevenson*			
County	*Above Expected Turnout for Johnson*	*County*	*Above Expected Turnout for Stevenson*	*County*	*Below Expected Turnout for Johnson*	*County*	*Below Expected Turnout for Stevenson*
San Augustine	27	Austin	19	Hemphill	−18	Sherman	−23
Sabine	26	Jasper	15	Upshur	−16	Panola	−23
Howard	25	Menard	14	Mills	−15	Roberts	−20
Newton	21	Ochiltree	13	Burleson	−15	Shelby	−19
Jim Hogg	20	Lamar	13	Coryell	−14	Terrell	−18
Houston	20	Frio	11	Lamb	−13	Mitchell	−16
Nacagdoches	20	Hood	11	Oldham	−13	Loving	−16
Henderson	18	Kenedy	11	Gregg	−13	Shackleford	−15
Duval	16	King	11	Sherman	−13	Uvalde	−15
Shelby	16			Washington	−13	Parmer	−14
Cass	16			Castro	−12	Crockett	−14
Hood	16			Hardin	−12	Marion	−14
Jasper	15			Brewster	−12	Hemphill	−13
Hidalgo	15			McCulloch	−12	Brewster	−13
Madison	14					Hartley	−13
Red River	14					Hudspeth	−12
Blanco	12					Deaf Smith	−12
						Chambers	−12
						Grayson	−11
						Briscoe	−11

* The standard error of the estimate is essentially the standard deviation of the actual voting percentages from the values predicted by the regression line. The standard errors here are the average values of the comparable standard errors of the forward and backward regression equations used to generate the voter transition probabilities in Table 1. Actual N = 252.

Note: The residual values or scores are the differences between the actual percentages of the county electorates voting for Johnson or Stevenson, on the one hand, and the corresponding estimated or predicted levels of turnout for Johnson or Stevenson, on the other. The residuals were generated by the equations representing the estimated relationships between voting patterns in the first and second primaries in Table 1. For example, the finding that Johnson's percentage in San Augustine County was 27 percentage points higher than the percentage for Johnson that the county would have had if its voting population had behaved in the same way as all of the Texas county electorates between the first and second primaries was derived by adding together the following products: 99 percent of the initial Johnson percentage (or .99 × 23 percent), 20.5 percent of the Peddy percentage (.205 × 39 percent), 31.7 percent of the "all other" percentage (.317 × 7 percent), and 2.2 percent of the percentage of the county electorate not voting in the first primary (.022 × 12 percent). The actual percentage of San Augustine County electorate voting for Johnson in the runoff was 57 percent, producing a positive residual of 27 percent (57 percent − 30 percent). For the sources for the number of poll taxes paid in each Texas county in 1948, and for the voting returns for the first and second 1948 Democratic senate primaries, see Table 1.

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Stevenson, on the other hand, made unexpectedly poor showings in many counties that had been lopsidedly in his column in the first primary. Of the twenty counties falling the furthest below expected turnout for the ex-governor, fifteen were in West Texas, including the Panhandle region. Stevenson correctly took for granted that he would carry most of West Texas, but his inability to turn out his supporters in large numbers underlined the malaise of his campaign. In sister counties Dallam and Hartley in the extreme northwestern corner of the Panhandle, for example, LBJ capitalized on "coffee coolin' Coke's" cancellation with only forty-eight hours notice of a scheduled address to the annual XIT Ranch reunion in Dalhart. Acts of this nature undercut the morale of the Stevenson advocates, but did not necessarily transform, as LBJ proclaimed, Stevenson voters into Johnsonites. The evidence presented here suggested that stay-at-home voters in Dallam and Hartley Counties slashed Stevenson's margin down from nearly three-to-one to slightly over a majority.[10]

Nothing illustrates the ineffectiveness of the Stevenson campaign in West Texas more than its failure to hold a second primary in two countries: Hansford (on the far northern Texas–Oklahoma boundary) and Kinney (on the Mexican border east of Del Rio). These counties in the first primary had favored the former governor over LBJ by respective margins of over three-to-one and over two-to-one, producing a combined plurality for Stevenson of four hundred votes. Because Stevenson's local supporters believed that their votes would be insignificant to their candidate's statewide margin of victory, they decided not to hold runoff elections in their counties.[11]

Assuming that subsequent voting behavior in the runoff in the Stevenson counties Hansford and Kinney would have mimicked the trends set by the counties where both primaries were held, a projected or predicted runoff result for each county can be calculated from the estimated relationships of voting patterns for the entire state (see Table 1). For example, had Stevenson captured 76.2 percent (17.9 percent/23.5 percent) of the Hansford County citizens who turned out and voted for him in the first primary, 54.7 percent (6.4 percent/11.7 percent) of the county's support for Peddy, and .2 percent (.1 percent/40.7 percent) of the qualified voters who had not voted in the first

[10] *Houston Post*, 17 August 1948.

[11] Caro, *Means of Ascent*, 286, 315. For the county voting returns for the first senatorial primary, see the *Texas Almanac and State Industrial Guide*, 465–467.

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primary, he would have won a hypothetical 27 percentage share of the total possible Hansford County vote, or 418 votes. Because LBJ would have received an estimated 155 votes, Stevenson would have enjoyed a majority in the county of 263 votes. Similarly, if an election had been held in Kinney County, the result would have been a majority for Stevenson of nineteen votes, generating a theoretical margin of victory for Stevenson in both counties of 282 votes and a conjectural statewide victory margin of 195 votes.[12]

The net loss or gain accruing to LBJ or Stevenson as a result of the idiosyncratic voting behavior in any county can be calculated by substracting the comparable residual values. For example, LBJ in Brewster county ran 12 full percentage points below the share of the possible vote he would have won had the Brewster County electorate behaved in the same way as all of the Texas county electorates between the first primary and the runoff; but his net gain over Stevenson was one percentage point (-12 vs. -13) or twenty-four votes (see Table 2). An unusually large decline in voter turnout between July and August in this West Texas county embracing Big Bend National Park on the Mexican border depressed Stevenson's runoff vote to a slightly greater extent than LBJ's total.[13]

The largest net gains and losses for LBJ and Stevenson above or below the predicted statewide trends are displayed in Table 3. Five of the six counties listed as having the most remarkable gains above the statewide trend in LBJ's favor were, not surprisingly, the neighboring Peddy strongholds in East Texas (San Augustine, Shelby, Panola, Nacogdoches, and Sabine) where LBJ had opened his second primary campaign and had targeted his most prodigious efforts. The abnormally large net vote gain for LBJ in San Augustine and Shelby Counties has been attributed to Edward A. Clark, a native of the area and one of LBJ's closest friends, who allegedly exercised with the help of Brown & Root Construction Company a phenomenal, albeit undue, influence, including promises of contracts, loans, and cash payments to individuals. Clark, who still resides in San Augustine, has in the past refused to talk publicly about what occurred in his home county or in Peddy's native Shelby County during the 1948 campaign. However, according to former U.S. Senator Ralph Yarborough, the LBJ camp "turned it

[12] In 1948 there were an estimated 1,548 and 972 eligible voters in Hansford and Kinney Counties, respectively. For the estimation procedure used, see note 1 in Table 1 above.

[13] In 1948 there were an estimated 2,399 eligible voters in Brewster County. See note 1 in Table 1 above.

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TABLE 3

The Largest Net Gains for LBJ and Stevenson Resulting from Gains or Losses Above or Below the Predicted Statewide Trends (in percentages of 1948 county electorates)

Group I: Net Gains Greater than 12 Percentage Points for LBJ			*Group II: Net Gains Greater than 12 Percentage Points for Stevenson*		
County	*Net Gain for Johnson*	*Estimated Size of 1948 Electorate*	*County*	*Net Gain for Stevenson*	*Estimated Size of 1948 Electorate*
San Augustine	37	2,759	Gregg (Longview)	17	20,650
Shelby	35	5,930	Lee	16	3,759
Panola	23	5,630	Burleson	14	4,514
Jim Hogg	21	2,174	Kenedy	14	119
Nacagdoches	20	8,254	Webb (Laredo)	14	12,155
Sabine	19	2,798	McCulloch	14	4,689
Howard	17	5,770	Austin	13	5,522
Duval	16	5,521	Mills	13	2,463
Madison	15	2,135	Hays	13	4,043
Houston	14	6,037			
Loving	13	111			

Note: The above percentages represent the net gain (in terms of shares of estimated 1948 "eligible voters") for LBJ or Stevenson due to idiosyncratic county voting behavior above or below the estimated statewide trends between the first and second senatorial primaries. For example, the finding that LBJ benefited from a 37 percentage point advantage over and above the statewide trend in San Augustine County was calculated by subtracting the 10 percentage points which Stevenson received *below* the possible vote he would have received had the San Augustine County electorate behaved in the same way as all of the Texas counties between the July and August balloting, from the 27 percentage points which LBJ received *above* the share of the possible vote he would have received had the county merely reflected the state trends (or 27 percent minus −10 percent = 37 percent). Actual N = 252.

around" between the two primaries "because of money" which Brown & Root spent "openly," "brash[ly]," and "ruthlessly."[14]

Historical accounts of the Johnson–Stevenson senatorial race rarely define vote fraud carefully. Activities such as large campaign expenditures, paying poll taxes for poorer citizens, treating voters to food and drinks, and making promises should not be clumped indiscriminately with other acts such as ballot box stuffing, miscounting, intimidation, and violence. The apparently Clark-orchestrated estimated shift to LBJ in San Augustine and Shelby Counties of some 3,097 votes (1,021 or 37 percent of 2,759 plus 2,076 or 25 percent of 5,930) need not have violated the voters' intentions or resulted from a dishonest manipulation of voting totals by election managers. The same cannot

[14] Caro, *Means of Ascent*, 274–275, 285, Ralph Yarborough quoted on 286. For a discussion of Texas campaign laws and money spent in the LBJ–Stevenson race, see Dallek, *Lone Star Rising*, 307–312.

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be said, however, for Jim Hogg and Duval Counties, two adjoining boss-controlled South Texas counties that also registered exceptionally large net gains for LBJ (see Tables 2 and 3). Notwithstanding that the vote for LBJ in Jim Hogg and Duval was initially bloated with bloc votes, the second-efforts in these two counties on behalf of LBJ by George B. Parr, the renowned boss of the South Texas bosses, were remarkable. (In previous elections Parr had delivered his bloc votes to Stevenson.) The evidence presented here suggests that Parr delivered 1,340 (457 + 883) more votes to LBJ than he would have otherwise received had Jim Hogg and Duval merely echoed the state trends. One could cynically argue that Parr did not commit serious distortions of the voting preferences of the large majority of the Spanish-speaking voters for whom he had traditionally paid poll taxes, but most contemporary observers claimed that arithmetical fudging governed outcomes more frequently than herding voters to the polls.[15]

Among the top eight counties with abnormally high net gains for LBJ is a lone West Texas county, which at first blush appears to be an indecipherable curiosity, but upon reflection goes far in explaining Stevenson's lackluster performance in reassembling his previous supporters. Howard County's major population center, Big Springs, had quartered an Army Air Force Bombardier School during World War II (see Table 3). Fallout from the so-called Eaker issue was bound to have a disproportionate impact here. General Ira C. Eaker, the former deputy commander of the Army Air Force, addressed a radio audience in West Texas ten days prior to the runoff balloting. In a network hookup covering the towns of San Angelo, Big Springs, and Abilene, Eaker praised LBJ's steadfast advocacy of "a 70-group air force," which would guarantee America's safety from air attack. Eaker pleaded with World War II veterans to rally around LBJ's candidacy. The Stevenson campaign's ill-advised counter-strike on the retired air force lieutenant general and his connections with the Hughes Aircraft Corporation boomeranged. In defense of Eaker, other prominent military officers stepped into the fray and aided the LBJ cause.[16]

Against a backdrop of increasing cold war fears, LBJ's "Peace, Preparedness, and Progress" slogan and his vindication of Eaker, a pop-

[15] Green, *The Establishment in Texas Politics*, 5, 114–115. For an introduction to Duval County politics, see Dudley Lynch, *The Duke of Duval: The Life and Times of George B. Parr* (Waco: Texian Press, 1976); and James L. Hailey, "Breaching the Mesquite Curtain: A Study of George Berham Parr" (M.A. thesis, Texas A&I University, 1988).

[16] *Houston Post*, 19, 21, and 22 August 1948; Dallek, *Lone Star Rising*, 294–295; and San Antonio *Express*, 26 August 1948.

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ular war hero, appealed to the new and potent constituency of returned veterans and their families and friends. On the strength of the Eaker issue, LBJ dramatically wiped out over two-to-one and over three-to-two Stevenson margins in carrying Howard County and adjacent Mitchell (Colorado City) County, respectively. Throughout the state, the issue of military readiness as embodied by LBJ's defense of Eaker against Stevenson's imprudent attacks brought considerable cross-pressures upon many initial Stevenson supporters, who evidently resolved their doubts by not voting in the August runoff.[17]

The largest Stevenson net gains failed for the most part to match the largest magnitudes of percentages of county net vote advantages for LBJ, but when translated into raw votes the unusually large percentage gains favoring Stevenson in Gregg (Longview) and Webb (Laredo) Counties more than offset reversals favoring LBJ in San Augustine and Shelby Counties and Parr's efforts for LBJ in Jim Hogg and Duval Counties (see Table 3). In support of Stevenson a few major (nonindependent) oil companies quietly spent large amounts of money two weeks before election day in Longview and Gladewater in heavily populated Gregg County. The mayor of Gladewater, who was credited with having carried the county for LBJ in the first primary, switched camps and successfully backed Stevenson in the runoff. The LBJ camp privately believed that Stevenson's adherents had purchased Gregg County votes, but whether this was accomplished by fraudulent tampering with the returns is extremely doubtful. The local pro-LBJ newspapers, the Longview *Daily Leader* and Gladewater *Tribune*, although stunned at the result and apparently ignorant of the activities of the oil companies, conceded that Stevenson had won in an honest and fair expression of voter preferences at the polls. Because the money spent in Gregg County may have mirrored similar exertions in violation of the Texas penal code on LBJ's behalf in San Augustine and Shelby, the LBJ camp probably avoided publicly protesting too much about the Gregg County reversal.[18]

Stevenson also bucked the state trends in Burleson County and neighboring Lee County by running relatively well, albeit in a losing cause

[17] For the county voting returns for the first and second senatorial primaries, see the *Texas Almanac and State Industrial Guide*, 465–467, and 474. On the low turnout for Stevenson in Mitchell County, see Table 2 above.

[18] Green, *The Establishment in Texas Politics*, 114, 117; Houston *Post*, 1 September 1948; Dallas *Morning News*, 1 September 1948; Garland Woodward to LBJ, 1 September 1948, and "Ted" [Ted Ryder?] to LBJ, 3 September 1948, Box 6, Johnson Papers, PPCF.

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(see Table 3). His net advantages here were not due to any ground swell of enthusiasm for his candidacy, but rather to the overconfidence of local LBJ partisans who, knowing that LBJ would easily carry their counties (which were located in the eastern part of LBJ's congressional district), failed to mobilize a full vote. In Austin County (west of Houston) the outcome in July was merely made more robust in August by a simultaneously held, hotly-contested runoff election for sheriff. Here the sharp increase in voter participation inadvertently skewed the senatorial vote by turning out Stevenson supporters who otherwise would have stayed at home. Thus a purely local circumstance beyond Stevenson's apparent knowledge or control redounded to his benefit.[19]

Stevenson also emerged with surprisingly high net advantages from two South Texas feudal baronies behind the so-called mesquite curtain. His net gain in Webb County was due to the failure of the Laredo political machine, crippled by the death of its long-time patrón, Peter P. Leyendecker, between the first and second primaries, to duplicate its initial efforts for LBJ (see Table 3). Stevenson had lost Webb County to LBJ in the first primary by over a twelve-to-one margin, but in the runoff LBJ's victory margin plunged to less than five to one—translating into a 1,701 vote net advantage for Stevenson. A similar 14 percentage point advantage favoring Stevenson in sparsely settled Kenedy County (The King Ranch) rendered only a 17-vote net gain for the former governor.[20]

Although LBJ won easily in both the first and second primaries in every South Texas "Parr-brokered" county, where the fix was in to some extent during the first primary, he would have done even better, nevertheless, in the runoff in these same counties had they reflected the

[19] Bellville *Times*, 29 August 1948. The LBJ campaign was aware of the counties where runoffs were simultaneously being held for local offices and adjusted its strategy to affect localities where a heavy voter turnout was anticipated. See Charles F. Herring to J. W. Walker, 3 August 1948 (copy), Box 106, House of Representatives, 1937-1949, Lyndon Johnson Papers, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, TX.

[20] San Antonio *Express*, 17 August 1948. In the runoff the Webb County machine had backed LBJ along with its own Philip A. Kazen for U.S. Congress. The Kazen-Lloyd M. Bentsen, Jr. runoff race was the bitterest battle ever in the history of the fifteenth congressional district and completely dwarfed voter interest in the senatorial race. Both Kazen and Bentsen supported LBJ over Stevenson, but only in Bentsen's home county of Hidalgo (McAllen) did heightened voter interest translate into disproportionate gains for LBJ. See Oscar C. Dancy to LBJ, 7 September 1948, Box 6, Johnson Papers, PPCF; Weslaco *News*, 18 and 25 August and 1 September 1948; and the *Valley Evening Monitor* (McAllen), 29 August 1948. See Dallek, *Lone Star Rising*, 347, who ignores the negative impact of the Kazen-Bentsen race on LBJ's totals in Webb County.

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TABLE 4

Respective Net Gains Over and Above the Statewide Trends for LBJ and Stevenson in Selected Counties (in percentages of 1948 county electorates)

County	Net Gain for Johnson	Net Gain for Stevenson	Estimated Size of 1948 Electorate
A. Counties under George Parr's Political Influence in South Texas			
Parr-dominated			
Jim Hogg	21		2,174
Duval	16		5,521
Zapata	2		1,429
Starr	6		6,130
Brooks		4	2,781
Partially Parr-controlled			
LaSalle	4		1,685
Neuces (Corpus Christi)		3	38,083
Webb (Laredo)		14	12,155
Jim Wells	4		9,677
(Questionable "second-effort" ballots cast for Johnson in Parr-dominated counties = 1,626 votes; in partially Parr-controlled counties = −2,390 votes. Net loss for LBJ = 764 votes.)			
B. Counties the LBJ Camp Wanted Investigated by the U.S. Senate			
Brown		10	8,589
Chambers	6		2,989
Clay		5	3,999
Dallas (Dallas)		4	143,522
Eastland		3	7,974
Galveston (Galveston)	4		33,912
Harris (Houston)	1		215,636
Wharton		2	8,832
(Possible illegal ballots "counted out" from Johnson's column or "added into" Stevenson's column in Brown, Clay, Dallas, Eastland, and Wharton Counties = 7,216 votes. Net gains favoring LBJ in Chambers, Galveston, and Harris Counties = 3,691. Net loss for LBJ = 3,525 votes.)			
C. "Second Effort" Ballots Cast for Johnson in San Antonio			
Bexar	5		102,273
(Net gain for LBJ in Bexar County = 5,114 votes.)			

statewide trends between the first and second primaries (see Table 4.A). The quantitative evidence thus suggests that within Parr's area of influence the truly extraordinary efforts in the runoff for LBJ were confined to Parr's home county of Duval (San Diego) and nearby Jim Hogg (Hebbronville). To the east in neighboring Jim Wells County—home of the notorious Box 13, which happened to be the only box in the county dominated by Parr's operatives—LBJ managed to acquire, according to the estimates, a 4 percentage point net gain over Stevenson, or about only 387 votes (of which at least 200 were patently fraudulent). In Brooks and Nueces Counties local patrónes failed in the second primary to exceed the state trend favoring LBJ. Thus, whatever may

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TABLE 4 (*Continued*)

County	Net Gain for Johnson	Net Gain for Stevenson	Estimated Size of 1948 Electorate
	D. Old "Ferguson" Counties[a]		
Angelina (Lufkin)	1		12,070
Austin		13	5,522
Bailey	0	0	2,628
Burleson		14	4,514
Comal		5	4,385
Coryell		6	4,306
Fayette (La Grange)		4	10,016
Falls		1	6,190
Guadalupe		9	6,327
Hamilton	1		3,658
Hardin		3	5,417
Henderson	11		7,828
Karnes		4	5,365
Lavaca	5		8,645
Lee		16	3,759
Medina	0	0	4,890
Milam		1	7,097
Mills		13	2,463
Newton	11		2,897
Orange (Orange)	4		11,792
Panola	23		1,295
Polk	5		4,259
Rains	3		1,718
Sabine	19		2,789
San Augustine	37		2,759
San Jacinto	12		1,168
Shelby	35		5,930
Somervell	9		1,123
Stonewall	2		1,576
Titus	4		5,196
Trinity	11		4,191
Upshur		12	5,812
Van Zandt	0	0	6,940
Washington		11	7,505
Wood		3	6,470

("Second-effort" ballots favoring LBJ in old "Ferguson" counties = 8,373 votes; favoring Stevenson in old "Ferguson" counties = 5,946. Net gain for LBJ = 2,427 votes.)

[a] Counties in upper fourth of all Texas counties ranked by V. O. Key according to their percentage of the popular vote for Miriam A. "Ma" Ferguson in second gubernatorial primaries of 1926, 1930, and 1932. See V. O. Key, *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Vintage Books, 1949), 266.

have been the magnitude of vote fraud or bloc voting benefitting LBJ in the South Texas Parr-brokered counties in July, second efforts for him in August apparently netted him less votes than were lost from his column in Webb County. As a consequence, questionable ballots cast for LBJ in the counties dominated by Parr and his collaborators amounted surprisingly to less than the net gains made by Stevenson in partially-controlled Parr counties.

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The quantitative findings generated here offer potential corroborating evidence of the likelihood that Stevenson's partisans dishonestly added in ballots for their candidate or counted out votes from LBJ's column. Although counties reporting vote changes favoring Stevenson can not automatically be assumed to have been the result of vote fraud, it is of minor interest that had no revisions been allowed, including those from South Texas, LBJ would have defeated Stevenson by 506 votes. In other words, the revisions that trickled in during the week after the election defied the law of averages and disproportionately helped Stevenson. LBJ publicly hinted, although usually in vague terms, that some of the amended returns entailed fraud, especially in Dallas County (Dallas), where the Democratic party chairman was Stevenson's cousin. LBJ also enumerated specific voting irregularities that he insinuated had aided the Stevenson cause. In Navarro County (Corsicana), he claimed that the ballots were suspiciously burned before a statutory date after which such burning was allowed. Even an honest mistake had cost him votes: an undisputed clerical error had transposed the Jack County results, wrongly giving Stevenson thirty additional votes.[21]

In addition to the counties where large postelection revisions favored Stevenson, the LBJ camp kept a running list of counties where election irregularities might have benefited Stevenson. In response to Stevenson's complaint, which launched a U.S. Senate subcommittee investigation of the election, LBJ significantly pared his list of counties, which he requested the Senate examine, to only eight (see Table 4.B). While the evidence generated here does not support LBJ's contention that Stevenson benefited from voting irregularities in neighboring Chambers (Anahuac), Galveston (Galveston), and Harris (Houston) Counties, the aggregated net gains in all eight counties favored Stevenson. The Brown County (Brownwood) result giving Stevenson, according to the estimates, an unexpected 859 vote advantage over and above the state trend, at first glance corroborates the speculation that this county was, as one historian has suggested, LBJ's "ace-in-the-hole" had he been forced to take the offensive in a drawn out battle to invalidate county returns within the Senate subcommittee or, for that matter, in any other forum. Although the unfolding of events never

[21] *Changes Made in the Figures of the Texas Election Bureau* (undated typescript), Box 6, and Walter Jenkins to Eliot Janeway, 31 July 1959, Box 9, Johnson Papers, PPCF; Dallas *Morning News*, 31 October 1948; Houston *Post*, 7 June 1952; and Dugger, *The Politician*, note 7, 459–460.

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required LBJ to press his challenge, the private correspondence of his strategists reveals that they were confident that Stevenson got more votes than were legally cast for him in Brown County.[22]

Upon further examination, the Brown County runoff result reflects the idiosyncratic pattern in Austin County where a local election brought out Stevenson voters who otherwise would probably have sat out the balloting altogether. The returns from six Brown County precincts in a heatedly contested county judge race were thrown out on a mere technicality, but there was no implication that the choices of the voters were misrepresented. The voters in these precincts had in fact emphatically favored Stevenson over LBJ. Nevertheless, had their ballots also been thrown out in the senatorial race, LBJ would have gained 468 votes.[23]

Although the Stevenson camp concentrated its formal protest to the Senate subcommittee on the bogus votes added into Box 13 in Jim Wells County and on alleged vote frauds committed in nearby Jim Hogg, Starr, Zapata, and Duval Counties, some observers have argued that undue influence in San Antonio could just as easily have supplied LBJ with a fraudulent margin of victory. The evidence marshalled here, however, offers insufficient support for claims that large sums of money personally distributed by LBJ and his partisans on election day throughout the Mexican-American west side of the Alamo City enabled him to carry Bexar County (see Table 4.C). LBJ, according to the estimates, ran a percentage point below the share of the possible vote he would have won had the Bexar County electorate behaved in the same way as all of the Texas county electorates between July and August. Nevertheless, his net gain over Stevenson was 5 percentage points, because Stevenson ran 6 percentage points below his predicted vote. LBJ's 5,114 vote net gain out of Bexar County over and above the state trend is not surprising for three reasons: Stevenson failed to make even a token appearance in San Antonio between the first and second primary elections; the Eaker issue plagued him in this community that was home to a large military population; and LBJ won the

[22] "Possible Election Irregularities Which Benefitted Coke Stevenson" (undated typescript), Box 6, and Samuel H. Still, Jr., "Texas Senatorial Contest—Synopsis of Facts," 25 March 1949, Box 8, and *Memorandum Concerning Illegal Votes Counted in Brown Co., Texas, Which is Now Involved in a Contest in the County Judge's Race, By Reason of Which Lyndon Johnson Might Be Able to Pick Up Some Votes* (undated typescript), folder marked "Election Irregularities," Box 6, Johnson Papers, PPCF.

[23] Green, *The Establishment in Texas Politics*, 116.

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endorsement and active support of Frank Cortéz, a local candidate for the U.S. Senate seat who in the first primary had received 3,891 Bexar County votes cast predominately by west siders. Finally, it should be kept in mind that in San Antonio elections, traditional vote buying, treating, and personal favors usually involved poorer voters whose intentions were not necessarily distorted.[24]

The quantitative evidence generated here also provides a direct test of the provocative hypothesis that bits and pieces of "the rusting Ferguson machinery" had cranked up behind LBJ in the runoff for their "last hurrah." Former Governor Miriam A. "Ma" Ferguson, thankful for LBJ's kindness after the death of her husband, former Governor James E. "Pa" Ferguson, had sent after the first primary an epistle endorsing LBJ to her supporters from the late 1920s and early 1930s. The evidence presented here corroborates the conventional wisdom that the old Ferguson counties did not vote distinctively but that some supporters of the Fergusons might have contributed to LBJ's strong showing in a host of eastern Texas counties (see Table 4.D).[25] The happenstance that some of the Peddy strongholds of extreme East Texas, especially San Augustine and Shelby, were among the counties that had registered consistently heavy majorities for the Fergusons in the gubernatorial primaries of 1926, 1930, and 1932 should not seduce scholars into concluding that Ma's letters were directly responsible for LBJ's victory.

In conclusion, it will always be effortless for historians to account for LBJ's victory by falling back on the some two-hundred fraudulent votes cast for him in Box 13 in Jim Wells County. The real challenge is to advance satisfying explanations for the votes cast for LBJ elsewhere. In light of the evidence presented here, the cumulative residual second efforts on LBJ's behalf in the boss-brokered South Texas counties proved to be of no unusual help. The analysis of the relationships between county voting patterns throughout the state in July and August suggests that the vigorous efforts made by LBJ to mobilize his former supporters, the extraordinary degree to which the Eaker issue struck a responsive chord among the World War II generation, and the assiduous exertions, although presumably well-lubricated with cor-

[24] Caro, *Means of Ascent*, 305–307; San Antonio *Express*, 23, 26, and 28 August 1948; David R. Johnson, John A. Booth, and Richard J. Harris, eds., *The Politics of San Antonio: Community, Progress, & Power* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 15–27. Robert A. Caro estimates the number of ballots illegally cast in the runoff for LBJ in San Antonio at roughly 10,000—a figure which he claims "does not appear to be greatly exaggerated" (Caro, *Means of ascent*, 471).

[25] Green, *The Establishment in Texas Politics*, 114 (quotation) and note 39 on 264.

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porate money and promises, in the old Peddy strongholds—all gave momentum to LBJ's candidacy. Knowing instinctively that the returned World War II veterans were the crucial new constituency, LBJ adroitly defined himself as the energetic and knowledgeable national candidate who had been to war and knew what was necessary militarily for the United States to maintain its place in a new world order. Stevenson willingly let himself be portrayed as the folksy State House candidate who was unsophisticated in the ways of the world beyond the Red River. What Stevenson offered was, in the words of a former LBJ aide, "old hat, old ways, old everything," and LBJ won because Texans rejected it.[26]

If the runoff primary vote count had been honest, accurate, and free of undue influence, would LBJ still have won? This is a question no historian can answer. The bottom line seems to be that LBJ squeaked out the closest victory ever for a U.S. Senate seat because over one-fifth of his opponent's initial voters sat out the balloting in the runoff election. His victory was also attributable to an indefatigable second primary campaign in which he mobilized an amazingly large percentage of his initial voting strength. Had "Calculatin' Coke" brought out his former supporters at the same rate as "Landslide Lyndon," the former governor would have easily defeated the ambitious congressman by over 100,000 votes—a margin of victory that could not have been overcome by mere theft via amended returns or even by an outright stealing of, in Caro's words, "many thousands" of votes.*

[26] Horace Busby quoted in Sidney Blumenthal, "The Years of Robert Caro," *The New Republic*, 4 June 1990, 35.

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Representation and Territory: The Israeli Experience

NANCY L. SCHWARTZ

Recent debate on electoral reform in Israel raises the question of whether the country should be divided into territorial districts for electing national representatives. This article explores Israel's remarkable resistance to districting in the context of Israeli political culture and asks whether democracy and political legitimacy would be enhanced by districts.

One of the hallmarks of a political state is territory. A state is "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."[1] There is a defined geographical area the regime attempts to govern. While other associations—kinship groups, tribes, a people, a nation[2]—may have political characteristics without having territory, the state in the modern era must have sovereignty over a bounded area.[3] A state possesses external boundaries.

[1] Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation" in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, trans. and ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 78. Weber continues, "Note that 'territory' is one of the characteristics of the state."

[2] Judith Hicks Stiehm, "The Man Question" in *Women's Views of the Political World of Men* (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1984), 208-14.

[3] Even the phenomenon of exiles abroad, claiming to be the legitimate regime for the home state, attests to the centrality of sovereignty over territory. See Yossi Shain, *The Frontier of Loyalty: Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation-State* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1989).

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Whether states also require internal boundaries is more controversial. Certainly, some subdivision is necessary once the country surpasses a small size. For sheer reasons of scale, the extraction of taxes and provision of services requires the drawing of lines. More than one justice of the peace or police officer cannot roam at will; they are assigned to discrete areas, each expected to perform the same role fairly, "*sine ira et studio*, 'without scorn and bias.'"[4] There is a definition of tasks according to impersonal criteria and by geographical area, with allowance made for density of population.

But this is an administrative division, concerning the output of a national government once policy is agreed upon.[5] What about geographical division for the input to government, for the debate and deliberation about policy? Should the country be divided into districts when the people choose their government, their political representatives? Representatives are supposed to perform their legislative tasks differently; "[t]o take a stand, to be passionate—*ira et studium*—is the politician's element."[6] How are the political representatives to define their tasks? To whom and to what are they passionate and responsible? Does political community and democratic accountability require the dividing of a country into electoral districts?

Most countries answer in the affirmative. In America and Britain, a basic unit of electoral politics is the local constituency, which chooses a single member by plurality vote. On the European continent, every state has geographic subdivisions for at least some aspect of the national elections process.[7] The districts are often multimember, choosing several legislators by majority vote or proportional representation. While districts may coexist alongside at-large or nationwide elections for some of the seats in the legislature, the political practices of most representative democracies affirm local geographic division.

Theoretically, we might argue that choosing representatives territorially is conducive to the creation of political community.[8] Political

[4] Weber, "Politics as Vocation," 95.

[5] These remarks apply to a national government, whereas a federal system is based on differentiation at the state level. In addition to administrative and electoral districts, the latter to be discussed in this article, there is also the question of governmental districts, beyond our ken here.

[6] Weber, "Politics as Vocation," 95.

[7] Arend Lijphart and Abraham Diskin, "Electoral Reform in Israel: The Basic Options," working paper presented to the Israel-Diaspora Institute, conference at Caesarea, Israel, March 1989, 3; Douglas Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967, rev. ed. 1971), chap. 2; Arend Lijphart, *Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), chap. 9.

[8] Nancy L. Schwartz, *The Blue Guitar: Political Representation and Community* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 20–22, 96–103, 106, 113–16, 117–22, and chap. 8.

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community requires citizens – formally free individuals, of diverse social backgrounds, who identify as members of the political whole. If representative institutions are arranged in certain ways, representation can educate the people into citizenship and thus help constitute the community. By coming from a local district and then sitting in a national legislature, the representative can stand and act for both the particular and universal aspects of political life. He or she stands in a descriptive sense for the social background of the majority who inhabit the area and also stands in a symbolic sense for the political character of the locality, its own choice of values. Bearer of these local attachments and loyalties, the representative then acts for the interests of the political whole. Throughout this process of standing and acting for collectivities, territorial representation also preserves the formal individualism of people by weighting the votes of citizens more or less equally in the choosing of each representative. The district representatives, even if they also belong to strong national political parties, keep certain clear lines of authorization and accountability to their local electorates. At its best, the system works to meld individual persons into political citizens, participants in a diverse national polity. At its worst, it disenfranchises minorities and leaves the inhabitants as apolitical as they were before.

Israel provides an interesting example of a state that does not have local geographic division for representation. The country is one big district for national elections, where individuals vote for a party list of candidates and seats are awarded according to proportional representation. Candidates are ranked according to their importance on the party lists, and then depending on how many votes each party wins, the seats are awarded from the top of the list down.[9] Political party organizations have great influence over candidates and voters, and the system also allows for a multiplicity and fluidity of small party formations.

The Israeli electoral system, being an almost pure type of a nonterritorial system of representation, raises certain theoretical questions. Is locally based representation central to political democracy? If a nation eschews territorial representation, how do we characterize it? Can it be considered liberal democratic, and if not, does it fit into other

[9] Oscar Kraines, *Government and Politics in Israel* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1961), 86–90. Marver H. Bernstein, *The Politics of Israel: The First Decade of Statehood* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 82, 86–90.

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categories to describe democracies divided politically along nonterritorial lines, such as corporatist and consociational polities? If it is not a liberal democracy, is it a civic republican or communitarian polity? And beyond characterization, what significance does such an electoral system have for the creation of political community? Does it contribute to the development of citizenship, or does it merely ratify and keep within bounds a latent civil war?

To answer these questions requires understanding the meaning and consequences of the electoral system. Since the Israeli system has been challenged as inadequate by reformers, I will take the most recent chapter of this debate and transform its general claims into more specific propositions, conditions that would have to be met if the case for territorial representation is to be made. I will also assess the meaning of these hypothesized effects in the context of Israeli political culture—first in terms of democratic legitimacy and then in terms of political legitimacy more broadly conceived.

I will argue that the introduction of geographic districts will not necessarily lead to greater democratic accountability or political community in Israel. Districts will not necessarily increase the influence of the individual voter; districts may decrease the influence of significant minority parties while also leading to increased intraparty fragmentation, or alternatively, to the effective disenfranchisement of certain minorities and thus to a delegitimation of the system. Examined in the context of Israeli political culture, the opposition to territorial districts can be understood.

Background

The Israelis have debated the merits of their electoral system for many years: electoral change or reform has been on the political agenda for almost as long as the state has existed. At independence in 1948, they adopted the national proportionate system, which had roots extending fifty years into the pre-state period.[10] David Ben-Gurion, the first prime minister, would have preferred a single-member district system based on the British model.[11] Most other proposals for reform have stayed closer to the multimember proportional system. Surfacing, and

[10] Howard M. Sachar, *A History of Israel, vol. I, From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1976), 135–36, 146–47, 191–92, 355.

[11] Avraham Brichta, "1977 Elections and the Future of Electoral Reform in Israel" in Howard Penniman, ed., *Israel at the Polls* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1979), 42.

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being defeated, directly or indirectly, the issue of electoral change is a recurrent one.[12] An official formulation states,

> The possibility of changing the governmental and electoral systems will be examined, with the aim of fortifying the country's democratic regime, of augmenting the government's ability to act, and of increasing the connection between voters and those elected.[13]

Since no party has ever won a Knesset (parliament) majority on its own, a plurality party has had to enter into coalition with others to form the government. The government is formed out of the parliament; the president of the state chooses as potential prime minister the leader of a parliamentary party deemed able to form a majority governing coalition. From 1948–1977, during the years of the Labor party's hegemony, Mapai (Israel Workers' party) usually found its coalition partners in Achdut HaAvoda (union of labor) and later with Mapam (socialist workers), also with the Mizrachi and HaPoel HaMizrachi (religious Zionists, later Mafdal or National Religious Party [NRP]) and the Progressives (later, Independent Liberals) and often with labor-affiliated Arab party lists. Other parties, such as Agudat Israel (religious, Hasidic-led Ashkenazic), the Sephardim, and General Zionists were sometimes in the government. In 1977, as one-party dominance gave way to two parties gaining significant national pluralities, the Likud party (union of the Herut—successor to the Revisionists—with the Liberals and Free Center parties) made a government coalition with the NRP and Agudat Israel.[14] In the 1984 and 1988 elections, Labor and Likud and their allies were almost evenly matched, and each sought additional small parties for a parliamentary majority. After long and inconclusive negotiations, primarily with Mafdal, Agudat Israel, Shas (religious, Sephardic) and Degel HaTorah (religious, Mitnagged Ashkenazic), the Likud and Labor parties decided to form a second national unity government with each other, although some of the religious parties (Mafdal, Shas) were in the government as well. (Agudat Israel sometimes serves in government coalitions but does

[12] Avraham Brichta, "40 Years of Struggle for Electoral Reform in Israel," *Middle East Review* 21 (Fall 1988): 18–26.

[13] "The Government's Guidelines, Major Points from the Basic (Policy) Guidelines of the Government's Programme," 22 December 1988, *Jerusalem Post*, int'l ed., 31 December 1988. Similarly, "Document: The New Government's Policy Guidelines," point 18, *Jerusalem Post*, int'l. ed., 23 June 1990.

[14] Daniel Shimshoni, *Israeli Democracy: The Middle of the Journey* (New York: Free Press, 1982), app. B and C, tables B and C, 494–97.

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not have full cabinet ministers, rather vice ministers, due to its sages' prohibition of their holding such political power.) In spring 1990, the unity government lost a vote of confidence, Shimon Peres was then unsuccessful in forming a Labor-led coalition, and Yitzhak Shamir was successful in June.

The outgoing Knesset passed two electoral changes: raising the threshold vote, the percentage of the vote required for a party to win a Knesset seat, to 1.5 percent, effective 1992; and direct election of the prime minister, effective 1996. In the June 1992 elections, the 1.5 percent threshold served to exclude Tehiya (renaissance nationalist party) from a seat it would have won under the old rules, and before the election the threshold influenced small parties to unite or try to unite. Three left-wing parties—Ratz (Citizens Rights Movement), Shinui (Change)-Center Movement, and Mapam—formed Meretz. Two Arab lists tried without success to combine—Arab Democratic party and Progressive List for Peace. And three religious parties—Agudat Israel, Degel HaTorah, and Moriah—formed United Torah Judaism (UTJ). The higher threshold may have influenced voters to cluster around and create medium and large parties among those passing the threshold, although this time the percent of valid votes wasted on parties below the threshold doubled, from about 2.5 percent in 1988 to 5 percent in 1992.[15] The higher threshold did not discourage parties from running; 25 approved lists competed.

The Labor Party led by Yitzhak Rabin ran as if direct election of the prime minister were already in effect,[16] stressing "Labor headed by Rabin" as its official name on the ballot, although many voters also knew that a new dovish list of Labor candidates had been selected by internal party primaries that spring.[17] The 1992 primary, expanded since the 1988 primary to all Labor party members, used organizational districts for voting and for most slots on the ticket.[18] These districts were both geographical (main urban areas, plus larger regions) and functional (kibbutzim, moshavim, and minorities). The Likud, after

[15] Asher Wallfish, "The PR Calculation of Votes," Guide to the June 23, 1992 Knesset Election, *Jerusalem Post*, 19 June 1992, Supplement, vi; "Final Results," *Jerusalem Post*, 28 June 1992; "How Israel Voted: June 23, 1992," *Jerusalem Report*, 16 July 1992, 13.

[16] I owe this observation to Myron Aronoff, letter to the author, 9 July 1992, 1.

[17] Michael Yudelman, "Labor Members Choose Young, Dovish Leadership," *Jerusalem Post*, 2 April 1992, 1-2.

[18] Dan Avnon, Israel Democracy Institute, letter to the author, 6 August 1992, 2; Myron J. Aronoff, "Better Late than Never: Democratization in the Labor Party" in Gregory S. Mahler, ed., *Israel After Begin* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 258–61, 267.

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suffering its defeat at the polls, resolved to hold party primaries in the future. It did so in March 1993 for its party chair, who would also be the next candidate for prime minister.

In the national elections, Labor won a significant plurality, and with Meretz plus two predominantly Arab parties (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality and the Arab Democratic List) had enough for a blocking majority against a Likud-led government. Asked to form a government, Labor swiftly negotiated a coalition with Meretz and Shas, also leaving open the possibility of Tzomet (a secular ultra-nationalist party) and UTJ joining at the ministerial or deputy ministerial levels.

The complicated negotiations to form a government and the influence of small parties in the government evoke public criticism and the call for more electoral reform. Proposed electoral and governmental change includes increasing the threshold vote beyond 1.5 percent and dividing the country into geographic districts for electing some or all members of the Knesset (MKs). Reform can also include a new constitution for Israel, completion of a basic law specifying civil and political liberties, and separation of church and state.[19] Of these issues—threshold vote, geographic districting, new constitution, bill of rights, and church/state separation—I will concentrate solely on territorial districts and in passing on the threshold vote insofar as it bears on the question of geographic districting.

Of the many plans for districts proposed over the years, I consider four significant alternatives—one for 120 single-member plurality districts; one for a "mixed system 60/60" with multimember districts alongside national proportional representation (a compromise from Gad Ya'acobi's Knesset committee in the last government); a variation on this, a "mixed system 80/40" (proposed by the Israel-Diaspora Institute); and an alternative "mixed system 60/60" of single-member districts alongside one at-large district (from Uriel Reichman's constitution group). During the current government, in 1992 MKs from five different parties proposed the second and fourth of these plans.

In all these plans, local districts might lessen the influence of small parties by making it harder for them to win seats. Certainly, if there

[19] Uriel Reichman, Baruch Bracha, Ariel Rosen-Zvi, and Amos Shapira of the Constitutional Drafting Committee, "A Constitution for the State of Israel," (Tel Aviv University Law School, 1987), 48. See also David Krivine, "Concerned Scholars Create Constitution for Israel, including Electoral Reform," *Jerusalem Post*, 1987; and Editorial, "Tilting at Windmills," *Jerusalem Post*, 12 August 1987. The 1986 proposed constitution has been revised and several proposed basic laws derived from it; some have been enacted in whole or in part.

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were 120 single-member districts with plurality rules, as explored by Nadav Safran, only one party would win in each constituency.[20] Unless a minority were highly concentrated geographically (such as the ultra-orthodox in Mea Shearim in Jerusalem and Bnai Brak in Tel Aviv, and the Arabs in the Galilee region) larger parties would tend to win overall. But an entire single-member district plurality system has not made it onto the formal political agenda.

Most electoral proposals retain a certain number (60 or 40) Knesset seats to be elected by national proportionate representation, as at present. Then 60 or 80 Knesset members would be elected by regional proportionate representation in multimember districts. In Gad Ya'acobi's mixed system 60/60 proposal, there would be 20 three-member districts with local proportional representation. Here there would be greater opportunity than in a single-member plurality system for more than one party to gain seats, but the results would still favor the larger parties in each district. In such districts "a small change in the percentage of the popular vote could bring about a large enough reallocation of seats to move the major parties in and out of power."[21] Since the number of seats elected at-large would decrease from 120 to 60, the effective threshold for gaining one seat would have been raised. (The Ya'acobi committee also proposed a formal threshold of 3.3 percent.)

The other major mixed system proposals have devices to reduce the disproportionality induced by local elections, yet some disproportionality remains, and there are different thresholds. The Israel-Diaspora (now Israel Democracy) Institute's mixed system 80/40 proposed using Israel's current fourteen administrative subdivisions as 14 multimember districts, with members from each district apportioned according to relative population, to total 80 seats. Then "a national pool" of 40 seats, with candidates chosen from ranked party lists as at present, would "be used to compensate for any disproportionality in the results of local elections." A threshold would be set at 2.5 percent, "thus reducing the number of parties. . . ."[22] Alternatively, the draft Constitution for the State of Israel by Uriel Reichman et al. proposed another

[20] Nadav Safran, "Interim Report on Electoral Reform of Harvard's Study Group on Israeli Politics," app. 3 in Yoram Peri, ed., *Electoral Reform in Israel* (henceforth "IDI-I"), Israel-Diaspora Institute, Report No. 5 (Tel Aviv: Alfil Publishing Ltd., 1989), 60–71; also, David Krivine, "Methods for Skinning the Electoral Reform Cat," *Jerusalem Post*, 10 April 1989.

[21] Peri, IDI-I, 39–40, 41; and Peri, *Electoral Reform in Israel Part III* (henceforth "IDI-III"), Israel-Diaspora Institute, Report No. 9 (Tel Aviv: Alfil Publishing Ltd., 1990), 16–17, 22–23.

[22] Ibid., 47–48.

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mixed system 60/60. Here, there would be 60 single-member plurality districts, alongside national proportional elections for the other 60.[23] National seats would be allocated by party according to its share of the overall (local plus national) vote, minus the number of local seats won. If a party won more seats in the constituencies than its overall vote warranted, it would keep those seats and they would be added to the total number of Knesset members (as in Germany). The threshold would be set at 2.5 percent (in Germany it is 5 percent).

In all these alternatives, the possibility of a party that wins less than 5 percent of the overall vote winning a Knesset seat is low. Parties that currently win less than four seats would disappear from the Knesset. Proponents estimated that the proposed mixed systems would, even without a higher threshold, reduce the number of parties. Parties winning elections would then number 7–9, down from the average of 11; and this in turn would diminish the number of parties contesting elections, down from the 28 in 1988 and 25 in 1992.[24]

Arguments in Favor of Geographic Districts

The main argument in favor of reform is that it would increase the likelihood of forming a government that could make decisions and have disciplined majority control of the Knesset on legislative and administrative issues.[25] If we group the reform arguments into separate propositions, the main expected effects of districts are to weaken the hold of the very small parties in coalition bargaining and governing; lessen the fragmentation of parties in electoral campaigns; increase the personal connection between the individual voter and the national representative; and weaken the hold of large parties over candidate recruitment and nomination. This last outcome is not uniformly desired by those in favor of reform, nor is it openly expressed by all who do favor it. The first two goals seek to engender a clear majority party or parties (and perhaps also a clearly defined opposition) that would give the government greater ability to act; the second two rea-

[23] Reichman et al., "A Constitution . . . ," 14–15.

[24] Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1988*, no. 39, "28 Parties Running for Knesset Seats," *Jerusalem Post*, int'l. ed., 8 October 1988; Peri, IDI-I, 39; Chuck Freilich in Peri, IDI-III, 16; Asher Wallfish, "Elections Committee Okays 25 Lists, Bans 5," *Jerusalem Post*, int'l ed., 3 June 1992.

[25] David Libai, Uriel Lynn, Amnon Rubinstein, and Yoash Tsiddon, *Changing the System of Government in Israel, Proposed Basic Law: The Government* (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 1990), 7, 49.

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sons for districts seek to increase the influence of the individual voter. At times, these two sets of considerations may be incompatible, if, for example, a voter intensely wanted to choose a minority party.[26] What is also remarkable in these arguments, which I shall consider briefly in turn, is that none of them makes a case for districts based on a consideration of creating political community within or among constituencies.

Weakening Small Parties

Diminishing the influence of the smallest parties is the most generally agreed upon goal of electoral reformers. Ya'acobi, then MK Labor and former chair of the special Knesset Coalition Committee on electoral reform and now ambassador to the United Nations, wants to break "the stranglehold of the small parties" on effective government.[27] Ya'acobi has been backing bills for regional, rather than national, proportionate representation since 1971. Even former Prime Minister Shamir, whose Likud predecessor party Herut opposed electoral change, remarked, "it is impossible to carry on with the existing system which leads to unseemly bargaining after every election."[28] Ya'acobi wants "the prevention of the tyranny of the minority . . ." and "a drastic reduction in the ability of small parties to extort concessions of vital national importance from a helpless majority."[29] Among those favoring electoral reform, the main offending small parties are deemed to be the religious, as in a (secular) newspaper editorial demanding that "the national majority be rid of the tyranny of minority parties, mainly religious."[30] There is also the claim that such coalitions are short lived: "unstable coalition government dependent on the whim of splinter parties."[31] While evidence does not support the claim that the resulting coalitions are unstable,[32] they may be deflected from their

[26] Peri, IDI-I, 49.

[27] Gad Ya'acobi, "Electoral Reform Now," *Jerusalem Post*, 26 July 1988.

[28] N. D. Gross, "Old Faces in New Cabinet," *Jerusalem Post*, int'l. ed., 31 December 1988; also, Dan Petreanu, "Shamir Says He'll Support Change in System of Government," *Jerusalem Post*, 25 December 1988.

[29] Gad Ya'acobi, "Tyranny of the Majority—or Minority," *Jerusalem Post*, 6 April 1989.

[30] Editorial, "Quo Vadis, Electoral Reform," *Jerusalem Post*, 9 June 1988.

[31] Dan Petreanu, "Electoral Reform," News in Brief, *Jerusalem Post*, 13 April 1989; see also, Petreanu, "Reichman Calls Urgently for Direct Election of PM," *Jerusalem Post*, 10 April 1989.

[32] Lijphart and Diskin, "Electoral Reform," 1, 2; Brichta, "1977 Elections," 32.

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original aims when the demands of the parties "bend the will of the majority to serve narrow 'sectional interests.'"[33]

Lessening Party Fragmentation

The reformers also want to lessen the number of parties competing in the pre-election period. The hope is that if the threshold or "cut-off quota" is raised or if districts operate with some disproportionality in their election rules, very small and especially new small parties will not appear so often. "Shamir also bemoaned 'the proliferation of political parties,'"[34] and Ya'acobi wants to reduce the incidence of "one-man factions" and increase the incidence of small parties joining with each other.[35] In 1992, when the threshold was raised to 1.5 percent, three left-of-center parties joined together to form Meretz, and two Ashkenazic religious parties formed United Torah Judaism. One can see that it might be easy for members of the largest parties to argue for the consolidation of small parties, preferably with the larger parties rather than with each other. But before 1992 there were also some small parties, such as Shinui and Tzomet, who might have lost their Knesset seats, yet whose leaders still advocated reform.

Increasing Voter-MK Connection

They do so because their priority is to increase the personal connection between the voter and representative. Amnon Rubinstein, then MK Shinui-Center, now MK Meretz, aims "to create a direct personal link between the MK and those who put him in. The MK would have to assume a responsibility to serve and a personal obligation to voters who meet him face to face."[36] Rubinstein, former dean of Tel Aviv University Law School and now Minister of Education, helped found Dash (Democratic Movement for Change, DMC) in 1977, which ran mainly on this issue of introducing district elections. Parties like this, which stress individual liberties of the citizen, both rights and responsibilities, want individuals to have more influence over their representatives and in turn want legislators to be more directly responsible to

[33] Editorial, "Equal Rights and the Budget," *Jerusalem Post*, 31 March 1989.

[34] Petreanu, "Shamir Says."

[35] Gad Ya'acobi, *The Government of Israel* (New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1982), 31, 32–33, 68, 74, 77, 306–7.

[36] Wallfish, "A Reform Whose Time Has Come," *Jerusalem Post*, 16 December 1988.

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their constituents. With geographic districts, the voters would have a specific MK to turn to for their specific plaints and through the reelection process would have a way of holding the representative to account.[37] Development towns in outlying areas and geographic regions in general would have a fairer share of national representatives.

While most of the Israeli proposals for electoral reform do not have single-member districts and do not provide for by-elections in case a seat becomes vacant, still, more elements of personal popularity and local issues would figure in candidate selection and election under a multimember district system than at present.[38] Even if the constituency to which the legislator were accountable was ultimately the party of which local constituents were a part, they would now have a specific member of that party responsible for them. Dedi Zucker, then MK Ratz, now MK Meretz, "attributes his party's popularity in great part to its MKs' personal contacts with members of the public who have always felt they have somebody to appeal to when their rights are infringed."[39]

The idea of "narrow[ing] the distance between the voter and his elected representative" runs throughout the various proposals for electoral change. This would "thereby strengthen . . . democracy," it is asserted, by decreasing the alienation of the voter, giving him or her a greater sense of efficacy. The Israel-Diaspora Institute's report on an electoral reform conference, organized by Yoram Peri, editor of *Davar*, continues that, "Constituencies should be introduced into the electoral system in order to enhance its responsiveness to the average citizen."[40] A 1986 proposed constitution by Professors Reichman, Baruch Bracha, Ariel Rosen-Zvi, and Amos Shapira, then of the Tel Aviv University Law School, called for half the Knesset members to be "elected on a personal candidature basis in direct elections."[41]

One might ask: is it really possible for the influence of all the citizens to increase and the distance between all the constituents and their representative to decrease? In districts containing tens of thousands

[37] Ya'acobi, "Tyranny of the Majority."

[38] Avraham Brichta, "The Political Consequences of the Proposed Electoral Reform in Israel" (paper presented at Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Newport Beach, CA, March 1990), 8-11. See also Lijphart and Diskin, *Electoral Reform*, 4.

[39] Wallfish, "A Reform Whose," 19. As chairman of the Knesset law committee, Zucker introduced two proposals—a mixed 30/90 system and a 60/60 system. Dan Izenberg, "Electoral Reform Proposal," News Brief, *Jerusalem Post*, int'l. ed., 5 February 1994.

[40] Peri, IDI-I, 36.

[41] Reichman et al., "A Constitution," 14.

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and characterized by majorities and minorities, can all voices, or only some, be heard and attended to? In America, "home style" representatives have concentric circles of supporters surrounding them, with influence decreasing outward from the center.[42] The Israeli reformers, to make their case here, will have to show either: that the possibility of getting new items on the political agenda and of forming new majorities is greater in a district than a nondistrict system, and thus the potential influence of the activist citizen is enhanced;[43] or that the connection for which they are searching is not "policy responsiveness" but "service responsiveness," the bread and butter constituency work that American Congress members are known for.[44]

Weakening Party Holdover Candidates

If the influence of the average citizen were increased, would that lessen the power of the politically active citizens, especially the party members? This is a result that some reformers hope for, others foresee, and others disavow. Daniel Elazar of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs finds a "mediocritization of Israel politics" and attributes it to "central control [of the parties] over the nominations process." He wants to weaken the role of "professional politicians" and open the process up to "good people," "interested people [who will] find it easier to run for office on the basis of their personal talents." District elections will bring forth "capable people, regardless of their party standing, since they will be able to challenge the party organizations within their localities."[45] Similarly, Eliezer Whartman of the Committee of Concerned Citizens (CCC) sees "a crushing mediocrity in the Knesset," since candidates must advance through party ranks and accept party discipline, and hence "[a]lmost no independent thinker joins the major parties."[46]

[42] Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* (Boston: Little Brown, 1978), chap. 1.

[43] Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 70.

[44] Heinz Eulau and Paul Karps, "The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Components of Responsiveness," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 2 (August 1977): 242–46.

[45] Daniel Elazar, "Electoral Reform for Israel," *Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints* (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs) 64 (15 September 1987): 2, 3.

[46] Eliezer Whartman, "Electoral Reform: Can Anything Be Done?" *Newsview* (26 December 1984–1 January 1985): 17.

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We might ask: What is independent thought? What is the value of independence as opposed to collective action in politics, and does independent thought appear even in the nonmajor parties? What is really being called for here is not so much independent as nonideological thought and a weakening of the ideological nature of all parties, large and small. Party machines, staffed by ideological party activists, are seen as restrictive. In this view, parties should appeal to the "large numbers of people . . . who had no ideological stake in any particular party," a "'non-party' population."[47] Perhaps, they argue, a "two-party system"[48] with large nonideological parties, alternating between government and opposition, and not subject to the claims of minor parties, could emerge.

Most reformers, however, question the desirability (much less the possibility) of this Americanization of Israeli politics.

> In a constituency system with a weakened party machine, less affluent candidates will find it difficult to run for office. Meanwhile, campaigns will become more expensive since even candidates of the same party will be campaigning against each other as well. . . . [If] candidates will have to campaign individually, thus weakening the party structure[, t]he ultimate result will be a group of Knesset members who draw their strength from the popular vote and will be less in debt to their parties for their position. Factionalism will increase, discipline will be weakened, and the Knesset will find it harder to function.[49]

Intraparty factionalism could increase if parties become more inclusive while weaker. Because of the specific conditions of Israeli politics, which include an electorate with significant and multiple "visions and divisions"[50] and a history of articulating these visions through politics, leading reformers like Ya'acobi, Reichman, and Peri want to find a way to have constituency representation while still preserving strong party organization. Primaries held within the Labor party in spring 1992 opened up the nominations process to all party members yet not to all party supporters in the general population, thus preserving the significance of party organization, and it did this through geographic and sectoral districts.

[47] Elazar, "Electoral Reform," 2.
[48] Whartman, "Electoral Reform," 9.
[49] Peri, IDI-I, 43.
[50] Myron J. Aronoff, *Israeli Visions and Divisions: Cultural Change and Political Conflict* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989).

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Coalition and Community

Even more than the projected effects of geographic districts, I am interested in their intended meanings. Institutions embody values, sometimes inchoate, sometimes implicit; and both the proposed institutional changes and the opposition to them embody a certain understanding of democratic politics.

The actual effects of geographic districts would be to diminish the number and influence of very small parties during election campaigns and in the pre- and postelection periods. Insofar as these parties have been able to hold larger parties hostage to bargaining in forming a government, their disempowerment would lead to increased democratic accountability and effectiveness, if by that is meant responsiveness to the will of a majority or plurality of the voters.

Electoral districts would not necessarily increase the personal influence or connection of the voters with their representative. The make-up of the district and its electoral formula (majority, plurality, or proportionality required to win a seat) will also play a role, and there is the political problem of who would draw the districts. While some Israeli districting proposals call for following existing political and administrative boundaries,[51] another plan envisages "natural" demographic boundaries to ensure ethnic homogeneity,[52] which while preserving some proportionality might also increase the alienation of minority individuals in those regions. This is not more democratic than the present system, if democracy also requires actual rather than virtual representation of individual persons in all their diversity.

If political life requires not only the representation but also the interaction of different parties, where does this occur in the Israeli political system? Since the district proposals, with one exception, retain a modified form of proportional representation, there are few incentives for the local interaction between groups that occurs under Anglo-American plurality and majority systems. We could say that in America, coalition-building occurs at the local level and before the election, while in Israel it occurs at the national level after the election. With

[51] Brichta, "1977 Elections," 55, n. 27; Peri, IDI-I, 45, 47; Uriel Reichman, letter to the author, 26 July 1989, stated that their proposed twenty-district map was "based on maintaining as much as possible population equality between the districts, geographic continuity, and existing municipal and regional council boundary lines."

[52] Peri, IDI-I, 50, and Peri, *Electoral Reform in Israel*, part II (henceforth IDI-II), Israel-Diaspora Institute, Report No. 6 (Tel Aviv: Alfil Publishing Ltd., 1989), 6–9, 11–27.

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electoral reform, the coalition problem might appear within rather than between the parties.

While aiming to strengthen the national political community—its ability to act and its internal cohesion and legitimacy—the reform proposals do not have as a goal, nor even a means, the building of local political community. Geographic electoral districts, while perhaps having some of the hoped-for effects, are not proposed in order to increase political community among the parties or citizens at the local level.

This is in marked contrast to the United States, which in its federalism and civic republicanism sees local political districts as building blocks and microcosms of the whole. The power of the local New England township, growing gradually for 150 years before the federal Constitution of 1787, and depicted in its political and administrative aspects by Alexis de Tocqueville in the 1830s, was carried over into an American ideology of local political districting for state and national representatives.[53] While some districts were originally homogeneous in their population, others were more varied, and all districts eventually became heterogeneous. Therefore, each could be seen as a microcosm of the whole, containing diverse individuals and groups that had to enter into coalitions. In a plurality or a majority winner-take-all system, diverse groups have the incentive to join together in the pre-election campaign in order to win a seat.[54] There is a binding effect of this Anglo-American decision rule that encourages local dialogue.

Why is there so little interest in building political community at the local level in Israel? What if there were greater incentives for religious and secular Jews to act together politically in an area and for Jewish and Arab Israelis also to do so? Some changes in municipal government, such as the direct election of mayors in 1978, moved in this direction of encouraging local factions to work together to win elections.[55] But national politics is still conducted in a non-locally-based fashion, giving primacy to historic ideological divisions. Most Israelis and even many of the electoral reformers are not interested in local political districting as an end in itself.

[53] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1945), vol. i, chaps. 3, 5, 12; vol. II, bk. 2, chaps. 4–8. See also, Schwartz, *Blue Guitar*, 73–74, 129, and chap. 8.

[54] Ya'acobi, *Government of Israel*, 31.

[55] Daniel J. Elazar, *Israel: Building a New Society* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 54.

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Arguments Against Districts

The Israeli reluctance to adopt territorial districts is a puzzle. It might be explained by considering the arguments against electoral reform and also by exploring their notions of political representation in the context of the political culture. What does Israel share with other political cultures, and what is unique?

Our discussion focuses on Israel within the cease-fire lines of the war of 1967. This does not include the occupied territories,[56] although there will be reference to peoples in the areas, insofar as some can vote in national elections. Perhaps precisely because the problem of the territories, or Israel's external boundaries, is so highly charged, is one reason why Israelis do not want to debate the question of internal boundaries.

It is ironic in this regard, however, that one of the points in Prime Minister Shamir's proposed plan for the peace process in May 1989 was regional elections or districts in the territories for the Palestinian elections of delegates to negotiations. These districts were analyzed in the *Jerusalem Post* as a way to break the power of one dominant party (the PLO) that might win overwhelmingly in proportional representation (PR) elections in one national district, and which might face more diverse opposition from Islamic fundamentalists and other Palestinians in regional districts.[57] Eliezer Whartman of the CCC group for electoral reform commented on the irony of the government only being able to move on electoral reform in the territories.[58] The irony disappears somewhat if one notes that in the 1988 National Unity government, insofar as either party was committed at least partly to electoral reform within Israel, Likud was more for direct election of the prime

[56] Jewish settlers in the occupied territories have voted in Israeli national elections. Palestinians in East Jerusalem will vote for the Palestinian Autonomy Council. These are trans-territorial arrangements across highly contested borders. Other issues such as who can run for office and how and where voters will vote are still to be decided in the peace process established by the Declaration of Principles on Palestinian Self-Rule in the Occupied Territories negotiated between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Oslo, Norway and signed in Washington, DC in September 1993. Yoel Marcus, "The Battle for Jerusalem Has Already Begun," *Ha'aretz*, 7 June 1994, Israel Information Service, Israel-Mideast@vm.tau.ac.il. The PLO wants Palestinians living abroad to vote in the elections for the Autonomy Council. Herb Keinon, News Brief, *Jerusalem Post*, int'l. ed., 23 July 1994.

[57] "A Peace Initiative by the Government of Israel," sec. 16, *Jerusalem Post*, 15 May 1989. Menachem Shalev, "Regional Elections Aimed at Preventing One Political Party," *Jerusalem Post*, 15 May 1989.

[58] Eliezer Whartman, "Direct Elections," Letter to the Editor, *Jerusalem Post*, 22 May 1989.

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minister while Labor was more committed to geographic districts.[59] This plan perhaps originated from the Labor-led foreign ministry.

Both Labor and Likud have backed away from electoral reform when the power of potential coalition partners required it. The Labor party also backed down at times when such exigencies did not confront them. The ease with which electoral districts can be eclipsed by other political priorities points to a deeper unease about the issue.

There are a variety of arguments against geographic districts within parts of Israeli political culture. Some arguments are clearly self-interested in the short-run sense; others are more rationally based in a system of self-interest broadly understood; and there are also arguments that involve value commitments going beyond utilitarianism into more absolute standards. Some of the arguments have been explicit, and other are implicit. There may even be structures of thought that go behind or beyond arguments.

Maintaining Party Strength

The most palpable objection to districting is that it would hurt the power position of existing politicians. Large parties comfortable in their ability to attract allies may not want their possibilities diminished; for years Labor did not feel it needed to change the status quo. Even in a position of relative parity between two major parties, the bargaining possibilities with many small parties may appear more attractive than with fewer; in 1990 the Likud gambled on this possibility and won. Small parties may oppose electoral change because it threatens their very existence: thus Agudat Israel demanded that the government not move on electoral reform. On the other hand, Tzomet demanded and left the former government coalition on the grounds that coalition members be allowed to "vote their conscience" on these issues.[60]

With electoral reform, party organization would change. Reform would lessen parties' centralized control over internal political processes, such as candidate recruitment and nomination, since with districts, local party organizations and even local primaries might come to control candidate slating. As some small parties disappear, the re-

[59] Wallfish, "A Reform Whose"; Andy Court, "Five MK's Launch Drive to Change Vote System," *Jerusalem Post*, int'l. ed., 7 January 1989.

[60] "Setback for Electoral Reform," *Israeli Democracy* (Winter 1990): 38; Gil Sedan, "Push for Reform Challenges Shamir," *Connecticut Jewish Ledger*, 7 June 1990, 1, 4; "Tsomet Quits Gov't Over Likud Reform Rejection," *Connecticut Jewish Ledger*, 27 January 1992, 1, 4.

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maining parties will become more unwieldy coalitions of different factions, harder to control from a center.

Enhancing Legislative Supremacy

There are also arguments used by the politicians and the parties, large and small, which are not mere rationalizations of short-run self-interest. They begin with debate on the relative power to be given different institutions of a polity—the prime minister and his cabinet, the government, the Knesset, the courts, and the public—media, other citizens organizations, and especially political parties.[61] Advocates of legislative supremacy in a parliamentary system tend to support strong parties and the virtues and experience of professional politicians rather than amateurs.[62] If districting were to take the control of political recruitment out of the hands of party members and leaders, candidate selection might become prey to local or national interest groups and to passing fancies and charismatic manipulators of the electorate. This, it is argued, can be undemocratic if it gives in to the more powerful organized interests and disorganized fears of the populace. These arguments on the merits of strong versus weak parties can occur in any political system. Then there are arguments more specific to Israel or to countries similarly situated. These concern its size and heterogeneity.

Keeping A Sense of Smallness

"Israel is too small to be divided into districts," its citizens often say. The land area is small; the length of the country can be covered in one drive. The country's narrow width is a fact never absent from discussions of security. "We are small" often translates into "and we are united," a theme that represents aspiration as much as reality. Yet there are differences of character between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, the Negev desert and the Galilee region, the development towns and the developed urban areas.[63] The American state of New Jersey is similarly small in area, if somewhat larger in population (7.8 million,

[61] Emanuel Gutmann, quoted in Krivine, "Methods for Skinning," 5.

[62] Weber, "Politics as Vocation," 83–84, 99, 115. (Although also see Weber's critique of proportional representation, 114.)

[63] Peri, IDI-I, 50.

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compared to Israel's 5.1 million plus 1.7 million in the occupied territories in 1991); New Jersey has thirteen congressional districts.[64]

Representing Heterogeneity

Israel also seems big, not geographically but socially and hence politically, because it is so diverse. Just as it has a great range of plants and topography, so too its range of ethnic, religious, and cultural (and class to a lesser extent) groups is great. There are cleavages, yet they are not exactly pillared as in segmented societies with consociational polities; nor are they cross-cutting cleavages in which any one division can be overshadowed by another.[65] For while not all of the social divisions are politically salient to the people as voters, some cleavages persistently are. The ethnic splits among Jews (by country of origin, or more generally, between Ashkenazim and Sephardim) are not directly translated into political party differences, except among the ultra-orthodox Jewish religious parties. To some extent, Labor has been more Ashkenazic and Likud more Sephardic in its membership. But the chief political divisions are rather over social philosophy and religious observance, into three main camps; "socialists, secular nonsocialists [revisionists and liberals], and religious. . . ."[66] The Israeli Jewish vote divides into these three political camps, with the socialist party losing its hegemony after 1977, the more market-oriented camp slowly rising in its fortunes since 1977, and the religious vote staying at about 15 percent over time (12 percent in 1992), even as the specific parties change.[67] Israeli Arabs, comprising 17–14 percent of the population, tended to vote for the Labor and Mapam parties of the Zionist left, directly or through Arab lists affiliated with Labor; then there was an increased vote for the Democratic Front or Rakah (Communist party) and two independent predominantly Arab parties (the Arab Democratic Party and the Progressive List for Peace), while in munic-

[64] Edith R. Hornor, ed., *Almanac of the 50 States* (Palo Alto, CA: Information Publications), 243; *The Europa World Yearbook 1994*, vol. 1 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1994), 1547.

[65] Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 3–5, 10–12.

[66] Lijphart, "Semiconsociational Democracy: Israel" in ibid., 129. For a different typology based on intensity of nationalism – humanist, nationalist and ultranationalist Zionism – see Aronoff, *Israeli Visions*, 132–35, although there are also non-Zionists and anti-Zionists outside the typology, 130–32.

[67] Asher Arian, *Politics in Israel: The Second Generation*, rev. ed. (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1989), chaps. 5, 8.

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ipal elections votes shifted from the Communists to Islamic fundamentalists.[68]

Democratic Legitimacy

There is a deeply held belief in Israeli political culture that significant minorities in the population deserve a voice. This does not apply to every newly forming pressure group; Israel is not a pluralist democracy in the American sense of open formation of new economic and single-issue interest groups and their easy access to the institutions of the political system.[69] But on the key issues of religion and political history, it is widely accepted that significant minorities deserve a voice.[70] Two enduring significant minorities are the religious Jews and the Israeli Arabs. A third might be the kibbutz members. While people in the majority do not necessarily want to grant these minorities power in a way that would give them geographic control over the local area, and while they neither expect nor wish to see these groups become the majority, they still wish to preserve their political presence. At the state's founding, "[a] basic political assumption was that no 'constructive' interest could be adversely affected without its consent in a matter which that interest considered to be of vital national importance."[71] Why did the Israelis think this, and why these particular groups? Pragmatic reasons are stated first, and then they merge into questions of democratic legitimacy.

The political theorist Shlomo Avineri, an opponent of electoral reform, writes,

> Raising the threshold may, incidentally, also do away with Rakah which, at present, is an effective *democratic* means for many Israel Arabs to voice their unhappiness with having to live in a country with a Jewish majority. By acting as a democratic conduit of Arab protest, Rakah has—dialectically—helped to integrate many Israel Arabs into the country's political structure. Depriving

[68] Sammy Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 342; Arian, *Politics in Israel*, 147; Ehud Katz, "From Where They Stand," *Israel Scene* (July 1990): 4; Katz, "A Race to the Finish," *Israel Scene* (December 1991): 7.

[69] Arian, *Politics in Israel*, 205–13.

[70] This view is acknowledged even by some reformers who advocated direct election of the prime minister. "The proposed law rests on the assumption that there is no political possibility—and there are those who believe it is good that there is no such possibility—to change the pure proportionality which characterizes the electoral system and which is deeply rooted in the awareness of the public in this country." David Libai et al., *Changing the System of Government*, 8.

[71] Shimshoni, *Israel Democracy*, 56.

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> them of this conduit could push many of them to much more dangerous and non-democratic means of protest.[72]

Similarly, John de Frece, a member of the Mapam Central Committee, argues,

> The extinction of representation for religious parties will produce unending extra-parliamentary activities and even revolt since the avenue of parliamentary action will be sealed off. This will constitute a serious threat to democracy.[73]

Both Avineri and de Frece also move on to a theoretical argument that democracy requires the empowerment of minorities as well as majorities, and that straight majoritarian democracy is undemocratic. For De Frece,

> there is absolutely no justification in adopting a system which will perpetuate—permanently and artificially—the domination of the two parties which are presently (and possible [sic] temporarily) the largest in Israel.

Avineri writes,

> Democracy is not only about majority rule; it is also about minority rights. The religious Jewish bloc is a minority in this country. . . . [B]asically the religious minority is doing what every minority aims to to—trying to maximize its power in order to persevere and gain through coalition-making what its numerical inferiority cannot give it.

Reichman, leader in the fight for electoral reform, grants that

> [I]n Israel various minority groups—the Arabs, the Orthodox—must be given a voice in the Knesset. Under the system we propose, the number of parties in the legislature will be reduced from the present 16 to something like six or seven, which is more reasonable.[74]

For Shimshoni, a "fundamental intuitive sense of legitimacy" requires attending to minorities, "[giving] substance to coalition building and coalition decision making."[75]

[72] Shlomo Avineri, "Changing the Rules Will Not Remove the Problem," *Jerusalem Post*, 21 June 1987.

[73] John de Frece, "A Case against Constitutency Representation," *Jerusalem Post*, 24 August 1986.

[74] Krivine, "Concerned Scholars".

[75] Shimshoni, *Israeli Democracy*, 57.

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Political Legitimacy

Beyond democratic legitimacy, there are other sources of political legitimacy that lead to these political mores. Here we move onto the field of Israel's unfinished revolutions.

Nationalism. The first of these is nationalism, the modern (19th and 20th century) revolution that seeks to create a nation-state out of diverse individuals and principalities. Loyalty to the nation-state needs to be forged, and Israel has been fairly successful at this. After independence, Ben-Gurion worked on *mamlachtiut* or statehood, strengthening state institutions and destroying quasi-private branches of organizations performing public roles (that is, the Palmach and the Irgun in the defense forces, and the socialist labor track in education).[76] Today 43.9 percent of Jews (although only 4.4 percent of Arabs) see their primary collective self-identification as citizens, rather than as members of a religious, ethnic, socioeconomic, or family grouping.[77]

Israelis often say the reason they need one big district for Knesset elections is that national problems overshadow local ones: because of seven wars since independence, foreign policy has a primacy that regional elections might threaten. But other countries with locally based national elections have found ways to form fairly unified foreign policies. Party divisions, rather than local issues, seem often to challenge coherent foreign policy; and countries, including Israel, have already worked out ways to craft bipartisan, even multipartisan foreign policies.

The goal of forming a national unit faces a greater problem. Since the Israeli state is based on continuous Jewish immigration, the job of political integration is continuous.[78] Institutions are not set in a state of "crystallization," as waves of newcomers alter their emerging characteristics.[79] Immigrants come with their old languages and prepolitical memories of another place. Israeli citizens and policy makers debate the methods of indirect and direct absorption as acculturation processes. For the immigrants, if locality were to be stressed in Israeli

[76] Charles S. Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, *Civil Religion in Israel: Traditional Judaism and Political Culture in the Jewish State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), chap. 4, esp. 84, 87, 92, 93–94, 97–98; Elazar, *Israel*, 75, 80–82, 204; Charles Liebman, "Conceptions of 'State of Israel' in Israeli Society," *Jerusalem Quarterly* 47 (Summer 1988): 103; Arian, *Politics in Israel*, 89, 216, 247–49.

[77] Smooha, *Arabs and Jews*, 87 and chap. 7.

[78] Brichta, "1977 Elections," 45–46; Shimshoni, *Israeli Democracy*, chap. 3.

[79] Ya'acobi, *Government of Israel*, 118.

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national politics, the locality that would matter would be their country of origin or that country's ethnic group. For this reason, perhaps, many Israelis are wary of stressing locality.

Zionism. The second revolution forming Israel's political culture is Zionism, the modern form of Jewish nationalism. It arose after the emancipation of the Jews in Europe as they confronted problems of being Jews in the face of modernization, secularization, and modern racial (rather than religious) anti-Semitism.[80] Zionism seeks a homeland for the Jewish people and has been predicated from the start on including all groups and approaches within it. This has had consequences for the political system it framed: ever since the first Zionist Congress in Basel in 1897, groups have been represented by the proportional representation system, each faction receiving delegates in direct proportion to its share of the vote.[81] Thus different socialist parties worked with bourgeois liberal parties and also in tandem with the revisionist wing, while the socialists maintained overall control in the pre-state community. These alliances were strategic—to win an independent state from the British and the world community—and tactical—insofar as they expected to have to live with each other and negotiate sectional interests in the independent state.[82]

Secular parties worked with the religious, and this alliance was more than tactical. In some way the labor Zionists were indebted to the religious for the soul of the religion and for the claim to the land, even as they rebelled against traditional Judaism.

> Zionism is the only secular movement [in Judaism] which tried to come to an agreement with Orthodox Jewry. The reason for this was not only practical . . . but possibly, and maybe primarily, ideological. It is connected to the problem of legitimation of the Zionist movement, for while in every "normal" national movement, the link between the territory and the nation is natural and is not cast in doubt, as far as the Zionist movement is concerned, the link between Palestine and the Jewish nation is . . . based . . . on historical memories, links and sentiments. These memories and sentiments are an essential part of Jewish tradition, which Orthodox Jewry represents, both in the eyes of the secular Jews and in the eyes of the non-Jewish world. It was most essential

[80] Shlomo Avineri, *The Making of Modern Zionism: The Intellectual Origins of the Jewish State* (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 3–13.

[81] Sachar, *History of Israel*, 135–36, 146.

[82] For years the ruling Labor party tried to delegitimize the Herut. See Donna Robinson Divine, "Political Legitimacy in Israel—How Important Is the State?" in Ernest Krausz, ed., *Politics and Society in Israel*, Studies of Israeli Society, vol. iii (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1985), 222–23, 225–26; also, Arian, *Politics in Israel*, 90.

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for the Zionist movement to gain to its side at least part of Orthodox Jewry, and to prevent the Orthodox camp from standing in opposition to it.[83]

Even highly secular Israelis wish to claim a contested national territory and do not wish to disenfranchise the religious *qua* religious, although some may wish to diminish the influence and number of their parties. Beyond the percent of the population that votes for religious parties, there is also another equal portion who are traditionally religious and vote for secular parties. Both the Likud, which has many traditionally religious voters, and Labor, the post-socialists, have bridges with religious groups. From 1948 until 1977, before the National Religious party left the coalition with Labor to enter a coalition with the Likud,

> Labor . . . entered into the arrangement with the Mafdal for reasons which were broader than the simple needs of power. Like most Jews, the leaders of Labor have believed that religion, or religious practice, was responsible for the survival of the Jews as a people throughout the centuries. The Hebrew language, Jewish history, major holidays, and the Bible are symbols around which all people could unite, and around which the Zionist movement rallied.[84]

Traditional liturgy and interpretation speak of a return to the land, providing an older underpinning for Zionism; political messianism heightens the stress on the land.[85] It need not be all of the historic land. Yisrael Lippel, a former Mafdal MK and then a Labor party MK, answered a query on how "a religious voter . . . [might be] willing to give up a part of Eretz Yisrael?"

> That's easy. I was raised in an ultra-Orthodox home. My father was a Bratzlav hasid who left everything to come to Eretz Yisrael, who went to pray at the Western Wall every day. I don't have to prove my link to Eretz Yisrael.
>
> But I don't see the state as the redemption, I see it as a stage in the redemption. We have to do far more. I am also aware of the Holocaust and the fact that we have to preserve the Jewish people in the Land of Israel. The area of land is not the essential thing, and we must do everything to avoid war. As far as territory is concerned, we must leave something for the Messiah.[86]

[83] Menachem Friedman, quoted in Baruch Kimmerling, *Zionism and Territory: The Socio-Territorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics* (Berkeley, CA: Institute of Int'l. Studies, 1983), 205.

[84] Shimshoni, *Israeli Democracy*, 38.

[85] W. D. Davies, *The Territorial Dimension of Judaism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), chap. 1 and 110–15.

[86] Haim Shapiro, "Quest for the Religious Vote," *Jerusalem Post*, int'l ed., 29 October 1988; and Davies, *Territorial Dimension*, 9, n. 3.

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Biblical tradition. Ancient Jewish political thought and practice, with its dynamism of factions with strong leaders, provides a third element in Israel's political culture that might militate against territorial districts. Before the institution of kingship, representation in the tribal confederation was by numbers and not by territory, "a tribal and numerical key instead of a regional one."[87] Kingship inaugurated more geographic subdivision; "tribal boundaries were replaced by a royal administration that crossed old borders." Solomon, for example, collected taxes through twelve districts not contiguous with the twelve tribes.[88] Later commentary would see both the tribes and their association with geographic areas as divisive.

> Why was the Torah not given in the Land of Israel? . . . To avoid dissension among the tribes. Else one might have said: "In my territory the Torah was given." And the other might have said: "In my territory the Torah was given." Therefore, the Torah was given in the desert, publicly and openly, in a place belonging to no one. To three things the Torah is likened: to the desert, to fire, and to water. This is to tell you that just as these three things are free to all who come into the world, so also are the words of the Torah free to all who come into the world.[89]

With kingship, there was a threefold dynamic between the priests, who controlled the religious cult, the kings, who centralized political administration, and the prophets, who spoke of the people's direct covenant with God. Central political power was never absolute, always limited by these other forces.[90] Prophets challenged the king and the people whenever they thought they were abusing power or ignoring the covenant with God. The prophetic promise leads to a critical view of state power and a dynamic, historical way of thinking. Sometimes it advocated seemingly apolitical action: Isaiah, for example, counseled Ahaz, king of Judah, not to subject himself to the Assyrians in fending off a threat from Syria and Israel. Ahaz's son Hezekiah tried to preserve the religious and political autonomy of his people by allying with

[87] Shlomo Goren, "Halacha and the People's Will," *Jerusalem Post*, 18 November 1988.

[88] Gordon Freeman, "Politics and the Prophetic Tradition in Judaism," (paper presented at Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, September 1987, 3–4); John Drane, *The Old Testament Story* (New York: Harper and Row, 1983), 84–85.

[89] *Mekhilta, ba-hodesh* 5, quoted in David Hartman, *A Living Covenant: The Innovative Spirit in Traditional Judaism* (New York: The Free Press, 1985), 327, n. 9. Also, Davies, *Territorial Dimension*, 93–94.

[90] Maimonides, *Mishneh Torah*, Bk. 1, Knowledge, sec. on Study of the Torah, chap. 3, sec. 1, in Isadore Twersky, ed., *A Maimonides Reader* (New York: Behrman House Publishers, 1972), 66. See also, Elazar, *Israel*, 187.

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Egypt against Assyria, yet Isaiah counseled against this too.[91] The prophet Jeremiah tells the people of Judah not to rely upon Egypt for strength in confronting the Babylonians. Rather, the people should temporarily accept the Babylonian exile in punishment for their corruption, build houses and gardens there, and after seventy years He will cause them to return. The prophets' prophecies come to pass.[92]

The prophets speak for the preservation of the people as a whole and for their direct relation to the Lord. *Realpolitik* is not always what it appears, they say, based on their understanding. If the people will observe the commandments, God will keep His promises in due time. And while contemporary Zionists would deeply oppose this kind of thinking for its political passivity, still a strain of it persists in the political culture.[93] Often individuals, groups, and political leaders become moral absolutists over certain issues, whether it be over preservation of the kibbutzim, nonacceptance of German reparations payments, or aspects of religious observance. And periodically, strong individuals leave their parties and coalitions and go into exile, forming one-man factions, and then they get wooed back to the parties.

Political loyalty in Jewish nationalism is to a people existing dynamically in historical time, not always so safely in political space. From this belief and experience comes a more sceptical view of the relation of representation to territory.

Hebrew language. It has also been suggested that the very structure of the Hebrew language affects their thinking about space and time. Hebrew thought compared with Greek is said, by some interpretations, to be more dynamic and historical, whereas Greek thought stresses the static and objective nature of things. Their notions of "word," for example, differ. In Hebrew, *dabhar* means both a spoken utterance as well as an activity or deed, a driving forward; in Greek, *logos* means both the spoken sound and the rational content behind it, an ordered arranging.[94] Verbs in Hebrew are said to connote "complete or incomplete action," rather than a discrete past, present, and future; and

[91] Drane, *Old Testament Story*, 116–17, 122, 125, 127; Isaiah 7: 30.1–7, 31.1–3 in *Oxford Annotated Bible*, rev. std. ed., Herbert G. May and Bruce M. Metzger, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962).

[92] Drane, *Old Testament Story*, 138–39; Freeman, "Politics and Prophetic Tradition," 12; Jeremiah 2.18, 27, 29.4–14, 37.5–10.

[93] David Biale, *Power and Powerlessness in Jewish History* (New York: Schocken Books, 1986), 16, 32, 40–42.

[94] Thorleif Boman, *Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek*, Jules Moreau, trans. (New York: Norton, 1970), 65, 66, 67.

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even "being" (*hayah*) in Hebrew is active, a combining of "becoming, being and effecting." As a result, the meaning and form of a thing do not stand apart from its origination by an actor, whether it be God or man, and the material in which it occurs.[95] The Hebrews are more oriented toward time, as a psychological continuum punctuated by different rhythms that one can feel and hear; the Greeks are said to be more oriented towards space, the idea of an unchangeable enclosed space that one could see or imagine.[96]

Liberal, Civic Republican, or Communitarian?

These differences in history and language may contribute to differences between Israel and other countries regarding local districting. Many modern republics are influenced by the political heritage of Greece and by the Atlantic republican tradition, which had roots in ancient Greek thought and Roman political practice. Civic humanism or republicanism values the citizen as one who possesses *virtù*, the disposition to save the city from destruction by fate and time.[97] It has a vision of a city that is diverse internally, while the homogeneity the citizens do share is kept safe from forces beyond the city walls. Political representatives in such republics come from different geographic areas of the polity.[98]

Can Israeli political culture be characterized as civic republican? Civic republicanism lies midway between liberalism and communitarianism, sharing the liberal belief in individual autonomy but placing freedom within a community context that is higher than mere social life and is a sphere of political values such as honor and glory. Israel is not a liberal polity; it does not enshrine all civil and political rights in its constitutional practice, and it has strong state involvement in the economy and society. Nor is Israel civic republican; it is rather a communitarian democracy, and its contrasts to civic republicanism are intriguing.

[95] Ibid., 144–45, 38, 45–46, 145–57.

[96] Ibid., 126, 131, 133–41, 170–81, 201–2, 205. Davies, *Territorial Dimension*, 130–31. See also Shlomo Riskin, "Shabbat: Building the World a Sanctuary in Time," although see "For a Jew, There Is No Place But Home," *Jerusalem Post*, int'l. ed., 29 February and 1 August 1992.

[97] J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, *Fortune Is a Woman* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

[98] Schwartz, *Blue Guitar*, 16–18 and chaps. 5–7, esp. 73–76, 107–17, and 129.

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A citizen under a civic republican regime is characterized by independence, deliberation, and the right to bear arms.[99] Independence, not being dependent on the will of another—through slavery, alms, or even wage-labor—is deemed crucial to autonomy, the capacity to form one's own free and reasonable judgment. Civic republicanism believes that possession of private property tends to assure this independence and tends to base political representation on property and place.[100] Deliberation is the mode of ideal public discourse, in which general principles are considered and debated and made to apply to specific situations. The hope is that citizens can agree on certain first principles, although they may also decide to collectively change them from time to time. The right to bear arms signifies another aspect of the citizen's independence—his ability to make a crucial contribution to the city's defense through a citizen militia—as well as his patriotism and potential heroism, the willingness to risk one's life for the city. Because of keeping a rather sharp distinction between the public and private spheres of life, civic republicanism tends to have exclusively male citizens.

In Israel, both men and women have the duty to bear arms. Women and men are drafted into the armed forces, although women may not serve in combat units. The exceptions to the draft include Jewish yeshiva students (men), ultra-orthodox women, and women with children. Christian Arabs and non-Bedouin Muslims are not drafted into national military service, Druzes are drafted, and the Bedouin may volunteer for the professional army. The drafting of Arabs could presumably occur if peace treaties with Arab countries were signed in the region. Military service affirms Israelis' patriotism and heightens their status.

Israeli citizens are not independent in the civic republican sense. They are enmeshed in a series of dependent and interdependent relations in society, and in a "hierarchical and dependent political culture."[101] Civic

[99] J. Donald Moon, "Citizenship and Gender" in *Constructing Community: Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), chap. 7, 146–47.

[100] J. R. Pole, *Political Representation in England and the Origins of the American Republic* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pt. iii, esp. sec. 1, "Massachusetts Discovers the Majority Principle," 197, 207, 213–14, 246–48. For a contrasting view, based on looser definitions of civic republicanism, see Peled, drawing on Sunstein, arguing that PR might be an expression of civic republicanism under modern conditions. Cass R. Sunstein, "Beyond the Republican Revival," *Yale Law Journal* 97 (July 1988): 1541, 1547–58, 1585–89; Yoav Peled, "Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab Citizens of the Jewish State," *American Political Science Review* 86 (June 1992): 432–34, and n. 1. They seem to take civic republicanism beyond its specific meanings regarding economics, military service, and political deliberation.

[101] Shimshoni, *Israeli Democracy*, 60, 122.

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republicans believe that individuals derive their autonomy primarily from private ownership of the land. In Israel, most of the land is collectively owned, nationally, and leased to individuals. The one exception to this is private property of Arab landowners. Israelis have had dependent and interdependent relations to collectivities—political parties and religious organizations with extended welfare and educational programs, such as the Histradut, General Zionists, and the Mizrachi in the pre-state period. Did they feel oppressed by this? In general, they were grateful to the bodies and ideologies that helped them when they first arrived. While this is changing as the economy and society become more privatized, there are still key institutions such as the army and, to a lesser extent, the health system that are still collectivist.

Finally, Israelis engage in deliberation, yet the discourse is not sober and philosophical, but rather passionate disputation. It is an "intense political society," with "divisions aggravated by a cultural pattern which places a premium on argumentative articulateness and dialectics."[102] Consensus in the sense of unanimity is not sought; it is told that "[u]nder Talmudic jurisprudence, panels of judges served as juries and had 23 members. When a panel returned a unanimous verdict, the court was required by law to throw it out, on the grounds that there must have been a predisposition or bias that precluded objective evaluation of the evidence."[103] Deliberation takes the form of argument often about the interpretation of one book. There is one book the Jewish citizens all read, whether as revelation, literature, or history—and then, they argue.

The religious culture "encourages intellectual opposition, even while it insists on obedience, to authority" in behavior. This "freedom to disagree combined with the obligation to obey" allows intellectual diversity while stressing "the fulfillment of obligations rather than [in] the exercise of rights."[104] The political culture combines autonomy with authority, but the authority is to be discovered; it is not given.

Citizenship in Israel is related to this book. The relation to the land is not essential, although it may be deemed crucially necessary at this

[102] Benjamin Akzin, "The Role of Parties in Israeli Democracy" in Gregory S. Mahler, ed., *Readings on the Israeli Political System* (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1982), 55, 52–54, 58.

[103] Stanley K. Sheinbaum, "Bunker Mentality," *The Nation*, 23 January 1989, 77.

[104] Sol Roth, *Halakhah and Politics: The Jewish Idea of a State* (New York: KTAV Publishing, Yeshiva University Press, 1988), 105, 112, 104. See also 50.

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historical point in time, in these two centuries of assimilation and the holocaust, but land is not the thing that defines who this people are.[105]

They do not achieve their political individuality through where they locally live. Whereas in America, according to Alexis de Tocqueville, we learn to love the whole from love of the part—in the present, through local government, and for the future, in the nation's goals. In Israel, they acquire affection or tolerance for the part through love of the whole, which is learned from oral and written tradition about the past, beloved actors who have come before.*

[105] Davies, *Territorial Dimension*, 78, 101, 122–26, 134. Avineri, *Making of Modern Zionism*, 29, 31, 34–35.

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Nationalism and Small-State Foreign Policy: The Greek Response to the Macedonian Issue

NIKOLAOS ZAHARIADIS

Few people could have foreseen the complications posed by the resurgence of nationalism and interethnic tensions in the wake of the dissolution of communism in the Eastern bloc. Although a great deal has been written about how nationalist aspirations and ethnic divisions affect a state's external relations,[1] little attention has been paid to nationalism as an external source of foreign policy. We are warned, for example, that the emerging nationalism in lands of Eastern Europe is an issue of great concern, but we are not given a theoretical map as to how it may affect the Western response.[2]

In this article, I am concerned with the effects of nationalism as an external stimulus on foreign policy: how nationalism in one state or region affects another state's foreign policy. The main argument is that structure, which has global and regional components, mediates the adverse effects of unifying nationalism (also known as irredentism). The findings extend structural theories, enhance the theoretical

[1] See, for example, James G. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity* (New York: St. Martin's 1991); James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[2] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Post-Communist Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs* 68 (Winter 1989-90): 1-25.

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understanding of a small state's foreign policy behavior, and emphasize the importance of symbols and ideas as sources of interstate disputes in addition to territoriality.

The case study from which I will draw empirical material involves the Greek response to Yugoslav Macedonian nationalism since World War II.[3] Why did the issue gain prominence in the post-cold war era after being dormant for over forty years? Particular emphasis will be placed upon explaining Greek efforts to prevent the international recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Oddly, Greek politicians have made it abundantly clear on several occasions that FYROM is not a contested territory and that Greece makes no territorial claims on that entity.[4] Why is Greece then so steadfastly opposed to its recognition?

Although this analysis does not question the merit of studies that seek answers in domestic politics, Greek foreign policy can be explained largely by examining the effects of external factors. In this sense, I follow a stream of research that views the state as a unitary actor.[5] Several reasons impelled this choice. First, external factors are likely to have the most influence on small states.[6] There is general agreement in the international relations literature that because small powers lack the capacity to influence greatly their environment, they are more likely to adapt their policies to its dictates.[7] Consequently, the foreign policy of a small state, such as Greece, should illuminate these effects most clearly. Second, I am interested in increasing the theoretical understanding of a small power's foreign policy, which is

[3] For a contemporary exegesis of various national perspectives on the Macedonian issue, see Symeon Giannakos, "The Macedonian Question Reexamined: Implications for Balkan Security," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 3 (Summer 1992): 26–47; Katerina Manolopoulou-Varvitsioti, "The Macedonian Question: The Independence of the 'Socialist Republic of Macedonia' and its Implications," *Athena*, March 1992, 69–71.

[4] Kerin Hope and Judy Dempsey, "Balkan Pledge on Macedonia: Greece Seeks to Allay International Concern about its Intentions," *Financial Times*, 13 November 1992.

[5] Graham Allison, *The Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

[6] Throughout this article, the terms "small" and "weak" are used interchangeably. Although scholars disagree as to what constitutes a small state, "small" here refers to size and power relative to other states in the international system.

[7] See, for example, Michael Handel, *Weak States in the International System* (London: Frank Cass, 1981); Robert O. Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics," *International Organization* 23 (Spring 1969): 291–310; Raimo Vayrynen, "Small States in Different Theoretical Traditions of International Relations Research" in Otmar Holl, ed., *Small States in Europe and Dependence* (Vienna: Braumuller, 1983). For evidence challenging this conclusion, see Athanassios G. Platias, "High Politics in Small Countries: An Inquiry into the Security Policies of Greece, Israel and Sweden" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1986).

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an area that contains mostly "theories not substantiated with empirical evidence."[8] Third, the case sheds light on the general issue of nationalism in the formerly communist Eastern Europe and the problems of the Western response. Without a doubt, the disintegration of Yugoslavia illustrates most vividly the type of challenge to world peace that has emerged in the post-cold war era. In its contemporary form this particular issue has not received adequate scholarly attention.

A Framework for Foreign Policy

Despite its role as a powerful force that shaped world history in the last two centuries, nationalism is one of the most ambiguous concepts in social science.[9] Indicative of this confusion is the fact that despite the plethora of studies on the subject, there is no widely agreed upon definition. Some authors view nationalism as a political doctrine, others as a political movement, and yet others as both.[10] Both seem more appropriate, because there is more to nationalism than mere ideology; the term can also take various organizational forms that may prove to be critical to its success or failure. In practical terms, this means that nationalism should be examined in terms of both content and organization. Nationalism is taken here to refer to "an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of self-government and independence on behalf of a group, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential 'nation' like others."[11] Central to this definition is the nation that is a group of people who share a collective sentiment that features ties of history, culture, and common ancestry.[12]

Although there exist many typologies, nationalism can generally be divided into two types: risorgimento and integral.[13] Risorgimento nationalism, which is the focus of interest in this article, refers to

[8] Maria Papadakis and Harvey Starr, "Opportunity, Willingness, and Small States: The Relationship Between Environment and Foreign Policy" in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and James N. Rosenau, eds., *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 428.

[9] Peter Alter, *Nationalism* (London: Edward Arnold, 1989), 4.

[10] For critical reviews of various definitions, see ibid., 4–9; Anthony D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983), chap. 7; and Ernst B. Haas "What Is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?" *International Organization* 40 (Summer 1986): 707–44.

[11] Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, 171.

[12] Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism*, 2.

[13] The typology belongs to Alter, *Nationalism*.

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liberation from political and social oppression and seeks to place the nation as an equal member of a family of nations. In broad terms, it can have one of two aims: separate or unify.[14] These aims have a differential impact on foreign policy. Separatist nationalism—that is, secession from a larger unit—may be viewed with caution, but it is unlikely to produce a hostile reaction by state A. This is particularly true when borders are clearly demarcated, the size of the state to be created (state B) is relatively small, and B's creation does not violate A's vital national interests—such as blocking vital commercial routes, weakening A's ability to defend itself, or undermining A's political authority. Unifying nationalism, however, which aims to liberate people who are members of state A, is likely to be met with hostility and even aggression. This is because such nationalism effectively undermines the sovereignty of state A, and by extension the concept of the nation-state itself. Any legitimacy accorded to state B will perpetuate demands and may eventually result in the break-up of state A.

Both aims can also be two points along the same national historical trajectory. It is possible that separatist nationalism evolves into unifying nationalism once state B has solidified control over its territory. This scenario is not at all infrequent, and Greece is no stranger to it.[15] Indeed, Greece's borders have continually shifted since its independence in 1830. Greek Macedonia was liberated from the Ottoman yoke in 1913 after years of armed struggle between opposing bands from Bulgaria and Greece, and to a lesser degree Serbia, and two Balkan wars that involved all the states in the peninsula.[16] Consequently, nationalism with latent or explicit unifying tendencies is likely to provoke a strong reaction by neighboring states. Of course, unifying nationalism

[14] John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (New York: St. Martin's, 1982), 11–12. Nationalism can also have a third aim, that of reform. This aim, however, is excluded from here because it is irrelevant to my case. In contrast to the other two aims, which seek to establish a state, reform nationalism emerges in an existing one—for example, Turkey and Japan—and makes no additional territorial demands.

[15] In the aftermath of the Balkan wars of 1912–1913 and World War I, Greece legally possessed nearly all the land inhabited by Greeks in Macedonia and thus hoped to liberate the remaining "unredeemed" Greeks in eastern Thrace and Asia Minor. The disastrous Greek-Turkish war of 1922 smothered all aspirations for a "Greater Greece," and subsequent Greek governments have been extremely reluctant to appear to covet neighboring territory, including that of FYROM. An elaboration of Greek unifying nationalism, the so-called *Megali Idea*, is included in John Campbell and Philip Sherrard, *Modern Greece* (New York: Praeger, 1968); and Douglas Dakin, *The Unification of Greece, 1770–1923* (London: Benn, 1972).

[16] For an incisive account of the Greek struggle in Macedonia, see Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897–1913* (Thessaloniki, Greece: Institute for Balkan Studies and Museum of the Macedonian Struggle, 1993).

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need not be destructive. It can have the beneficial effect of bringing together disparate groups of people. The attractiveness of such ideology is the obsessive search for a sense of community; the group becomes "a refuge against a hostile and uncaring world."[17] More relevant to the present situation in Eastern Europe, nationalism can be considered as "a substitute for factors of integration in a disintegrating society."[18] So long as this ideology refers to people within a given state, tension between states is likely to be low. But when this ideology spills over borders, tension is likely to increase.

Symbols and ideas associated with unifying nationalism are likely to have destabilizing consequences even when political authorities profess not to covet their neighbor's territory. This is because security also rests on ideational bases.[19] Symbols, ideas, names, and the historical memories that make up the nationalist package have a proposensity toward exclusivity because they are the ideational mechanisms of demarcating communities. Adopting a particular symbol, such as a flag, choosing a certain name, such as the name of a country, are some ways of acquiring an identity. Disputes are likely to erupt when symbols, ideas, and even history itself becomes contestable—that is, when two or more entities lay claim to the same thing.[20] Under conditions of contestability, the national psyche is pulled in opposite directions, because the same symbol or idea signifies two different national allegiances. The more important the symbol or idea in nationalist ideology, the greater the trauma to another nation's heritage and by consequence the more intense the dispute is likely to be.

Apart from content, the organizational apparatus by which nationalism manifests itself is also significant. It makes a difference whether nationalist ideology is espoused by a sovereign versus a nonsovereign entity. Sovereign entities command exclusive territorial ownership and demand undivided political loyalty. Conversely, nations as opposed to states derive their vitality and viability largely from cultural bonds.[21] In this way, the normative identity of nations "rests not in space, but

[17] Manning Nash, *The Cauldron of Ethnicity in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 128–29.

[18] Miroslav Hroch quoted in E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 173.

[19] Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991).

[20] For a detailed exposition on the linkages between national heritage and national identity in Macedonia, see Evangelos Kofos, *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia* (New Rochelle, NY: Caratzas, 1993), esp. app. iii.

[21] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

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in time."[22] Moreover, stateless nations do not have clearly demarcated boundaries; in fact they may extend across several states. The consequences of this differentiation suggest that the impact of nationalist ideology differs along the organizational dimension. State nationalism, to employ Yosef Lapid's terminology,[23] is likely to have more deleterious effects on other states than the ideology of stateless nations. This is because sovereignty elevates the legitimacy of nationalist ideology; after all, sovereign states are viewed as equally legitimate units in the world system. The more legitimate and organized the entity that contests a national symbol or idea, the more intense the dispute is likely to be.

Structure acts as a filter refracting or absorbing the potentially negative effects of nationalism. In this sense, structure becomes an intervening variable that conditions the impact of nationalism in one country on another country's foreign policy. It follows that certain types of structure are more capable of refracting and cushioning the negative effects of unifying nationalism. Structure here refers to the way the parts of a system are arranged. According to realists and neorealists, who are the most forceful advocates of the centrality of structure in international affairs, states must rely on their own capabilities and external alliances to ensure survival and enhance security.[24]

Since World War II, the global system of military bipolarity has had a profound impact on state behavior.[25] States clustered around two hegemons by forming alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and by formulating or redefining their interests and objectives to better suit alliance goals. This is particularly true of small states. Because they lack extensive coercive powers, small states are dependent on the

[22] C. J. Berry, "Nations and Norms," *The Review of Politics* 43 (January 1981): 75–87.

[23] Yosef Lapid, "Theorizing the 'National' in International Relations Theory: Reflections on Nationalism and Neorealism" in Friedrich Kratochwill and Edward D. Mansfield, eds., *International Organization: A Reader* (New York: Harper Collins, 1994).

[24] For further elaboration, see Henry A. Kissinger, "System Structures and American Foreign Policy" in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene Wittkopf, eds., *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's, 1983); Kenneth M. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); and Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). For additional insight and criticism consult Robert Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

[25] One could, of course, argue that the global system became tripolar in the 1970s and 1980s with the addition of China. More recently, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, one analyst envisions a unipolycentric system which also includes regional hegemons, such as Japan or Germany. For further elaboration on the concept of unipolycentrism, see John Spanier, *Games Nations Play*, 8th ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993).

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security umbrella offered by superpowers. Consequently, the former pursue policies that avoid direct confrontation with the latter or at least cast their actions and goals in ways that suggest that their defense is also in the interest of their senior partners.[26] The foreign policy of Greece illustrates this pattern of behavior well. Historical disputes with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia concerning claims over territories of northern Greece, which Greeks refer to as Macedonia and Thrace, were for the most part brushed aside. Relations with these countries were then reformulated on a cold war basis, that is pursuing warmer relations with nonaligned Yugoslavia while assuming a more bellicose posture vis-à-vis communist Bulgaria.[27]

Global structure, however, is not the only structural variable affecting a small country's foreign policy. Small states also have a narrow geographic range of concerns.[28] Because they lack the resources for extensive international interaction, they tend to concentrate on regional issues of immediate security. Consequently, a regional component should be added to our framework: the regional balance of power. Although it is affected by the global system, it also has its own internal dynamics that influence a state's foreign policy.

To a large extent, the global system affects the regional balance of power. Independence was won by most Balkan states in the nineteenth century, partially because of support from foreign powers such as Britain, France, and Russia. Traditionally considered to be weak powers, Balkan states, including Greece, have also sought continued protection by allying themselves with stronger patrons. Diplomacy has been conducted in consultation with their protectors, and the intensity of pursuit of their goals has been tempered by signals from foreign governments.

Once fluid, the structure of the Balkan balance of power has been relatively stable with the advent of global bipolarity. Being Soviet allies, Romania and Bulgaria stood on one side. Greece and Turkey, two reluctant NATO allies, stood on the other. Leaning more toward the West although pursuing a middle, nonaligned policy was Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, in their pursuit of national interests, Greek policy makers occasionally sought to shift the balance. In periods of intense

[26] David Vital, *The Inequality of States* (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1967).

[27] For geopolitical reasons, the Greek socialist government initiated security talks with Bulgaria in the early 1980s.

[28] Maurice A. East, "Size and Foreign Policy: A Test of Two Models," *World Politics* 25 (July 1973): 557; Papadakis and Starr, "Opportunity, Willingness, and Small States."

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antagonism with Turkey, for example, Greece sought warmer relations with Bulgaria to counterbalance any relative power disadvantage vis-à-vis its eastern neighbor. To put it in classical realist terms, when faced with external threats, small states will seek to improve their position by seeking marginal changes in the regional distribution of power.

This situation yielded some unexpected benefits to Greece. National sovereignty and legitimacy granted by international recognition, as well as the gradual integration of states into an international community of equals, resulted in attempts to solidify the political map.[29] So long as the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia remained intact, Greece's northern borders remained fixed and internationally recognized in their post-1913 form. It appears, therefore, that it is beneficial for Greece to support Yugoslavia in her post-World War II territorial form, for changes in the status quo may lead to disputes over borders or, worse yet, an upset in the regional balance of power should smaller Yugoslav republics seek alliances with more powerful neighbors. Consequently, opposition to the creation of a state is likely to be stronger when another state perceives that such an action will result in a negative tilt in the regional balance of power.

In this article, I am concerned with the impact of external factors on a small state's foreign policy. I have proposed a framework arguing that foreign policy is affected by nationalism, the effects of which are in turn mediated by global and regional structure. In the next section I use this framework to explain Greek foreign policy in response to Yugoslav Macedonian nationalism.

Greek Foreign Policy vis-à-vis Yugoslavia since World War II

To comprehend Greece's policy in regards to Yugoslav Macedonian nationalism, the content of FYROM's unifying nationalism must first be examined.[30] In the aftermath of World War II, Yugoslavia pushed aside defeated Bulgaria and took the initiative to raise the national consciousness of the Slavic inhabitants of Macedonia. To eradicate the pro-Bulgarian sentiments of a large segment of the population of Yugoslav Macedonia, Josef Broz Tito and the Communist party of

[29] Mayall, *Nationalism*, 35.

[30] The discussion on the content of FYROM's nationalism borrows from Nikolaos Zahariadis, "Is the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia a Security Threat to Greece?" *Mediterranean Quarterly* 5 (Winter 1994): 84–105.

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Yugoslavia laid out the groundwork for a remarkable transformation process, turning the indigenous Slavs into ethnic Macedonians by "mutation."[31] FYROM's version of Risorgimento nationalism has contributed significantly to the republic's push for national self-determination and international recognition. However, it is based on an interpretation of Macedonia's long history designed to suit the political needs of Yugoslavia's Communist party. The mutation process required the invention of the essential elements of a new, albeit artificial nationality: a distinct language and church affiliation; an easily identifiable name; and a splendid history.

The formation of the Republic of Macedonia as an equal partner among the six republics of federal Yugoslavia was a crucial first step, for it deterred secessionist tendencies and annexationist ambitions. From then on, the cultivation of Macedonian culture played a decisive role in propagating Macedonian nationalism.[32] To sever the Bulgarian linguistic ties that the local dialect had, a commission of Yugoslav linguists produced a "new" literary language based on the Prilep dialect but also enriched by Serbian, Russian, and Polish contributions.[33] In marked contrast with Marxist practice elsewhere, the newly formed Communist regime in Skopje established by government decree the autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church over the objections of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate. Though the church violated the canons of the Eastern Orthodox Church, and thus did not receive official recognition, it suited well the Balkan tradition of church affiliation as a determinant of nationality. Severing the spiritual ties that connected Yugoslav Macedonians with other Balkan Slavs was a compelling way to reaffirm their separate existence and raise Macedonian consciousness.[34]

The nation-builders in Skopje found the idea of unifying the three Macedonian regions in a single state impossible to resist. As a result,

[31] Evangelos Kofos, *The Macedonian Question: The Politics of Mutation* (Thessaloniki, Greece: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1987).

[32] Stephen E. Palmer, Jr. and Robert R. King, *Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1971), 154.

[33] The idiom spoken by Macedonian Slavs—in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and several villages near the border in northern Greece—was known as a Western Bulgarian dialect that had noticeable but not significant Turkish and Greek influence. Because the idiom lacked an alphabet and consequently a written component, it tended to vary in pronunciation and vocabulary depending on the proximity to a major national group. The Prilep dialect has a close affinity to Bulgarian but is influenced by Serbo-Croatian.

[34] On the subject of the Macedonian Church and nationalism, see Palmer and King, *Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question*, 165–73.

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they intensified efforts to raise the national identity and cultural distinctiveness of Macedonian minorities across the borders. Macedonian literature and historical treatises, as well as Greek-language broadcasts from Radio Skopje, for example, portrayed Greek Macedonia as the cradle that nurtured the Macedonian national ideology and minimized Greek contributions to the region's liberation.[35] Similar efforts were aimed at eradicating the Bulgarian origins of Slavs in Macedonia. From Greece's standpoint, these efforts aimed at strengthening cultural ties with Skopje and weakening links with Athens or Sofia until international conditions were ripe for more dramatic political action.

Still, the most visible way that Yugoslav policy makers sought to establish the historical and political legitimacy of the newly formed state was to adopt the term "Macedonia" as its denomination. The term has historically acquired several meanings,[36] but never before has it symbolized the national character of a separate Slavic people. During the second half of the nineteenth-century, when the revolt against the Ottoman empire was growing, the region had a multi-ethnic and multilingual population. In addition to Greeks and Bulgarians, smaller ethnic groups such as Vlachs, Jews, Serbs, and Gypsies made up the remainder of Macedonia's non-Turkish population. Significantly, however, the term Macedonian was not used to describe a separate nationality.[37]

The term Macedonian first became attached to a non-Greek political movement in 1893. That year a secret organization, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), was founded by Bulgarian revolutionaries born in Macedonia. While some IMRO leaders advocated unification with Bulgaria, others championed the political autonomy of the region. During the interwar period, the term acquired for the first time a strictly Slavonic interpretation. In the upheaval that followed the Balkan wars and the population exchanges,[38] Macedonia

[35] Kofos, "National Heritage and National Identity," 256.

[36] Nicholas P. Andriotis, "History of the Name Macedonia" in no ed., *Macedonia: Past and Present* (Thessaloniki, Greece: Institute of Balkan Studies, 1991).

[37] Duncan M. Perry, *The Politics of Terror: The Macedonian Liberation Movements 1893–1903* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988), 19–20. Barker, *Macedonia*, 16–17; Kofos, "National Heritage and National Identity," 238–39. "Even as late as 1945," confirms Fromkin, "Slavic Macedonia had no national identity of its own." David Fromkin, "Demetrios Returns: Macedonia and the Balkan Question in the Shadow of History," *World Policy Journal* 10 (Summer 1993): 71.

[38] The 1919 Treaty of Neuilly provided for Greek–Bulgarian voluntary exchanges of population. About 52,000 Bulgarians of eastern Macedonia and Thrace left Greece, and 25,000 Greeks left Bulgaria. In the Greek census of 1928, 81,984 persons registered as Slav-speaking, living mostly in western Macedonia. The 1923 Lausanne Agreement provided for Greek–Turkish compulsory

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became a prime ground for revolutionary activities by Communists who saw an opportunity to subvert the bourgeois Balkan governments. Under the prodding of several IMRO leaders and Bulgarian Communists, the Fifth Comintern Congress in 1924 called on the Balkan Communist parties to cooperate for the establishment of a united and independent Macedonian state within the framework of a Balkan Communist federation.

Tito employed the Macedonian label in 1945 to activate the mutation process. The application of this designation to the republic and its people offered several significant advantages. As a regional and geographic designation, the label was well known to the population and very suitable for speedy adoption. It sharply contrasted with Bulgarian, Serbian, or Greek names and could consequently sever ties that Slav speakers had maintained with these three countries. But more importantly for political purposes, this name availed Skopje the opportunity, "through the interplay of its regional and national meanings,"[39] to breed massive confusion and obscure historical events. The confusion had very destructive and far-reaching implications, for it could create the erroneous perception among policy makers and the general public that everything associated with the region of Macedonia and its people can be legitimately claimed by the nation of Yugoslavia's Macedonia. The name enabled the Yugoslav Macedonian authorities to manipulatively diminish the presence and contribution of other ethnic groups (Greek, Bulgarian, Albanian, Turkish, Vlach, Jewish) in Macedonia's recent history and refute a significant aspect of these peoples' heritage. The consolidation of Yugoslav Macedonian nationalism, however, antagonized its Balkan neighbors, because the copious mixture of ethnic, historical, religious, cultural, and linguistic legends employed to found this nation overlap with Greek and Bulgarian national traditions.

Nationalism has not conditioned Greek foreign policy directly. Rather, its effects have been filtered through external structural impediments. The latter kept nationalism in the region alive but dormant for thirty years. Further, these impediments narrowed decidedly the policy options available to the Greek government. In a nutshell, the Greek

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population exchanges. 348,000 Turks left Greek Macedonia and 638,000 Greeks from Asia Minor settled in Greek Macedonia. According to the 1928 census 88.1 percent of the population in Greek Macedonia was Greek. Elisabeth Barker, *Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics* (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1950), 46–8.

[39] Kofos, "National Heritage and National Identity," 249.

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reaction was the by-product of the psychology of fear induced by anticommunist sentiments domestically and reinforced by perceived external security threats originating at the global as well as the regional levels. However, structural changes in the 1980s unmasked the raw and potentially destabilizing effects of nationalism.

The formation of a constituent republic within the Yugoslav sovereign federation achieved de facto international recognition of the people as a separate nationality. In line with unifying nationalism, claims for respecting Macedonian minority rights elsewhere could now be used as levers of pressure in geopolitical calculations. Neighboring states acquiesced to the formation of Macedonia in the hope of resolving Yugoslavia's complex problem of nationalities. Greece realized early on that Belgrade's willingness to counterbalance the powerful centrifugal forces active in Yugoslavia could not always prevent occasional bellicose demonstrations of Macedonian nationalism. As a result, Greece vehemently denied the existence of a Macedonian minority on its territory and intensified efforts to secure a close relationship with the federal government and Serbian authorities in the hope that these two institutions would contain Yugoslav Macedonian irredentism. This was an effective strategy as long as Tito sought to maintain Yugoslavia's international significance, both as buffer state between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and as leader of the nonaligned movement. But Yugoslavia's strategic importance as an anti-Soviet communist regime may have handicapped Greece's ability to withhold the prospect of improved relations until a more favorable solution of the Macedonian issue was reached. The intense Anglo-American interest in Tito's survival after Stalin expelled Yugoslavia in 1948 from the Cominform provided the impetus for closer relations among Yugoslavia and her noncommunist Balkan neighbors.[40]

Internally weakened by years of civil strife, Greece could not furnish the power required to grapple with the Macedonian initiatives of Tito's Yugoslavia and relied on Western influence to entice and pressure Tito to abandon any expansionist desires toward Greece. The Americans and the British had by 1949 decided that Tito's presence as an independent and potentially disruptive influence in the communist movement had vital and strategic implications in the East–West confrontation and wished to see a quick normalization of Greek–Yugoslav relations.

[40] For an incisive account of the western concern about Tito's survival, see Beatrice Heuser, *Western "Containment" Policies in the Cold War: The Yugoslav Case, 1948–53* (London: Routledge, 1989).

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As a result, they pressured Tito to terminate the military assistance to Greek guerrillas and urged both governments to resolve their differences in the conclusion of the Greek civil war. The rapprochement incurred several setbacks over claims that the rights of Slav-speaking Greeks were violated. Western intermediaries persuaded the Greek government that Tito could not risk censuring the nationalistic outbursts of Macedonians, because this was likely to allow the dissemination of pro-Bulgarian propaganda and raise discontent among Macedonian communists.[41] Following some groundbreaking diplomacy, the two states finally reestablished formal diplomatic relations in mid-1951.

The consolidation of the military pacts in Europe and the ensuing cold war shaped the geopolitical character of the Balkans and checked the proliferation of historic and ethnic rivalries that were the primary destabilizing element in the region. The Korean War and the perception that a Soviet-satellite attack on Yugoslavia was imminent created the conditions for Yugoslavia's integration into the Western defence strategy.[42] At the regional level, the signing of the Tripartite Balkan Pact of 1954 by Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey indirectly placed Yugoslavia in a position to reap the benefit of NATO's security and illustrated the shared interests of these three states in the defence of their frontiers against Bulgaria. Though the pact quickly collapsed because of the deteriorating state of Greek-Turkish affairs over Cyprus by 1955, it diminished significantly the perceived threat from the north by securing a friendly Yugoslavia and permitting Greek military planners to reorient the nation's defence toward its eastern neighbor. Since then, the steady deterioration of Greek–Turkish relations has remained a key factor influencing the regional balance of power. Economic cooperation and high-level military consultations between Yugoslavia and Greece were consequently perceived as part of a tactical move aimed at bolstering Greece's bargaining position vis-à-vis Turkey, though it was never anticipated that Yugoslavia would interfere militarily into a squabble between the two NATO allies.

These considerations required frequent Greek silence on Macedonia in the interest of defusing crises that could intensify internal disputes and undermine the cohesion and stability of the Yugoslav Federation. In contrast, the upsurge of Macedonian nationalism guided "Belgrade's

[41] On the Western mediation efforts between Greece and Yugoslavia, see ibid., 88–97.

[42] The Yugoslavs had announced their intention to defend the Julian Alps in northern Yugoslavia and block the Soviet assault on Italy and the Adriatic. Ibid., 155–58.

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hand in the dispute with Greece" in several instances.[43] Following Bulgaria's decision to retract the recognition of Macedonian minorities in 1958—which is Bulgaria's official policy even in 1994 despite recognition of FYROM's statehood—Skopje expressed an increased concern for the Slavs of Greek Macedonia, pushing the Yugoslav government to support a cultural campaign designed to raise their ethnic consciousness.[44] This effort revived old feuds and forced the Greek government to unilaterally suspend the joint border agreement in March 1962.

Tito's death in 1980 and the ensuing disruption of government continuity in Belgrade facilitated the eruption of nationalistic and even secessionist indulgences by the republics. This ethnic polarization had considerable consequences beyond the Yugoslav borders, because in order to placate the republics, the federal authorities agreed to raise the subject of minority rights in bilateral meetings with neighboring states. Proclaiming minority rights as a principal component of Yugoslavia's foreign policy disturbed Greece and Bulgaria, since they were not prepared to accept that Yugoslav minorities existed in their territories. This often reached crisis proportions, because Yugoslavia was unwilling to cooperate on other issues unless problems with Yugoslav minorities in foreign lands were resolved. As a result, the state of Greek-Yugoslav relations during the 1980s alternated between strained and improved, depending on Belgrade's varying willingness or capacity to adopt the ethnic minority planks issued by Skopje.

The heightened sensitivities about the plight of ethnic minorities in the Balkans opened the way for Turkey to attempt to restructure the regional balance of power and further strain Greek–Yugoslav relations. Turkey, which for many years complained internationally about the alleged mistreatment of Muslim populations in Bulgaria and Greece, found in the minority issue a point of convergence with Yugoslavia and later with Skopje, which could be exploited to ferment regional opposition to Greece. On its part, Yugoslavia was irritated by Greece's oscillating policy toward the NATO alliance and the continuing disputes over the demarcation of operational responsibility in the Aegean. In addition, the Greek government under socialist rule had pursued a policy of close cooperation with Bulgaria concerning Balkan security

[43] Palmer and King, *Yugoslav Communism*, 195.

[44] This statement by Nikolai Slatinski, chairman of the Bulgarian Parliament's Committee for National Security, is characteristic of current official attitude. "As far as every normal Bulgarian is concerned, the Slav Macedonians are Bulgarians, with our culture and our blood." Macedonian Information and Liaison Service News, 3 May 1994.

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that sharply deviated from traditional policy. Thus the advancement of demands for Macedonian minority rights as means of pressuring the Greek government served for different reasons both Turkish and Yugoslav interests.

The transition in Balkan politics during the 1980s parallels the radical transformation in East–West relations, which altered Yugoslavia's geostrategic significance. The emergence of Solidarity in Poland and the human rights movement in then Czechoslovakia manifested the vulnerabilities of the Marxist system and, in conjunction with International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreements, reduced tensions amongst the two alliances and undercut the rationale for Western support of a unified and independent Yugoslav federation. In the late 1980s, the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe that ended the East–West ideological divide created new dynamics, leading inexorably to the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and the formation of completely new geopolitical realities in the region.

Alarmed by the impending loss of the final structural impediment to a recrudescence of Yugoslav Macedonian nationalism, the Greek government sought to prolong the regional status quo until an agreeable alternative was formulated. Greece initially opposed the break-up of the Yugoslavian federation and recognition of its constituent republics as independent states, but after failed negotiations to end the hostilities, Greece joined other European Community (EC) members and the United States in recognizing Croatia, Slovenia, and later Bosnia–Herzegovina. Greece, however, remained adamantly opposed to the recognition of FYROM and secured EC commitment in 1992 that the former republic would not be recognized until it relinquishes the term Macedonia, because that designation raises suspicions of territorial ambitions.[45]

After independence, FYROM's government escalated its propaganda efforts by adopting provocative nationalistic symbols, for example the star of Vergina on its flag. This was the symbol used by the ancient

[45] The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Greece: Country Report* 3 (1992): 9. Greece obtained two additional conditions from the EC specifying that the former republic must provide constitutional and political guarantees that, first, it harbors no territorial claims over Greece. Second, it does not intend to conduct hostile propaganda activities against Greece. These conditions were necessary because FYROM's new constitution included sections which stated that FYROM's parliament reserved the right to authorize annexation of territory and to protect the minority status and rights of so-called ethnic Macedonians in neighboring states. The Arbitration Committee of the EC issued a report, known as the Badinder Report, confirming that the offending sections, but not the preamble, were subsequently amended from FYROM's constitution.

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Macedonian royal dynasty and was found in King Philip's tomb in Greece. Skopje also adopted the image of the White Tower (the symbol of the city of Thessaloniki in Greek Macedonia) on its commemorative currency, changed the names of many streets and other public places with Slavic appelations of Greek cities, and distributed pamphlets denouncing "the illegal Greek occupation of parts of Macedonia since 1913." In addition, maps were distributed depicting the region of Greek Macedonia in chains. The Greek government interpreted these measures as acts with hostile intentions.[46] This helps explain why Athens has refused to accept Skopje's offer to conclude a treaty on the inviolability of borders as sufficient evidence of good neighborly relations and has insisted on the additional removal of some of these symbols, namely the symbol on the flag.

Since the inception of hostilities in Yugoslavia, Greece has attempted to forestall the recognition of Macedonia by seeking to reconcile its regional policy objectives with those of the international community, which favors the principle of self-determination. This is an inherently risky strategy, for it creates the negative impression that Greece is closely aligned with Serbia, the party in the conflict universally condemned as the aggressor. Greece and Serbia have had a longstanding relationship based on economic interdependence, common Orthodox heritage, and historical enmity against the Turks. Nevertheless, it is also indicative of the urgency to redirect the Greek foreign policy in the region, particularly in light of the precarious state of Greek–Bulgarian affairs. Problems between Bulgaria and Greece preceded Bulgaria's recognition of FYROM and were due to the pro-Turkish bent of Bulgaria's first postcommunist government. Following FYROM's recognition, Greece suspended a $50 million line of credit to Bulgaria, but relations between Sofia and Athens have since improved markedly, particularly in the economic sphere.

The Greek government indicated a preference for a truncated Yugoslav federation that would unite Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia–Herzegovina, and FYROM under Serbian hegemony and eagerness to function as a broker between Serbia and the West. This position contrasted sharply with the hardening attitudes projected by the Western leadership which, accepting the fact that Yugoslavia was irrevocably partitioned, pressed for the imposition of tough UN and EC sanctions

[46] These and other examples of so-called hostile propaganda are included in a pamphlet by the Citizen's Movement, *Borders, Symbols, Stability* (Athens: Citizen's Movement, 1993).

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against Serbia to force the cessation of hostilities. To deflect EC criticism that its position disrupted the first exercise in common foreign policy after Maastricht and to secure a more favorable resolution of the nomenclature issue, Greece agreed to impose an EC trade ban on the republics of Montenegro and Serbia. Greece reluctantly also agreed to UN sanctions imposed at the end of May of 1992. It contributed a destroyer to the NATO flotilla patrolling the Adriatic to monitor the naval embargo. Yet the frequent diplomatic consultations among Greek and Serbian officials throughout the civil war in Yugoslavia raised suspicions that the two sides collaborated on a joint platform to preserve the stabilizing presence of Serbia in the Balkans, albeit in a restructured fashion. Press reports that the Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic, proposed the division of FYROM between Greece and Serbia were confirmed by the Greek foreign ministry. Greece rejected the offer and reported it to the EC.

To influence the consensus over FYROM's recognition, Greece has lobbied its EC colleagues and the United States by reviving the almost forgotten historical antecedents of the Macedonian Question and by stressing the potential of further destabilization in the region.[47] Greeks do not dispute the existence of a nation, a language, or a republic after 1944; but they refute the legitimacy of appropriating the Macedonian name to define a Slavic population in the Balkans.[48] Furthermore, they argue that diplomatic recognition of the former republic under the term Macedonia perpetuates the residual designs by the Skopje regime on the adjoining Greek province by the same name. Greece worries that the confusion created by the denomination is designed to install gradual legitimacy to FYROM's claims over "unredeemed" lands belonging to Greece and Bulgaria.[49] Greece's concerns are not allayed by the obvious disparity in military capabilities and attachment to collective security organizations that currently exists between the

[47] For an official exposition of the Greek position, see the article by the former Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Virginia Tsouderos, "Greek Policy and the Yugoslav Turmoil," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 4 (Spring 1993): 1–13.

[48] The republic's population of almost 2 million is quite heterogeneous consisting of the following ethnic groups: 67 percent Macedonians; 19.8 percent Albanians; 4.5 percent Turks; 2.3 percent Serbs; 6.4 percent others. Judy Dempsey, "Specter of Falling Balkan Dominoes Haunts Europe," *Financial Times*, 17 June 1992. For a recent exposition of the disputes that threaten to shatter the fragile coalition between the various ethnic Albanians, see Laura Filber, "Macedonia's Albanians Fearful of Ethnic Bloodbath," *Financial Times*, 17 November 1992; Frank Viviano, "Next Balkan Flash Point—It could be Macedonia," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 25 August 1993; and Zahariadis, "Is the Former Yugoslav Republic a Security Threat to Greece?"

[49] On the linkage between international recognition and territorial expansion, see Giannakos, "The Macedonian Question Reexamined," 45–46.

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two states, because Athens fears the risk of a protracted low-intensity warfare and because it foresees that the auspicious convergence of interests among FYROM and Turkey in the near future would present a formidable challenge to Greek vital and strategic interests in the region. Convergence is likely for two reasons. First, there is a shared interest in raising sensitivity over the plight of minorities in the Balkans. Second, FYROM is expected to welcome Turkey's role as a regional benefactor and protector, given Skopje's internal political and economic weakness and historical rivalries with other regional powers.[50] Despite amending some of the offending constitutional sections, the usurpation of the term encroaches a significant part of Greek history and sustains the high level of mistrust prevalent in recurrent dealings with Skopje over the last four decades.

Following FYROM's unsuccessful bid for recognition from the European Community, the issue came before the UN's Security Council. Greece conceded FYROM's entry to the UN under the temporary designation Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and agreed to negotiate a resolution to the dispute with FYROM under UN auspices. Despite reported progress on issues of economic cooperation, negotiations reached an impasse on the appelation issue and the symbols. Following Andreas Papandreou's advent to office in October 1993, Greece changed tactics. Having failed to reach a satisfactory conclusion, Papandreou raised the stakes by pulling out of the negotiations. Ostensibly, this was done for purely domestic reasons, since there was no change in the external environment. Though he requested that three conditions be met before reestablishing dialogue with FYROM—namely, Skopje should remove the symbol on its flag, amend its constitution, and cease the propaganda by signing a treaty with Greece guaranteeing the inviolability of borders—he asked that the nomenclature issue be resolved by negotiation. Given FYROM's dependence on Greece for two-thirds of its oil needs and as an export route, its unwillingness to show more flexibility is surprising. To understand Greece's response, we need to examine two more changes in the regional balance of power.

The protracted conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina has prompted the deployment of several thousand troops from the United States and the rest of Europe in the region. Some 700 UN troops from Scandinavian countries were deployed in FYROM in February 1993, and 300 addi-

[50] For a detailed analysis of Greek security concerns, see Zahariadis, "Is the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia a Security Threat to Greece?" On the subject of FYROM's economic survival and her dependency on adjoining states for economic support, see James Pettifer, "The New Macedonian Question," *International Affairs* 68 (Fall 1992): 479–80.

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tional military personnel from the United States joined them in May. The Scandinavians have recently been moved to other parts of former Yugoslavia. As a result, Washington has indicated it will increase its military presence in FYROM. Though their purpose was to prevent a spillover of hostilities to the south,[51] the U.S. presence also upset the regional balance of power by strengthening FYROM's hand in the negotiations, because it gave the appearance that the United States was on its side.[52] President Bill Clinton's decision to station forces in FYROM was all the more surprising, given the absence of such a request by FYROM's government.[53]

Yet another tilt in regional power came in December 1993 and early 1994, when six European Union (EU) countries and the United States recognized FYROM under that name and sought to establish diplomatic relations with that state. Ostensibly, the purpose was to strengthen regional stability,[54] but the net effects on Greece were quite different. Though the EU members fulfilled their obligation of consultation under Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) rules, their recognition went against a previous decision adopted in Lisbon in 1992 not to recognize FYROM under the designation Macedonia or its derivatives. Moreover, the timing of the action dealt a blow to Greek efforts, because it took place two weeks prior to Greece assuming the rotating EU presidency. At the very least, it signaled a distrust on the part of some of Greece's EU allies and shattered Greek dreams for additional leverage through a common EU foreign policy. The U.S. decision to follow that of some EU members further undermined the Greek position by giving the impression, rightly or wrongly, of choosing sides.

Faced with changes that in Greek eyes seemed to bolster FYROM's unifying nationalism, Papandreou's government toughened its stance by shutting down the border with FYROM on 16 February 1994. Fully cognizant of the dramatic consequences for FYROM's fragile economy, Athens has insisted that it will not reopen the border unless Skopje shows evidence of good will by meeting the three conditions adopted

[51] "300 U.S. Troops in Macedonia to Try to Contain Balkan Conflict," *New York Times*, 13 July 1993.

[52] Several commentators have noted the auspicious U.S. interest in establishing a stronger military presence in FYROM in addition to the peacekeeping troops already there. Misha Glenny, "Bosnian Quicksand," *New York Times*, 18 February 1994; Macedonian News Agency, 18 November 1993.

[53] Antony Moussios and Nikolaos Zahariadis, "Clinton's Foreign Follies," *Hellenic News of America*, June 1993, 23; and Craig R. Whitney, "NATO Adrift? Allies Worry over Bosnia Impasse," *New York Times*, 14 May 1993.

[54] Paul Lewis, "Europe to Defy Greece on Ties to Macedonia," *New York Times*, 12 December 1993; and David Binder, "U.S. to Recognize Macedonia," *New York Times*, 9 February 1994.

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previously by Greece. "We want this crisis to be an opportunity to resolve the problem," said the Greek foreign minister, Karolos Papoulias.[55] Although some commentators claim the retortion measures were instituted for domestic purposes only,[56] the analysis here only partially confirms this conclusion. The decision to toughen the Greek stance flows mostly from Papandreou's previous decision to pull out of the negotiations. Imposing preconditions carried an implicit threat; what if the other side did not agree? The Greek government was curiously silent on this issue, ostensibly hoping it would not have to resort to more drastic measures. Clearly, the framework presented here does not account for internal Greek politics. But that is not the whole story. The decision by several EU members and the United States to recognize FYROM certainly triggered the Greek response of February 1994, because it signaled the failure of Papandreou's efforts. Failing to achieve a satisfactory outcome, Papandreou actually had no other choice but to follow through with his implicit threat. Otherwise he would have lost credibility not only in Greece but also in the eyes of FYROM's government. Consequently, the decision to impose the retortion measures can be partially explained as a response to the external environment.

Conclusion

This article has explored the effects of nationalism as an external stimulus of foreign policy. The proposed framework argued that the effects of nationalism are mediated by global and regional structure. The argument enhances the theoretical understanding of a small state's foreign policy.

Despite being limited to external factors, the framework has shown considerable explanatory power. It has confirmed conventional wisdom that the policies of small states are strongly conditioned by their external environment. This argument is likely to acquire more relevance in the case of Greece, since the adoption of a common foreign policy within the European Union framework. Nevertheless, the findings also reveal the limits of such cooperation. Formulating a common foreign policy was originally conceived as Europe's way of acquiring collective leverage in world affairs. Such benefits were particularly welcomed by small states, such as Greece, because that would reduce their vulner-

[55] "Greece Closes Macedonia's Main Trade Route," *New York Times*, 18 February 1994.
[56] See, for example, "When Gods Nod," *The Economist*, 28 February 1994, 52–3.

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ability to the external environment. Traditional balance of power considerations, however, have made this exercise quite difficult. Actions by several of Greece's European and NATO allies helped upset the regional balance of power, prompting a swift Greek reaction that did not appear to be in congruence with the spirit of CFSP. Despite the emergence of supranational authorities in Europe and the end of the cold war, small (as well as large) states still act or react in national terms.

At a time when structural approaches are losing their appeal in the discipline,[57] the argument made here shows that structural insights have considerable explanatory potential. Still, it goes beyond structural theories of international relations. Conceptualizing structure as a mediating variable has added yet another source of interstate disputes in addition to territoriality. Ideas and symbols can also have a negative impact on another state's foreign policy, but the effects are likely to be strongest under certain structural conditions. This means that nationalism throughout the cold war period refracted through the structural impediments that kept it at bay but also helped nourish it. As structure changed, the negative impact of nationalistic dreams could no longer be restrained, thereby increasing regional instability and insecurity. In contrast to conventional structural approaches that view insecurity solely as being rooted in the structural distribution of power, the argument here suggests that ideas and symbols associated with unifying nationalism can also serve as causes for concern.

Finally, the end of the cold war has affected states differently. Vulnerability to a rapidly changing environment is likely to increase uncertainty and by consequence a small state's insecurity. The presence of unifying nationalism in neighboring lands further accentuates fear. At best, the creation of a new state will upset, at least temporarily, the regional balance of power. At worst, it will legitimize claims on the small state and effectively undermine its territorial integrity. The irony is that despite promises of stability in the new world order, small states are likely to encounter more instability.*

[57] Charles W. Kegley, Jr., "The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities," *International Studies Quarterly* 37 (June 1993): 131–46.

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Congressional Oversight and the Diversity of Members' Goals

DIANA EVANS

The literature on congressional oversight of the executive branch often argues that Congress fails at its mandate to oversee the bureaucracy comprehensively in large part because members of Congress receive so few political payoffs from oversight.[1] Although scholars differ on how adequate is the amount of oversight done by Congress, it is rarely, if ever, asserted that it approximates the standard of systematic and comprehensive oversight set by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Members of Congress are thought to be motivated to engage in activity that serves the reelection goal more directly than oversight, specifically, in passing legislation with particularized benefits for constituents and organized interests and in doing casework.[2]

Some recent studies of oversight likewise assume that legislators are motivated primarily or exclusively by the desire for reelection and, therefore, do oversight only when it serves their constituents and clientele groups. However, unlike earlier research, this more recent litera-

[1] Seymour Scher, "Conditions for Legislative Control," *Journal of Politics* 28 (August 1963): 526–551; Morris S. Ogul, *Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976).

[2] David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); Morris P. Fiorina, *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). For important dissenting positions see R. Douglas Arnold, *The Logic of Congressional Action* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); and Keith Krehbiel, *Information and Legislative Organization* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992).

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ture suggests that Congress exerts extensive control over the bureaucracy precisely because doing so gives members frequent opportunities to serve constituents and interest groups.[3]

Other scholars recently have come to share the view that Congress does much more oversight than many had previously thought. They argue that incentives besides reelection motivate oversight; thus, there is more of it than the reelection goal alone would suggest, much of it informal and behind the scenes.[4]

Although studies increasingly recognize the role of nonelectoral goals in driving oversight, none has yet considered the differential impact of legislators' goals on oversight behavior and policy outcomes. The nonelectoral goals as identified by Richard Fenno are influence, defined as "reputation and/or a larger-than-average share in House decision making"; and making good public policy as interpreted by the member of Congress.[5] How do members behave with respect to oversight when the reelection goal conflicts with one or both of the other goals? I contend here that both electoral and nonelectoral goals lead to oversight. However, unlike other scholars, I argue explicitly that when members' good public policy, influence, and reelection goals conflict, reelection does not always dominate their oversight behavior. Moreover, when the reelection goal conflicts with one or both of the other goals, oversight motivated by the good public policy or influence goals produces different behavior by congressional overseers and different policy outcomes from oversight motivated by reelection. These differences are most evident in policy areas where organized interest groups are pitted against the general public. Here, under the reelection assumption, Congress is expected to serve electorally-useful interest groups; by contrast, under the assumption that nonelectoral goals sometimes conflict with and override electoral ones, Congress is ex-

[3] Morris P. Fiorina, "Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy: A Mismatch of Incentives and Capabilities" in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981); Matthew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms," *American Journal of Political Science* 28 (February 1984): 165–179; Barry R. Weingast, "The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal Agent Perspective," *Public Choice: Carnegie Papers on Political Economy* 44 (1984): 147–191.

[4] Joel D. Aberbach, *Keeping a Watchful Eye* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1990); Christopher H. Foreman, *Signals From the Hill* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Morris S. Ogul and Bert A. Rockman, "Overseeing Oversight: New Departures, Old Problems," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 15 (February 1990): 5–24.

[5] Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *Congressmen in Committees* (Boston: Little Brown, 1973) 3, 9.

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pected to conduct oversight in ways that hurt the interests of clientele groups and help the general public.

The following two sections further develop the argument that goals make a difference in oversight. To demonstrate the usefulness of distinguishing between electoral and nonelectoral goals as determinants of oversight behavior, I examine two programs in federal transportation policy. For the purposes of this study, following Christopher Foreman,[6] I define oversight as congressional supervision of the bureaucracy, which includes direct congressional participation in program management in addition to post hoc review. This definition is neither the broadest nor the narrowest definition available. Narrowly defined, oversight is retrospective program review and evaluation. Morris Ogul defines oversight more broadly as any behavior by legislators or their staffs that produces an impact "intended or not" on the behavior of bureaucrats.[7] By contrast, the definition used here implies intentional behavior by legislators and staffs.

Congressional Goals and Oversight

Although previous research often recognizes that goals other than reelection motivate oversight, it either assumes that reelection dominates the other goals or is silent about how members behave when electoral and nonelectoral goals conflict.[8] Yet it is clear that reelection does not always dominate and that different goals produce different behavior in Congress. Although it is often the case that in their committee activities members experience no conflict among their goals,[9] they nevertheless sometimes take actions in pursuit of their policy and influence goals that do not help their reelection prospects. For example, Richard Fenno found that members of the Ways and Means and Foreign Affairs Committees felt that those assignments did not help with reelection. Service on the Education and Labor Committee was viewed as damaging to the reelection prospects of its Republican members and was discouraged by party leaders.[10]

Additionally, despite his first-cut explanation of congressional behavior in terms of reelection seeking, David Mayhew ultimately finds

[6] Foreman, "Signals From the Hill," 13.

[7] Ogul, *Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy*, 11.

[8] Ibid., 184; Scher, "Conditions for Legislative Control," 551; Aberbach, *Keeping a Watchful Eye;* Foreman, *Signals from the Hill*; Ogul and Rockman, "Overseeing Oversight."

[9] Kenneth A. Shepsle, *The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

[10] Fenno, *Congressmen in Committees*, 1–14.

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it necessary to take account of members' desire for internal influence, a goal that in his own analysis produces different behavior from reelection.[11] Finally, a major study of congressional participation in policy implementation for which the case studies in this article were undertaken indicates that congressional involvement in many policy areas is sustained over time and is motivated by goals in addition to reelection.[12]

Because it is clear that different goals produce different behavior, it is important to consider how those goals affect oversight. Moreover, as with any collective product of Congress, the role of specialized policy leaders is critical in oversight. Where there are no electoral benefits for meaningful, nonsymbolic congressional action, such action is most likely when undertaken by leaders in key positions, usually chairs of committees or subcommittees with a jurisdictional claim who are committed to a particular policy position or to exercising their own power and the power of Congress over the executive branch.[13] In such cases, congressional involvement will likely be maintained over a significant period of time, usually at the staff level, as the motive for involvement goes beyond the quick political payoff.

The cases of congressional participation in program administration that are examined here involve motives other than or in addition to reelection. In more than one instance the resulting policies served broad, unorganized interests at the expense of reputedly powerful organized groups, a result that is counterintuitive under the reelection assumption. In one case, the reelection goal and the oversight that resulted from it were manipulated by power and policy-oriented leaders to achieve general interest goals.

Oversight and Organized Interests

Although the reelection goal does not preclude oversight that would serve broad, unorganized publics, particularly individual constituencies, the desire for reelection does make members of Congress especially sensitive to the wishes of organized interests, sometimes at the expense of the broader public, whose members normally are not in a

[11] Mayhew, *Congress*.

[12] Robert S. Gilmour and Alexis A. Halley, eds., *Who Makes Public Policy?* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1994); *Beyond Distrust: Building Bridges between Congress and the Executive* (Washington, DC: National Academy of Public Administration, 1992).

[13] R. Douglas Arnold, *The Logic of Congressional Action* (New Haven: Yale University Press); Burdett Loomis, *The New American Politician* (New York: Basic Books, 1988).

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position to reward or punish their representatives for lax oversight. If constituents are unorganized, they are unlikely to have enough information to identify the lack of oversight as the source of their problems.[14]

In such situations, when a crisis or scandal in program administration produces public pressure for congressional action, members can maximize their political profit from the public and minimize their loss with interest groups by taking symbolic action, giving only the appearance of change in the publicly desired direction. Such a strategy is most likely to be successful in policy areas in which there are no established public interest groups to expose the deception and raise its electoral cost. Indeed, this is exactly how Mayhew expects a reelection-driven Congress to behave in the regulatory arena, where the costs of meaningful legislation are usually imposed on organized interests, and the benefits are dispersed among the general public.[15] Of course, where the prospective benefits of oversight go to organized groups, Congress is likely to perform it, as they can expect electoral rewards in the form of campaign contributions, endorsements, and the like.

If the reelection assumption is relaxed, meaningful congressional action in the general interest is much more likely in policy areas where organized interests oppose unorganized constituents. In the interest of making good public policy, members may forego an increment in interest group support and oppose the requests of their clientele groups, even if their constituents would have been pacified by symbolic action that falsely appeared to hurt special interests and help constituents. Thus, the major argument of this article is that unlike the reelection goal, nonelectoral goals supply motivation for sustained, nonsymbolic oversight, particularly in those areas in which, under the reelection assumption, it is least likely.

The Case Studies

In the following case studies in transportation, it is apparent that in most of the congressional-bureaucratic interactions examined, the assumption of nonelectoral goals is more useful than the reelection goal alone. Multiple goals provide a better explanation for the pattern

[14] Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).

[15] Mayhew, *Congress*, 132–136.

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of congressional involvement in the administration of programs where the costs of oversight are concentrated and the benefits widespread, the area in which oversight is least likely under the reelection assumption.

Specifically, using the argument developed in the previous section I show in each case study the action that would be predicted assuming the reelection goal alone and contrast that with the action actually taken. I further show that the actions taken in most cases are inconsistent with pure reelection-seeking and consistent with power or policy goals. The case studies show the utility of a broader, differentiated view of the motives for congressional oversight.

The two cases concern, first, congressional involvement in the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System program, a system for preventing midair collisions; and second, highway demonstration projects, congressionally-designated highway projects for the districts of individual members of Congress.

Each case study is based on extensive interviews in 1990 and 1991 with congressional staff, executive branch program managers, and interest group representatives, as well as an examination of the official printed record and correspondence among the actors.

TCAS: The Traffic Alert Collision Avoidance System

The development of TCAS began in 1981, when newly appointed FAA Administrator J. Lynn Helms put forth a new set of technical specifications for the aircraft collision avoidance program. The new system was expected to solve the major problems that had plagued and delayed the implementation of its predecessor in the 1970s.

Congressional monitoring of the program was sporadic in the 1970s, when a fatal midair collision on 28 September 1978 over San Diego between a PSA airliner and a general aviation (private) aircraft led congressional committees to step up informal pressure on the FAA to complete research and development on TCAS and require the airlines to install it. In 1981 an agency official testifying before the House Science and Technology Committee predicted, inaccurately as it turned out, that the new TCAS would be ready for installation by 1984 or 1985. Thus, between 1981 and 1986, official congressional action was limited to three oversight hearings and House and Senate appropriations committee report language in 1984 and 1986 that encouraged further development of the system.[16]

[16] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1984*, H.Rpt. 98-246 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [hereafter GPO], 1983), 33; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations,

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However, a spate of midair collisions and near collisions in the mid-1980s, the most disastrous of which was the August 1986 collision over Cerritos, California between an AeroMexico airliner and a general aviation aircraft, produced a crisis atmosphere in Congress, which in turn prompted legislative action. The Cerritos accident, which claimed eighty-two lives, raised the issue of Mode C altitude-reporting transponders; the fact that the majority of the general aviation fleet still did not carry them was widely regarded as a major contributor to the increased incidence of midair and near-midair collisions. Mode C transponders were designed to provide air traffic control with the transmitting aircraft's location, including altitude, enabling controllers to alert pilots to collision hazards. The private plane involved in the Cerritos accident did not have one, and Los Angeles air traffic controllers never saw it on their screens. TCAS, designed primarily for airliners, independently receives information on the proximity of another aircraft from the second craft's Mode C transponder and issues avoidance instructions to the airliner's pilot; thus, the transponders are also an integral part of TCAS.

There were several reasons for the FAA's delay in developing and requiring TCAS. The airline industry resisted the imposition of a requirement, as it promised to be expensive and in the beginning, potentially unreliable. In part, the need for a system that was completely reliable led the engineers at FAA to work to continue to improve the design. As one improvement led to another, the temptation was irresistible to delay requiring the system as the next advance was perfected. Without pressure from the upper levels of FAA or Congress to complete a workable system, nothing interrupted that cycle.

In the wake of the Cerritos collision, Congress decided to force the FAA's hand. The House Public Works and Transportation Committee held hearings on the status of the FAA's TCAS research and development program. Within a year, that committee jointly with the House Science and Technology Committee reported and the House passed nearly unanimously a bill ordering FAA to move forward on a requirement for installation of TCAS and Mode C transponders on precise

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Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1986, H.Rpt. 99-256 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1985), 37–38; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1986*, S.Rpt. 99-152 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1985), 35.

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timetables mandated in the legislation, with a 1991 deadline for completion.[17]

The question posed here is: how would the House Public Works Committee, which took the lead on the legislation, have behaved if reelection alone had been the motivating factor for its members? From staff members' remarks, it is clear that public concern, hence arguably electoral considerations, triggered congressional action. In this case, a genuine regulatory solution would offer general benefits in the form of safer flying conditions but would impose concentrated costs on the airline industry and on general aviation pilots, who would have to buy expensive new equipment. To prevent that, those clientele groups would likely attempt to capitalize on the friendships they had built with committee members and their staffs through campaign contributions, honoraria, and other kinds of attention. Thus, if reelection had been the only goal that motivated members of the committee, the resulting legislation would likely have been at best vague, leaving much discretion to the FAA to write regulations on its own timetable.[18] During that process the affected interest groups could exert pressure for lenient rules, out of the glare of the public spotlight. Congressional action on both the TCAS deadline for the airlines and the Mode C regulations for private pilots would have given maximum flexibility and discretion to an agency that had already dragged its feet for years.

Such a course of action would be optimal for reelection-driven committee members, as they could take public credit for crafting legislation to deal with the problem without provoking the anger of organized groups, who would clearly recognize the opportunity inherent in the less visible rule-making process to minimize their costs.

The plausibility of that scenario is enhanced by the fact that no public interest groups were actively involved in seeking the regulation. Thus, no organized groups played watchdog to ensure that the new rules were as strict as congressional rhetoric might suggest. Moreover, two of the three most active private interest associations made substantial campaign contributions to members of the relevant committees in both the House and Senate. Although research on the impact of political action committee contributions on roll call voting has pro-

[17] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Public Works and Transportation, *Aircraft Collision Avoidance Act of 1987*, H.Rpt. 100-286/pt.1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1987).

[18] Michael T. Hayes, *Lobbyists and Legislators* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1981).

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duced conflicting results,[19] Richard Hall and Frank Wayman found that campaign contributions were associated with committee members' devoting more time to the requests of groups whose goals they already agreed with.[20] Thus, we would expect reelection-seeking committee members especially to assist groups that gave them campaign contributions.

In this case, representing private pilots in opposition to strengthening the Mode C requirement, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association PAC in 1985–1986 contributed to half the members of the Public Works and Transportation Committee, most heavily to the chair and ranking minority member of the Aviation Subcommittee: subcommittee chairman Norman Mineta received $7,500; ranking minority member Newt Gingrich received $3,000. Of those committee members who received money from that group, the average contribution was $2,033. The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), which opposed the TCAS requirement, contributed to 80 percent of the members of that committee; this PAC's average contribution was nearly $4,200 per member in the 1986 election cycle. They gave $7,500 to Mineta and $5,000 to Gingrich. If we assume that committee members were motivated by the desire for reelection, the absence of public interest groups along with members' desire to continue to receive PAC contributions from their clientele groups would lead us to predict that the committee would not produce meaningful progress toward forcing the FAA to require TCAS and upgrade its Mode C requirement.

Did the House legislation take a symbolic form? The answer is yes and no. It is no for the bill requiring the major airlines to install TCAS: the legislation ordered FAA to require all airliners with more than thirty seats to have TCAS within four years.[21] Although the airlines did not take a public position against the legislation in hearings, they were unhappy with the requirement and began working immediately after its passage to weaken it. As one congressional staffer said in a personal interview, "The airlines don't ever want to spend a dollar on anything new; they have had to be dragged kicking and screaming to new technology."[22]

[19] M. Margaret Conway, "PACs in the Political Process" in Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, eds., *Interest Group Politics*, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1991).

[20] Richard L. Hall, and Frank W. Wayman, "Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees," *American Political Science Review* 84 (September 1990): 797–820.

[21] U.S. Congress, *Aircraft Collision Avoidance Act of 1987.*

[22] All respondents were promised anonymity.

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In this case, the committee did not report weak or symbolic legislation and did not give the FAA discretion on timing the regulations, as they could have if they had sought only a legislative vehicle for empty position taking. Instead, the committee reported and the House passed substantive legislation, indicating that the House and in particular key members of the Public Works Committee were motivated largely by concern with good public policy, the desire for influence over an agency with which they were demonstrably frustrated, or both.

On the other hand, the House committee's Mode C transponder requirement in the same legislation took the shape of a reelection-driven decision. According to several respondents, the group representing general aviation pilots, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), worked to forestall efforts to legislate additional Mode C requirements. Accordingly, although committee members felt compelled to respond to the Cerritos accident with some reference to a Mode C requirement, they "fuzzed it over," in the words of one staff member, in response to AOPA's concerns. Specifically, the bill did not define the "high density traffic areas" in which it ordered the FAA to require Mode C, leaving the agency with broad discretion to define the term in a rulemaking process into which AOPA customarily had significant input.

However, counteracting the weakness of the House on this issue was the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, whose chairman, Ernest Hollings, as well as Senators Pete Wilson, John Danforth, and Robert Byrd, offered a floor amendment to the airport and airway system reauthorization bill that imposed an expanded requirement for Mode C transponders. This mandate was seen by all participants as strict and detailed, leaving much less room than the House bill for agency discretion. Thus, the Senate did not respond as if the key members were motivated solely by the desire for reelection. Instead, they thwarted the wishes of a wealthy, numerous, and reputedly powerful clientele group of the committee of jurisdiction, despite the fact that as with House members, AOPA was generous in its 1985–1986 campaign contributions. Its PAC gave the eight senators on the Commerce, Science and Transportation committee who were running for reelection in 1986 an average of nearly $3,000. Both the full committee chairman, Ernest Hollings, and the subcommittee chairman, Wendell Ford, ran for reelection that year; AOPA gave them $5,000 and $3,000, respectively.

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Staff interviews indicated that strong policy commitments on the part of the active senators provided the motivation to write a strict requirement. As one staff member said,

> Hollings really became engaged in the issue rather than it being purely staff; he had informed arguments. He thought every general aviation plane should have Mode C, but the staff talked him into limiting it to areas with radar coverage.

That limitation notwithstanding, the legislation produced a requirement that covered all but the most lightly used portions of the U.S. airspace system.

In the House–Senate conference committee on the airport and airway reauthorization, to which the TCAS and Mode C requirements had been added, the already demanding TCAS schedule was not controversial. The Senate prevailed on its stricter Mode C requirement, agreeing only to push back the deadline for implementation from two years to three, despite House conferees' misgivings about the interests of general aviation pilots.

The resulting FAA-proposed rule on Mode C transponders was strict and predictably controversial, expanding the requirement for the transponders to areas that included all major and most small airports. The airlines, the Air Transport Association, and Senator Hollings all supported that rule. However, the general aviation community most emphatically did not. AOPA generated 70,000 letters to Congress and the FAA in opposition to the rule. The pressure had its effect: ten members of the House Public Works Committee, including the chairs and ranking minority members of both the full committee and the Aviation Subcommittee, wrote to the FAA administrator asking FAA to weaken the proposed rule, arguing that it went well beyond the intent of the legislative mandate. Seven of these ten members (70 percent) received PAC contributions in 1986 from AOPA, compared to only seventeen of the remaining thirty-nine members (44 percent).[23]

[23] Seven of the ten committee members who signed the letter received campaign contributions from AOPA in 1985–1986. The mean contribution to those members was $3,000; the remaining three had received nothing. Of the remaining thirty-nine committee members, seventeen of the nonsigners received campaign contributions from AOPA averaging $1,600; the remaining twenty-two members of the committee received nothing. Thus, the letter-signers on the average had received more money from AOPA than the nonsigners. However, the group of members involved is too small to allow the properly specified statistical analysis that would be necessary to conclude that the contributions had a significant impact on member behavior. In any event, Hall and Wayman, "Buying Time," make a persuasive case that PAC contributions primarily "buy" the time and effort of committee members who support the interest group anyway, rather than converting a group's

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The agency responded by telling the House committee that the final regulation would be "reasonable," so they would not have to legislate their desired changes. The final Mode C rule did indeed reduce the proposed requirement somewhat, but still expanded it significantly beyond its previous limits.[24]

There is an important postscript to the story of TCAS. The FAA and the airlines felt from the beginning that the 1991 deadline for installation of TCAS would be impossible for the airlines to meet for both technological and economic reasons. An Office of Technology Assessment report requested at the behest of the Air Transport Association by Wendell Ford, chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee's Aviation Subcommittee, examined the feasibility of the mandated schedule and supported the position of FAA and the Air Transport Association. According to several respondents, that report persuaded Congress to pass legislation in 1989 to loosen the deadlines and restore some discretion to the FAA.[25] The legislation, PL 101-236, authorized extension of the installation deadline for up to two years beyond the previous December 1991 deadline if the FAA administrator deemed it necessary to ensure a "safe and orderly transition" to TCAS. The requirement that general aviation aircraft carry Mode C transponders was not weakened or delayed.

Thus, the attempts of clientele groups to weaken strong regulatory legislation, which would have been successful with a Congress motivated primarily by the reelection goal in the absence of citizens groups representing the general public, were only partially successful here. The AOPA continued to oppose the Mode C requirement, and the airlines faced a 1993 deadline for installing equipment they did not want.

Highway Demonstration Projects

Highway demonstration projects are specific construction projects authorized by Congress for the districts of its members. At first glance, they appear to be a clear example of classic pork barrel politics, with little relation to the goals of good public policy and influence, and with little more than an incidental connection to congressional partici-

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opponents. The information presented here does not constitute an additional test of their hypothesis but is consistent with it in the sense that on the whole, members who received the most money from AOPA exerted extra effort on the group's behalf.

[24] 53 *Federal Register* 23356–23374.

[25] Office of Technology Assessment, *Safer Skies With TCAS* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1989).

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pation in program administration. The projects certainly can be viewed as pork in the sense that they are distributive benefits designed to help members get reelected. However, demonstration projects do constitute a form of participation in program administration with both state and the federal transportation departments. Most of the congressional staff members interviewed said that the members who asked for projects were dissatisfied with the highway construction priorities of their state transportation departments, which had either not included members' projects on their priority lists or had placed them so low that they were unlikely to be built. Prior to the funding constraints that emerged in the late 1970s, one staff member said, "members worked with [the federal] DoT [Department of Transportation] and their state DoTs to solve their district problems, but this is harder now." Thus, the demonstration projects in the 1987 highway reauthorization provided individual members with a means of forcing federal and state administrators to implement the members' policy preferences in an era of scarce resources.

Despite the projects' clear connection to reelection, this case study shows that the legislation that dispensed them was crafted by a leadership team that used them to promote broader policy and influence goals. Specifically, committee leaders included the demonstration projects requested by individual members in large numbers in the highway reauthorization bill to enable those leaders, who were motivated by the good public policy and influence goals, to pass a highway reauthorization bill with significant general interest provisions. Oversight in the form of congressional supervision of the highway program was electorally motivated and produced benefits for individual districts at general expense, but the projects were included in the larger bill to promote committee leaders' general interest legislative goals by prompting rank and file members to support those goals.

The 1987 reauthorization of the nation's federal-aid highway and urban mass transit programs ultimately contained 152 demonstration projects, an unprecedented total.[26] According to a Federal Highway Administration official, the previous maximum, contained in the 1973 highway reauthorization, had been fourteen. The five-year cost, approximately $1.4 billion of a total program authorization of $88 billion, constituted a little less than 2 percent of the total; most of the bill's

[26] "Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987," PL 100-17, 2 April 1987, 181–201.

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funding was for long-standing formula programs for such purposes as construction and rehabilitation of interstate and other federal-aid highways.[27]

Despite their relatively small share of the total authorization, demonstration projects accounted for much of the conflict over the bill, being partly responsible for the failure of a 1986 House–Senate conference in the last weeks of the 99th Congress. The disagreement between the House Public Works and Transportation Committee and the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, which did not include demonstration projects in its bill, created an impasse that in turn produced a five-month gap in program spending authority for the states. Moreover, the Federal Highway Administration adamantly opposed the projects on the grounds that they distorted administrative priorities and undermined the integrity of what previously had been an exemplary system of integrated highways which met both state and national needs. President Reagan cited demonstration projects as a primary reason for his 1987 veto of the authorization, which was quickly overridden.[28]

Although House Public Works and Transportation Committee staff members maintained that some projects did in fact demonstrate substantive technological advances, the primary and most obvious motivation of House members for requesting them was to enhance their chances for reelection through constituency service. As one respondent said, "Anyone would concede that what they're demonstrating is how a member of Congress can come to the Public Works Committee, get a project, and go home and put out a press release."

The stated purpose of most of the projects supports that view. For example, the legislation authorizes several as follows: ". . . to demonstrate the benefits of enhancing safety and improving economic vitality of a depressed area. ". . . [to] demonstrate the effectiveness of construction of parking facilities in relieving on-street parking congestion and unsafe parking practices. ". . . [to demonstrate] methods of improving economic development and diversification, and eliminating traffic and highway safety hazards. . . ."[29]

In the Senate, there was more resistance to the projects, largely because senators would have needed many more projects than House

[27] Ibid.

[28] Linda Greenhouse, "Senate, for Now, Upholds the Veto of Roads Measure," *New York Times*, 2 April 1987.

[29] "Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act," Section 149.

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members to make a real difference to their reelection chances. They feared that the demand from local interests in the larger states would become unmanageable. According to congressional staff members, senators were much more concerned with overall formulas for allocating highway funds by state; as one said, "formulas are the Senate's pork."

However, as noted earlier, House leaders' motives for including demonstration projects in the legislation went beyond reelection, an incentive that also existed in earlier years, when few such projects were included. The Public Works Committee leadership used members' demonstration projects to build the legislation with a freer hand and to produce a veto-proof bill. Although the literature of political science has given much attention to logrolling as a device to pass a series of narrow special-interest bills, logrolling has not generally been recognized as a tool used by committee leaders to assemble enough votes to pass broad general interest legislation.[30] In this case, it was understood that the Public Works Committee leadership expected members who received demonstration projects to support the leadership version of the bill. As one staff member said:

> It's like the godfather: "you came to me, but once I do you a favor, you have to be loyal." The committee doesn't go out and say it's having a sale of demos; you go to the committee; it says jump through these hoops, and you get it. Six months later, maybe even on another bill, they call in their chits.

In return for the projects, the leaders of the committee sought support for their own programmatic objectives, especially the 55-mph speed limit. They directed the Federal Highway Administration to enforce the speed limit by depriving states that did not enforce it of a portion of their federal highway funds. They also directed the agency to restrict access to interstate highways for tandem trailer trucks, access that was ardently sought by the trucking industry. In at least two cases, demonstration projects helped to enable the committee to pass legislation that involved oversight on other matters on which the com-

[30] For a seminal theoretical treatment of coalition formation to pass distributive legislation, see James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1962). For empirical investigations of logrolling, see John A. Ferejohn, *Pork Barrel Politics* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1974); and James B. Kau and Paul H. Rubin, "Self Interest, Ideology and Logrolling in Congressional Voting," *Journal of Law and Economics* 22 (October 1979): 365–384. For the case that bureaucrats use awards of district projects in a way similar to that found here, that is, to reduce legislators' opposition to their programs, see R. Douglas Arnold, *Congress and the Bureaucracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

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mittee was opposed by the states and the trucking industry. Additionally, a major strategic objective was to ensure the support of a sufficient majority of members to override an expected presidential veto of the legislation.

The strategy was successful. Elsewhere I have estimated multivariate regression models of the impact of receiving a demonstration project on House members' voting on floor amendments to the highway reauthorization bill. In these models, variables were included to control for such factors as party, ideology, committee membership, and district characteristics. Two votes were taken on increasing the speed limits; on both votes, members who received a project from the committee were significantly more likely, with all things equal, to oppose an increase in the speed limit than members who were not so favored. Similarly, members who received a project were significantly more likely than others to vote to override the president's veto of the reauthorization. The same effect occurred for several other votes on which the leadership took a unified position.[31]

Thus, to attain their policy goals, committee leaders used rank and file members' reelection needs as a tool in the construction of a winning coalition for highway and transit legislation that reflected the leaders' policy preferences and involved considerable supervision of the bureaucracy in addition to the specification of highway projects. In the case of the 55-mph speed limit in particular the leaders' preference was for general-interest policy that was opposed by most trucking companies and by rural and western states. According to committee aides, the late James Howard, then chairman of the House Public Works Committee, was motivated both by his personal commitment to the 55-mph speed limit as a saver of lives and by his desire to wield his power as committee chair. Along with the chair of the Surface Transportation Subcommittee and the ranking minority members of both the committee and subcommittee, he carefully crafted the legislation in private meetings with staff. The special benefits that they dispensed in that process gave them a much freer hand in policy making than is common in the modern Congress.

The authorization of highway demonstration projects was a result of a successful attempt by committee leaders to construct a winning

[31] Diana M. Evans, "Policy and Pork: The Use of Pork Barrel Projects to Build Policy Coalitions in the House of Representatives," *American Journal of Political Science*, forthcoming, 38 (November 1994). The tandem trailer issue did not come to a vote; my inferences on that issue are based on comments of interviewees and are consistent with the statistical evidence on other issues.

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legislative coalition for broader policy objectives. It is clear that the inclusion of the projects held in check the House majority that wanted to raise the speed limit to 65 on rural interstate highways. However, in the Senate the pressure for an increase in the speed limit was stronger than in the House, and Senate negotiators pressed hard on the issue in conference. Eventually, to report a reauthorization bill that would be veto proof in both houses, House conferees were forced to allow a House vote on the speed limit. When given permission by the leadership of Public Works, the House did vote 217–206 to allow an increase in the speed limit in rural areas.[32]

The question remains as to how the House Public Works Committee leaders who crafted the highway bill would have behaved had reelection been their only goal. Although the demonstration projects were consistent with the reelection goal, committee leaders' motivations for including them in the bill were not. It seems clear that they would not have held out so long for a speed limit that was an election issue only to those whose constituents wanted it raised, members from western and other sparsely populated states. Indeed, the Surface Transportation Subcommittee chairman, Glen Anderson of California, was, in the words of a staff member, "getting killed on 55 at home." However, he sacrificed the electoral benefits of supporting a change and stayed with the committee chair in order to keep the policy coalition and the power of its leaders intact. Moreover, the House committee leaders' insistence on both the 55-mph limit and demonstration projects killed the 1986 conference on the bill, which had serious effects on the highway program and the committee's clientele groups. The failure to pass the reauthorization in the 99th Congress led to a five-month gap in program funding.

Had reelection been House members' only goal, the committee would have approved the 65-mph limit from the beginning along with the demonstration projects, as they eventually were forced to do anyway to get the legislation out of conference the second time around. In this case House committee leaders attempted until the bitter end to force the Federal Highway Administration to continue to impose concentrated costs on organized interests, particularly truck drivers, trucking companies, and some states to provide the general benefit of increased highway safety. Their means of enforcing this policy was to order the

[32] "Highway Bill Passes Over Reagan's Veto," *1987 CQ Almanac* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1988), 331–336.

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agency to deprive states that did not comply with the speed limit of a portion of their federal highway funds, not a popular position electorally. The price for this temporary victory was reelection-driven congressional participation in the management of the highway program in the form of demonstration projects.

Conclusions

This study does not constitute a fully developed theory of congressional goals and their impact on oversight behavior; it does not specify when particular goals will be activated nor when the good public policy and/or influence goals will dominate reelection or vice versa. Rather, my purpose has been a first step toward such a theory. This study shows that an understanding of the form and amount of congressional participation in program administration depends on understanding the goals that motivate members of Congress and their differential impact on behavior and policy outcomes.

Much of the oversight literature that considers the question of incentives for doing oversight in terms of members' goals assumes that they are motivated primarily by the desire for reelection; that assumption has supported the inference that oversight activity tends to serve particular interests. I argue that in addition to reelection, the nonelectoral goals of good public policy and influence also motivate oversight behavior and lead to policy outcomes that do not always serve particular interests.

The aviation case especially supports that argument. Although the drive for reelection played a prominent role in both case studies, so did nonelectoral goals. With respect to TCAS, Congress participated in program management in a different form from what we would predict using the reelection assumption alone, because clientele groups were opposed to congressional directives to the bureaucracy.

Both cases included policies for which costs were concentrated to a greater degree than benefits. But the reelection-based literature leads us to expect policy results that either provide symbolic benefits to constituents without imposing concentrated costs on organized groups or that delegate the real decisions to the executive branch, which may produce a similarly lenient policy result. In the case of the requirement for Mode C transponders, nothing of the kind happened. The Senate held fast on its demand for strict regulation of a normally powerful clientele group. On TCAS for airliners, although Congress eventually

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extended the deadline for installation, it did not give the FAA discretion to extend it beyond 1993, as the industry wanted.

On highway demonstration projects, House committee leaders committed to certain policy goals delayed a major program reauthorization for five months after the previous authorization had expired and risked a presidential veto to win at least some of its policy goals and the demonstration projects that made possible the achievement of those goals. Only at the insistence of the Senate, did they ultimately lose on the speed limit. The committee leadership's attempt to force the agency to enforce the speed limit by linking it to agency funding formulas that were essentially unrelated to the speed limit constituted oversight in the general interest, as the costs were concentrated on truckers and the western states. A critical variable in that process was micromanagement of the highway program by individual members in the states that received demonstration projects.

Theories of oversight that lump all goals together cannot distinguish the unique impact of nonelectoral goals. This research demonstrates the value of making a distinction between electoral and nonelectoral goals by demonstrating that different goals do have a differential impact on oversight. The reelection goal does not always eclipse the others.*

* Thanks to G. Calvin Mackenzie, Kenneth Meier, Robert Gilmour, Lawrence Longley, and Alexis Halley for their thoughtful comments on previous versions of this work. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, September 1991.

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Book Reviews

The Two Faces of National Interest *by W. David Clinton. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1994. 278 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $15.95.*

Following World War II, public officials invoked the national interest sparingly, if at all, to explain American foreign policy. Yet in private consultations, the same officials often defined foreign policy in terms of interests. In recent years, public and private usage have come on line. Presidents and secretaries of state give expression to national interest in reviewing options for Bosnia, North Korea, Somalia, and Haiti.

Scholars have been slow in joining policy makers. In the wake of such neglect, the need for a major treatise updating Charles A. Beard and Hans J. Morgenthau has become apparent. W. David Clinton has written such a book in which he discusses the two faces of national interest: the security and well-being of a people within a nation state identified as the common good and the interaction of states with one another and with the international society aiming at preserving independence. Defined in these terms, Clinton argues that the national interest is a viable approach for analyzing and understanding international relations. Clinton proceeds step by step in examining his subject. He studies with a critical eye the popular usage of the subject and traces its origins from Thucydides, Machiavelli, Louis René Édouard Rohan, Frederick the Great, George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, Metternich, Alexis de Tocqueville, Robert Carr, Beard, and Morgenthau. In every case, the author displays a profound understanding of his forebears and goes to the heart of their theories.

Clinton grapples with charges against the national interest. He explicates criticisms that the concept is ambiguous, undemocratic, irrational, obsolescent, and exclusivist, analyzing each in turn. Without denying that in some instances critics have a point, he offers convincing reasons for the validity of the concept. Along the way, he provides useful definitions of the national interest in general and within particular contexts. His discussion of "national interest" and "national interests" is especially helpful as are his reflections on the internal and external realms of national interest. Clinton's concept of broadening and narrowing national interests challenges those who write of the rigidity of the concept and its resistance to peaceful change.

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Clinton tests the coherence and relevance of his views of the national interest against four turning points in American foreign policy since World War II: the Marshall Plan, the Korean War, the Nixon Doctrine, and the Carter human rights policy. What sets his discourse apart is attention to details and the exigencies of congressional debate, the diversity of cultures and national tradition, the role of personalities, and the convergence of separate national interests and objectives. He reminds us of facts that are often overlooked: The European economy in early 1947 was slow in recovering from the shock of World War II; the decision to intervene in the Korean War involved the United States in a process of clarifying its interests unlike the steps leading to the Marshal Plan (the latter required prolonged deliberations while decisions on Korea were taken in approximately three weeks); the Nixon Doctrine called for U.S. restraint and a reduction of American participation in Asian wars; and Carter's human rights crusade entailed a break with tradition in foreign policy.

No study of a principle of American foreign policy, however venerated, will satisfy academic and political partisans. This reviewer would have liked to see more discussion of tragic choices involving intractable if not insoluble problems. Any fair-minded person must agree, however, that few books compare with Clinton's in historical and philosophical sweep, even-handed weighing of the facts, and holding to the primary purpose of painstaking study of a term often used as totem or whipping boy.

KENNETH W. THOMPSON
The University of Virginia

The Real World Order: Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil *by Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky. Chatham, NJ, Chatham House, 1993. 212 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $16.95.*

This old-fashioned book presents a grand line of argument that "the current world order will be different and better than the one with which we are familiar" (p. xv). The reason? "For the first time in history a small number of great democracies – the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Britain, and Italy – will have most of the world's power" (p. 4). These are the most important nations in what the authors label the zones of peace, wealth, and democracy. None faces "substantial military danger to its independence or survival," because the democracies do not fight one another and because they now have military preponderance over all others. Economic conflicts among them are noisy, but the stakes of specific disputes are typically small, and economics will not drive these democracies into fundamental conflict. So with the cold war behind us, "the age of heroism in American foreign policy is thankfully over" (p. 169).

The fortunate nations in the zones of peace stand in contrast to those in the zones of turmoil, war, and development, "the six-sevenths of the world that is

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not yet wealthy and democratic" (p. 9). For people in these zones, near-term prospects are bleak, with millions bound to die "unnecessarily," from horrors "we cannot stop." But "the same process that changed the zones of democracy has already begun to work in the zones of turmoil. The newest, most reliable part of this process is economic development . . . the transition from traditional poverty to modern wealth is almost inevitable everywhere" (pp. 43–44). In the next century, fewer people will die of starvation, and "billions more people will live long enough to know their grandchildren" (p. 9). And democracy will gradually follow, though it "is probably now at a temporary high water from which it is likely to recede before advancing again" (p. 36).

The initial development of the authors' world view is followed by a potpourri of judgments and prescriptions: usually interesting, sometimes persuasive, occasionally infuriating (like the authors' rating of India as less democratic than Bulgaria or Brazil). "Nuclear weapons will not affect the fundamental character of the next world order" (p. 60), but they could cause "great tragedy"—hence "*there are few things more worth doing than preventing the spread of nuclear weapons*" (p. 70, authors' emphasis). Russia is now weak, with her shaky democratic institutions unlikely to survive: our policy toward it should be "modest benevolence" (p. 98) with low expectations. But fundamentally: "in the current world order there is no good basis for a long-term political or strategic policy for the United States in the zones of turmoil" (p. 139). In any case American influence over these nations will come more through its existence and example than its specific actions.

U.S. policy should emphasize the support of democracy. The United States should form a UN Democratic Caucus, which would develop joint positions by weighted voting among its members. Advanced democracies should agree "that none of us will sell the most advanced military equipment to a nondemocracy" (p. 157). In general, "the United States ought to be prepared to intervene in the zones of turmoil [for democracy and peace, against aggression and genocide] cautiously and on the basis of consultation with other democracies" (p. 187). The "overall goal should be the advance of stable democracy so that the zones of peace will be extended as soon as possible" (p. 199). A similar view pervades the "enlargement" speech by President Clinton's national security assistant, Anthony Lake, given the month *The Real World Order* was published.

Are there problems with the Singer-Wildavsky analysis? Of course. Within the democracies, the authors tend to treat economic growth as linear and stretching forever, ignoring their endemic recent problems of productivity and unemployment. The authors say astonishingly little about East Asia outside Japan. China is mentioned in several specific contexts, but there is no overall treatment of the nation Lee Kwan Yew has predicted will become the greatest power ever during the twenty-first century, and whose march toward democracy remains uncertain. I could find no mention of AIDS, which is devastating whole nations in sub-Saharan Africa and threatens to do likewise in parts of Asia.

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But it would be wrong to conclude on a critical note, for the authors' vision is grand and compelling. *The Real World Order* would be stimulating reading for scholars, students, and citizens, even if Singer and Wildavsky hadn't gotten the main things right. But in this reviewer's judgment, they have.

MAC DESTLER
University of Maryland

Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967 *by William B. Quandt. Washington, DC, and Berkeley, The Brookings Institution and the University of California Press, 1993. 612 pp. Cloth, $38.95; paper, $15.95.*

At precisely the moment that the Middle East peace process has entered its most critical phase, William Quandt has written a wise and wide-ranging account of American efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, an account that should serve as a handbook for historians and policy makers alike. Those familiar with Quandt's earlier work will recognize the first three-quarters of *Peace Process* as an updating of two of his previous books, *Decade of Decisions* and *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics*.

Quandt sees considerable continuity in U.S. policy from the 1967 Six Day War through the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference. First, American policy makers have almost always focused on process as opposed to substance in attempting to broker an Arab–Israeli settlement, in large measure because procedural issues usually proved less explosive than substantive matters. Quandt sees this procedural bias reflected most fully in the pragmatic step-by-step approach favored by Henry Kissinger during the mid-1970s and by George Shultz during the late 1980s. Second, Quandt argues that because American policy has been "president-centered," it has frequently been shaped by domestic considerations, though less by narrow interest group politics than more broadly by what might be called metapolitical forces. Well aware of the rhythms of the American electoral calendar, Democrats like Jimmy Carter and Republicans like George Bush pressed hardest for an Arab–Israeli settlement during their first three years in office before hunkering down during their bids for reelection. Third, during the two decades after 1967, American policy makers tended to view the Middle East conflict through the prism of the cold war, a tendency that Quandt argues led presidents as different as Lyndon Johnson and Ronald Reagan to regard Israel as a strategic asset and to write the Arabs off as Soviet stooges. Quandt believes that with the end of the cold war the United States must refocus its policies toward the Middle East by adopting a long overdue regional perspective to replace the out-of-date globalist outlook dating from 1945.

The story that Quandt tells here, enhanced by seventy pages of documents ranging from UN Resolution 242 to the Soviet–American invitation to the Madrid

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Conference, suggests that refocusing American policy will not be easy. His revised and expanded chapters on the Six Day War and its aftermath, for example, reveal an anti-Soviet and anti-Nasser Lyndon Johnson in June 1967 flashing Levi Eshkol a yellow light that over the following fifteen years appeared increasingly green to both Arabs and Israelis. Although Quandt has made few changes in the section on Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger, his chapters on the 1970 "Black September" crisis in Jordan and the outbreak of the 1973 Yom Kippur War remain what they were when they first appeared during the late 1970s—brilliant sketches of the ambivalent partnership that was emerging between Israel and America. Likewise, Quandt's chapter on the Camp David Agreement draw heavily on his earlier work, an insider's authoritative account of Jimmy Carter's frustrating attempt to persuade Menachim Begin that Israel's relationship with the United States must be a two-way street.

One will find few kind words here for Ronald Reagan, who, according to Quandt, "overvalued" America's ties to Israel, "underinvested" in the peacemaking process, and absent-mindedly presided over the Iran-contra affair that seriously undermined U.S. credibility in the Middle East. Only during the final two years of the Reagan administration, with a much more assertive George Shultz at the helm, did U.S. policy "return to realism," opening the door to a dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization that would eventually permit George Bush and James Baker to bring Arabs and Israelis together in Madrid to talk peace. Although he gives the Texan from New England high marks for adopting a no-nonsense approach toward both Yitzhak Shamir and Yasir Arafat during 1991, Quandt, like most other critics of Bush's foreign policy, sees too much caution and too little imagination during 1989 and 1990.

As Quandt put the finishing touches on this book in the spring of 1993, however, he remained relatively optimistic about the outcome of the Middle East peace process. If Bill Clinton and his advisers could develop "a realistic appraisal of the regional situation," (p. 418) if they could adopt "a domestically sustainable policy of evenhandedness," (p. 420) and if they could provide coherent and creative leadership, then they stood "a good chance of contributing to the long sought goal of Arab–Israeli peace" (p. 431). A year later, in the wake of Yitzhak Rabin's rendezvous with Yasir Arafat in the White House Rose Garden, Quandt would probably conclude that two out of three was good enough.

DOUGLAS LITTLE
Clark University

The Entangling Alliance: The United States and European Security, 1950–1993
by Ronald E. Powaski. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1993. 261 pp. $59.95.

This book attempts to explain why the United States expanded its military presence in Europe following the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 and

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why that presence is now declining. The author also seeks to explain why, despite past transatlantic disagreements, "America's involvement in the entangling alliance is likely to endure" (p. x). In fact, the book both surpasses and falls short of these aspirations.

In two respects, *The Entangling Alliance* is an impressive and useful work. The first is its broad sweep. The book provides a comprehensive overview of U.S. involvement in European security affairs since 1950. It addresses, sometimes with surprising thoroughness and detail for such a compact volume, virtually all of the important issues.

Second, the book represents a remarkable synthesis of much of the existing secondary literature on the subject and a good number of primary sources, such as the relevant volumes of the State Department's documentary series, *Foreign Relations of the United States.* It effectively integrates the findings of many key works and cites other useful texts in a section on suggested readings.

One shortcoming of the book is that it tends to be insufficiently critical of the works on which it relies. Consequently, it simply repeats much of the conventional wisdom about NATO, some of which recent research has shown to be mistaken. For example, it mischaracterizes the strategy (MC 14/2) adopted by NATO in 1957 as massive retaliation, overlooking the significant degree of flexibility introduced by that document.

A more serious weakness of *The Entangling Alliance* is that it provides little evaluation or analysis. Instead, it is almost entirely descriptive. The chapters typically move from topic to topic without relating them to larger themes. And even the introduction and conclusion contain no general arguments.

As a result, the book never satisfactorily answers the questions that it raises at the outset. It offers no summary of the main reasons for the expansion, persistence, and decline of the U.S. military presence in Europe. Nor does it provide any analysis of the underlying forces that held NATO together over the years, despite recurring conflicts between the United States and its allies.

While the reader might expect to find a discussion of the prospects for continuing U.S. involvement in European security affairs after the end of the cold war and the demise of the Soviet threat, this is inexplicably absent. The author argues that "there seems to be no possibility that an American military presence on the European continent will come to an end in the foreseeable future" (p. ix). Yet he fails to support this important claim with any thorough or convincing analysis. What discussion does exist is limited to several scattered paragraphs in the last chapter and conclusion.

Finally, the book is marred all too frequently by factual and typographical errors. In the most egregious instance, the last name of former French Prime Minister René Pleven is repeatedly misspelled.

Despite these weaknesses, *The Entangling Alliance* should be a useful text for survey courses on U.S. foreign and security policy, U.S.–European relations, and postwar Europe, especially if it is ever issued in paperback. It should also

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serve as a valuable companion for scholars needing quick access to facts about the alliance and reference to other sources.

JOHN S. DUFFIELD
University of Virginia

The White House Speaks: Presidential Leadership as Persuasion *by Craig Allen Smith and Kathy B. Smith. Westport, CT, Praeger, 1994. 288 pp. $55.00.*

In politics, perception is reality, at least in the eyes of some cynical practitioners. A logical corollary, encouraged by the authors' analysis of the way the White House now functions (or malfunctions) as an organ of persuasion, is that process is substance. That conclusion would seem to suggest that a slick sales approach can succeed, whatever the merits of the product being sold. The authors do not commit themselves to any such cynical finding, yet their approach does emphasize form over content.

In fairness, their subject is persuasion and how it works at the presidential level. As dutiful scholars, they examine the way political scientists of recent times have viewed the office of the president and the way the occupants have used or tried to use their presidential powers. Quick summations are offered on the views of recognized scholars who have made a contribution to a better understanding of the modern presidency, but each is seen as falling short in explaining how a president must persuade the public to accept his policies.

What, then, is the key to successful presidential persuasion? The authors propose what they term as an "interpretive system model." Briefly, the model assumes that every citizen interprets the world and comes to conclusions about specific events or proposals based on his/her individual reactions to laws, language, logic, and ideology. In modern political shorthand, that means we are all members of special interest groups, but there is nothing pejorative about such groupings.

The problem for the modern presidency has been the proliferation of interpretive systems. A society increasingly self-divided into ethnic, racial, class, gender, and economic groupings views political policy and actions through diverse lenses. Pity the president trying to get all, or most of them, to view events through the same focus employed by the White House.

So the challenge today is for a president to develop a rhetoric that will build and sustain coalitions of interpretive systems large enough and powerful enough to overcome the opposition of other interpretive systems.

Following presentation of their analytic system, the authors examine specific case histories in presidential persuasion. They note successes and failures and explore the factors relevant to each. For example, George Bush typified in 1988 the persuasive power of a divide-and-conquer approach, when an electorate is ready to buy the theme of good guys versus bad guys. The Willie Horton ad

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put the Michael Dukakis campaign in a deep hole. So, too, did the Democratic governor's veto of a Pledge of Allegiance requirement in public schools. Bush, riding the Ronald Reagan train of old-fashioned American values, tossed in a few sneering comments about "liberals" and ran home a winner.

The downside of such presidential rhetoric, the authors pointedly note, is that it inhibits governance. And such was Bush's fate on most domestic issues in which he tangled with Congress. The resulting gridlock coupled with national economic problems and his seeming embrace of right-wing ideological positions doomed Bush's 1992 reelection bid. Beyond the external political factors, the authors argue, there was also Bush's inability to capitalize on his post-Gulf War popularity by presenting to the nation a vision of where he wished to take the United States. Bush's dismissal of the "vision thing" is revealing commentary on his rhetorical shortcomings.

By contrast, Bill Clinton did offer the nation a vision of change during the campaign, recognizing the widespread disgust in the American public with Washington's gridlock. In office, he has been less successful, in part because his rhetoric with Congress requires a different focus from that aimed at the public at large and in part because he has allowed his proposals to be picked apart by opponents, leading supporters to wonder just where he stands.

Experienced professional politicians will find no surprises in this book. In their dissection of the way recent presidents have conducted their dialogue with the public, the authors show that a charismatic personality, a command of language, and a feel for what moves people are great aids to a successful presidency.

It might also be useful if the would-be president knew something about the nature of the American government system and the extent of current societal problems and if he possessed some reasonably clear and equitable solutions to those problems. A message alone, however well delivered, is not the answer.

JOHN J. SMEE
Fordham University

Economic Justice in American Society *by Robert E. Kuenne. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1993. 435 pp. $59.50.*

Any book with a title like this is by definition ambitious, and in important respects this one fulfills the ambitions described by its title. However, judging by its own agenda, its success is uneven. The book takes aim at the need for a coherent public philosophy of economic justice in American society. The New Deal changed views of how much government intervention in the economy was justifiable. Conservative administrations since then have sought to limit the degree or reverse the course of such intervention without successfully redefining rationales for what is and is not appropriate. Robert Kuenne, a senior economics

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professor at Princeton, presents a coherent, philosophically grounded argument that should appeal to open-minded citizens regardless of partisanship or ideology. While the argument deserves a broad audience because of the range of its thinking, the amount of attention it devotes to income distribution and redistribution may limit its appeal to those who could easily miss its articulation of standards to limit government intervention in the economy.

Almost half of the book is devoted to "theoretical bases for economic justice." Two main chapters present egoistically-oriented and socially-oriented theories of social equity. The former category includes Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Karl Marx, Robert Nozick, and Milton Friedman. The latter includes Immanuel Kant, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and John Rawls. The analysis is measured against an American ethos, which involves individualism, pragmatic rationalism, and materialism, and provides a benchmark of political feasibility for adoption in American society. The egoistically- and socially-oriented theories are then systematically evaluated (and for the most part found wanting) in terms of their conceptions of the good and of the right, the incentives to act in accordance with the right, and their compatibility with the American ethos.

The culminating chapter of the first half of the book is a far reaching statement of constitutional principles, the "bases for economic justice in America." These bases involve entitlements theory grounded in Nozick, supplemented by a "compassionate function" and a "corrective function." Kuenne then proposes a ten-article constitutional bill of economic rights and obligations, and a policy program to institute them. These are principles based on a coherent public philosophy for a market economy, with obligations of self-support, along with a guarantee of a level of income that "affords the opportunity to live in dignity and self-respect . . . when the individual is unable to provide that provision in whole or in part." There are articles regarding the reduction of inequalities of opportunity, the provision of assistance in income, freedom of choice of occupation, and just taxation. Many existing government programs would not pass judicial review if the Constitution were amended according to this program. I find this chapter to be the keystone of Kuenne's contribution.

Most of the second half of the book is devoted to an empirical treatment of patterns of income distribution in the United States. This section contains more than fifty figures and more than eighty tables describing the distribution and analyzing the feasibility (as measured by the tax price) of several redistributive programs. These include transfers that would bring everyone up to the poverty line and to 50 and 60 percent of median income. The estimated tax prices of these programs are compared to the tax increases of the budget deficit reduction agreement of 1990. As Kuenne acknowledges, the redistributive program is far more controversial than that of budget deficit reduction, and accordingly even less politically feasible than realistic programs to achieve budget balance.

This book might reach more of the audience it deserves if it linked itself directly to similar or contrasting literature. This is an exercise in constitutional economics, but the work of James Buchanan is not mentioned. The theme of economic rights and obligations deserves contrast with the relevant portions of the United

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Nations Declaration of Human Rights. The principles for government intervention in the economy are similar to those derived from theories of market failure, but this literature is scarcely engaged.

Many liberals will approve of Kuenne's proposals for income redistribution, and many conservatives will approve of his programs to reduce government intervention in the economy. A careful reading of this book will provide a basis for a coherent public philosophy that incorporates strong points of both ideologies, and for a reasoned public discourse about specific choices.

WILLIAM R. KEECH
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Head Start and Beyond: A National Plan for Extended Childhood Intervention
edited by Edward Zigler and Sally J. Styfco. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1993. 155 pp. $22.00.

This little book is a tremendous resource on the thirty-year history of preschool and elementary education for economically disadvantaged children in the United States, and everyone with an interest in effective outcomes in early childhood education should read it. The purpose of the book is to lay out the goals, methods, and delivery systems of the three most important federal programs we have for early childhood educational intervention—Head Start, Project Follow Through, and Title I/Chapter I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA). A newly created fourth program to extend the methods of Head Start into the elementary school grades, the Head Start Transition Project, is described in a separate chapter by Senator Edward Kennedy, who introduced the legislation to establish the program. His words might have been more effectively consolidated into the other chapters. The book's drawback is its lack of coordination in being a collection of papers that when taken together overlap in content, but it contains so much useful information that the book's strengths prevail.

One strength is in the authors' sound and measured assessment of the past, present, and future of educational policy to meet the needs of poor children. I liked this book for the authors' commitment to a balanced judgment of the outcomes and prospects of early childhood public policies. Edward Zigler, Sterling Professor of Psychology and director of the Bush Center in Child Development at Yale University, author of many books in this area, and one of the architects of Head Start is certainly the dean of the field and is a coauthor of every chapter but one.

The book's central chapters follow the history of the three principal programs from conceptualization to the present. The chapter on Head Start describes what this program—which like so many of the 1960s started out without clear information about how to meet the needs of the poor—was intended to do and what it in fact did. It contains, among other things, helpful short overviews of

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its evaluation, legislative, and appropriations history, and offers a to-the-point analysis of the problems created by its rampant expansion. There is a healthy emphasis on caveats in this book and no where is it more welcome than in the authors' counsel that policy makers take caution in the current climate of widespread and uncritical acceptance of the Head start program. They feel that "popular emotions may be getting out of hand" (p. 18) as Head Start has come to bear the mantle of salvation for nearly every problem of dysfunction that impedes the life chances of youngsters trapped in poverty today. They offer a fair-handed discussion of the limits of Head Start, and they criticize the frequent tendency to apply non-Head start evidence to inflate claims for the program, and the failure of advocates to face the "sobering question of what can realistically be expected of a one-year treatment delivered at the age of four" (p. 21). This "blind faith" tendency, not for the first time, threatens the future of early childhood intervention.

A second chapter tracks the smaller and less well known Project Follow Through, started over twenty years ago to serve Head Start graduates in kindergarden through third grade. The program was flawed by its unclear and contradictory mission from the onset and never really got off the ground. It is an interesting tale of failed communication between Congress which wrote the bill, and the Follow Through planners and supporters who came to see congressional intent through new eyes as the parsimony dictated by federal cutbacks came up against new requisites of program evaluation. The chapter contains interesting information drawn from first-hand sources on the details of how community action was implemented in early childhood education policy and on the outcomes of parental involvement. While, as the authors point out, Follow Through may not have been *the* answer to the needs of ongoing early childhood education, its experience has been valuable in pointing out how we could meet some of these needs.

A straightforward discussion of the problems and shortcomings of Title I of the ESEA—replaced in 1981 by Chapter I of the Education Consolidation Improvement Act (ECIA)—is laid out in a third chapter. Title I (now Chapter I) was intended to transform America's schools into the "vital factor in breaking the cycle of poverty." In spite of its many changes it remains, the authors tell us, more influential than any other legislation in molding how our schools meet the needs of poor low-achieving children. However, as they see it, considerable money has been and continues to be directed into this program, which has produced only small changes in the educational attainment of poor children. More accountability, they believe, should be demanded to justify the significant expenditure of tax dollars that go into this popular program.

In the end, the authors offer a great deal of experience and insight in a very manageable book that ought to be taken seriously by policy makers. They urge an expansion and evolution of the new Transition Project, although they are not sanguine about its prospects in the current fiscal climate.

JUDITH RUSSELL
Barnard College

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Welfare Realities: From Rhetoric to Reform *by Mary Jo Bane and David T. Ellwood. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1994. 200 pages. $29.95.*

In 1988 Congress passed and President Ronald Reagan signed into law a major welfare reform act, the Family Support Act. The act was designed to get welfare mothers with children no younger than three into employment or training. Transitional Medicaid coverage was provided to reduce the hardship of loss of Medicaid on leaving the welfare rolls. Additional funds were provided for daycare and training. Subsequent legislation provided still further Medicaid coverage for the working poor, child care, and Head Start. Yet, despite all these efforts, by the 1992 presidential campaign public discontent with the welfare system seemed as strong as ever, and welfare reform was an important issue for Bill Clinton's winning campaign.

This book has three major goals: to define who gets on welfare, who gets off welfare, and why; to recommend how the welfare system might be reformed; to determine alternatives to welfare.

On the first of these issues, the authors make the point that there really are two classes of welfare recipients, those who move off the welfare rolls within a reasonable period of time and those who stay on indefinitely. It seems paradoxical, but those who move off are a majority of those who go on welfare; while those who stay, because in the authors' words they "tend to accumulate" (p. 51), comprise a majority of those on welfare. "Only 22 percent of those beginning a first spell stay for ten years, but that group represents 57 percent of recipients on welfare at a point in time" (ibid.). Never having married, never completing high school, and having no work experience are predictive of long welfare stays. As to the underlying reasons that cause dependency, the authors try to fit the various theories into three broad categories—rational choice models (which, as the authors point out, in a sense deny dependency by asserting that going and staying on welfare represent the best economic deal that a low skills head of household can get); expectancy models (the welfare recipient has a sense of having lost control of her life and therefore exhibits low motivation); and cultural models (emphasizing the culture of poverty and the underclass). The authors test each of the models against data on welfare and poverty; none of the three comes through with flying colors. One notable observation is how few of the poor live in ghetto areas: "just 12 percent of the poor and 26 percent of the black poor are found in neighborhoods with census tract poverty rates of 40 percent or more" (p. 89). Though the data are sparse, there seems to be no greater concentration of welfare households in ghettos.

The authors' proposals to reform or eliminate welfare lack the statistical power of the earlier parts of the book. In terms of reform, the authors' emphasis is on management improvement, so that those on welfare understand the system and those who manage the system see their primary goal as getting welfare recipients trained and into jobs rather than pushing papers to prevent fraud. In terms of alternatives to welfare, the authors emphasize a significantly higher minimum wage or an improved earned income tax credit (the Clinton administration has

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gone the latter route) and a much stronger system of child support enforcement, with the father identified at the time of birth and required by payroll deduction to pay a statutorily set portion of his earnings for child support; if the withholding fell below a minimum level, government would make up the difference.

This book is of particular interest because both of its authors are serving as assistant secretaries of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The book thus presumably opens up to readers some of the thinking that has gone into President Clinton's welfare reform proposals.

BILL GREEN
New York City Housing Development Corporation

The Presidential Campaign Film: A Critical History *by Joanne Morreale. Westport, CT, Praeger, 1993. 224 pp. $49.95.*

Introduce a camera and alter experience. According to Joanne Morreale in this excursion through the filmed history of American presidential campaigns, it is a lesson learned early by the documentary producers and advertising consultants who throughout the century have crafted celluloid political imagery. In one campaign film, actors are depicted as criminals to illustrate how the candidate is tough on crime. The candidate: Thomas E. Dewey in 1948. In another movie, a special effect is employed to exaggerate the knitting skills of the candidate's wife. The film: *The Life of Calvin Coolidge*. During the Spanish–American War, the battle at Santiago Bay was reproduced in a bathtub to make it visually exciting. And Teddy Roosevelt posed for the cameras on his way up San Juan Hill. Deception through illusion is hardly new.

The Presidential Campaign Film is at its best when documenting the illusions to emerge from the national political contests of the past forty years. Detailed analyses of the text and techniques of campaign footage serve to document the transition from the documentary-style expository films of the pre-television era to the emotional appeals of the contemporary documentary-advertisement. The former method, appropriate for a period of stronger partisanship, served to rally the faithful to their standard-bearer. The latter method, by contrast, is suited to a period of personalized, televised politics and weak partisanship, where emotional appeals to the mass audience sway the undecided. Accordingly, Madison Avenue figures strongly in the development of the campaign film, although at every turn Republican candidates learn and apply marketing lessons more swiftly and effectively than their opposite numbers.

Because television permeates every aspect of contemporary presidential campaigns, films produced for candidates of the past generation have served primarily as vehicles for reaching the mass audience, to be witnessed during television coverage of political conventions, during election-eve broadcasts, or recycled in snippets as campaign commercials. Consequently, Morreale devotes much

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attention to the attributes of constructing an image for television. In the process, she covers territory familiar to anyone with a casual interest in media politics, from Dwight Eisenhower's use of spot advertisements and the emotional impact of Lyndon Johnson's "daisy" commercial, to Ronald Reagan's calculated image campaign, aped successfully by George Bush in 1988 and Bill Clinton in 1992. Well worn details of the politics of these periods provide the backdrop for this discussion.

But, the analysis is not without merit. Morreale's consideration of campaign deception raises meaningful ethical questions about film and politics, which she briefly notes in an afterword, stating: "Although campaigns have always used images and entertainment, there is no longer any ground to distinguish image from reality" (p. 180). This important assertion assumes the effectiveness of the campaign film on the viewer as it trumpets the triumph of advertising specialists in the political process. Although it can be debated how much campaign film (as opposed to the advent of television, weak partisanship, electoral reform, and the like) contributes to this condition, Morreale's documentation of the deceptive potential of partisan films underscores the significance of understanding their content. In this vein, her analysis would be stronger if she explored the ethical issue further. But it should make satisfying reading for anyone interested in the techniques of political image manipulation.

MATTHEW R. KERBEL
Villanova University

Commager on Tocqueville *by Henry Steele Commager. Columbia, University of Missouri Press, 1993. 130 pp. Cloth, $24.95; paper, $12.95.*

Readers desiring a succinct introduction to Alexis de Tocqueville's 1831 masterpiece, *Democracy in America*, could well begin with Commager's introduction. He deftly shows why it stands far above the mass of travel literature about the United States. Tocqueville sought to explain the practical circumstances that illustrated the great problems of political philosophy rather than to tell amusing tales of local customs. He came neither to condemn nor to praise, but to learn and analyze the possible future of an impending world-wide democracy. Commager comes to Tocqueville in a similar spirit, pronouncing *Democracy in America* "one of the great and enduring works of political literature" (p. 16) despite significant flaws: Tocqueville provided no substantive evidence of "the tyranny of the majority," barely mentioned the reform movements and economic revolution sweeping ante-bellum America, and ignored Jacksonian Democracy and its presidential symbol.

What one makes of the rest of this slim book, a series of lectures delivered in 1978 to which Commager added a twenty-page update for the 1990s, will

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depend on one's stance toward the late-twentieth-century liberal internationalism Commager espouses. For a few interjected tributes to Tocqueville's wisdom aside, he basically argues that Tocqueville was wrong. Minorities stirred up Red Scares; sane majorities acting through legal institutions stopped them. Centralization brought liberty and equality, albeit greatly diluted, to minorities, women, and the poor where states and local governments repressed them. Perhaps the most insightful pages of the book (pp. 80–85) compare the stifling of individual dissent in the Old South and the early cold war by societies assessing a paranoid collective liberty. But it was not an ambitious military that America had to fear, as Tocqueville warned, but a "military-industrial-financial-labor-academic-scientific aggregate, which exercised enormous political power" (p. 75).

Commager really warms up when he seizes on Tocqueville's insight that America had to beware of an aristocracy of manufacturers, and he traces much of the nation's and the world's current problems to the unbridled excesses of this class. He somehow misses the irony that only the creation of such an aristocracy could have vanquished an Old South he equally deplores, or that the comparative strengths of capitalist economies were essential to ending as well as propelling the cold war. Once he abandons Tocqueville for the contemporary scene, Commager loses the balance he maintained in dealing with his ostensible subject.

In keeping with following Tocqueville in using American democracy as a model for the world, Commager argues that greater nationalization (of wealth, resources, education) and internationalization to solve global problems will avert impending catastrophe, just as a benign national government is largely responsible for most of the justice the United States now enjoys. Such assertions are attractive but beg the questions: who controls the requisite bureaucracies, for what purpose, with what degree of competent management, and how do we get from here to there?

Despite these problems, Commager invites retrospection among intellectual historians concerning whether and how we can lift a figure (such as Tocqueville, Plato, Burke, Marx, etc.) out of the past and apply him as a starting point to argue a case we have already decided in our own minds. That Commager abandons Tocqueville and turns for inspiration in his final pages to John Stuart Mill, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Thomas Jefferson suggests there are better ways to make a case for contemporary ideologies than selectively quoting from past authorities who had no conception of the problems we now face.

WILLIAM PENCAK
Penn State University

The Last Best Hope of Earth: Abraham Lincoln and the Promise of America *by Mark E. Neely, Jr. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1993. 207 pp. $24.95.*

With this volume, Mark E. Neely, Jr., the Pulitzer-prize winning author of *The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties*, fills a conspicuous lacuna

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in the literature by providing a brief, readable, lavishly illustrated, well informed overview of the life of the sixteenth president. Neely, a professor of history at St. Louis University, focuses on Lincoln's presidency, ably summarizing his own work and that of other recent scholars. Political scientists will be gratified by Neely's emphasis on the role of political parties during the Civil War, a subject given short shrift by historians. (He is currently working on a book about it.) He focuses most closely on Lincoln's role as commander-in-chief, on the politics of emancipation, on other constitutional issues, on the election of 1864, and on the assassination.

The full, judicious discussion of these topics contrasts sharply with the treatment of Lincoln's pre-presidential years and of his inner life. Arguing that the sources for Lincoln's early years are "meager" (p. 1) and that "his domestic life in general offers nothing very interesting to the modern reader" (p. 31), Neely devotes little space to them. In fact, the sources are not so meager, as Douglas L. Wilson's pioneering study of Lincoln's courtship and Paul H. Verduin's work on Lincoln's ancestry show. Neely ignores both these scholars.

More importantly, Lincoln's inner life profoundly affected his outer life, as scrutiny of the psychological origins of his hatred of slavery, of his intense ambition, of his depressions, of his woe-filled marriage, of his midlife crisis, of his appeal as a father figure, and other topics could demonstrate. This neglect of connections between the inner and outer life can be attributed to space limitations and to Neely's aversion to applying the insights of psychology to the study of the past.

On Lincoln's racial views, Neely quotes with approval an 1876 address by Frederick Douglass, the leading black abolitionist, who declared that Lincoln "was pre-eminently the white man's President" (p. 97). This Neely deems "perhaps the best speech on the Sixteenth President ever given" (p. 201). But he ignores Douglass's 1 June 1865 oration in which Lincoln is called "emphatically the black man's President."

Lincoln's success as a frontier politician and lawyer, as well as his eloquent and extemporaneous farewell address to the people of Springfield, belie Neely's assertion that "Lincoln was a poor extemporaneous speaker and he knew it" (p. 154).

Neely's tone is sometimes harshly judgmental. He condemns Lincoln for devising an "intellectually dishonest" program for dealing with slavery (p. 41); for supporting the "profoundly racist dream" of colonizing freed slaves (p. 42); for countenancing "election fraud" (p. 53); for writing "foolish and unrealistic" military orders (p. 66) and "ill-tempered and mean-spirited" letters (p. 71); for appearing "to insult" the U.S. cavalry (p. 72); for failing to "see war as a complex cultural phenomenon with a historical dimension" (p. 83); for offering "niggling and obscure objections" to the Second Confiscation Act (p. 108); for "maligning" Democrats in 1864 (p. 174); and for almost "lying" about his intentions regarding slavery (p. 110). At times Neely seems more devoted to ladling out praise and

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blame than in making understandable to the modern reader Lincoln's thoughts and deeds.

Despite these flaws, Neely's book should be welcomed by layman and specialist alike as the distillation of more than a quarter-century of thoughtful research and reflection by a leading Lincoln specialist.

MICHAEL BURLINGAME
Connecticut College, New London

Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience *by Martin Shefter. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1994. 316 pp. Cloth, $49.50; paper,* $14.95.

Every author and publisher is certainly entitled to some poetic license, even some marketing hubris, in selecting a book's title. In this case, however, the text delivers considerably less than the title promises, and that's the chief source of the disappointment.

Neither the title nor the subtitle suggests that this is a collection of six essays or articles published between 1977 and 1986, plus a fragment of the author's 1992 book on New York City's fiscal crisis. The author has added a first chapter on "Political Parties and States," but while it serves to sound some analytical themes, many of those themes resound only distantly in what follows. The book remains what it is—a collection of materials which, while they stand comfortably on their own, are not a unified or even consistent work of explanation or analysis.

Moreover, the focus on political parties is far narrower than the commanding title suggests. The essays deal almost exclusively with urban party organizations, especially the traditional patronage-based parties that mobilized the urban working classes and ethnic-racial communities. Even within that focus they deal with the party as a shifting coalition of groups and interests. There is considerably less about their organizational lives or their observable activities.

Nonetheless, Shefter does argue a consistent "theory" of the parties. He takes exception with the bottom up view that sees them as the product of mass pressures and expectations. Leadership, with its brokering and strategies, explains much more. The result is an elite-centered view of the parties, one in which the coalition building often (always?) excludes a mass role. It is a view curiously similar, if less formal, to that of the rational choice theorists. Leaders control incentives, patronage especially, and they use them strategically for their own group or class goals. Unfortunately the Shefter position is never fully worked out, and one is not sure about the dynamic that enables the leaders or entrepreneurs to recruit the individuals they mobilize. If that transaction rests simply on the value of patronage, the theory ironically is open to the same criticisms that confront the public choicers.

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In this party-centered view of urban politics, the major battles for party power are not limited to elections. They also involve reform attempts to weaken one or more parties by using the power of the state to deny them patronage, to change electoral forms, even to pursue their radical or corrupt leadership. The section on the demise of the American Labor party is only one example. Reformers and reform movements do not come off well in the analysis, and it is in this respect that both Shefter's personal loyalties and his strengths as a political historian are most convincingly displayed.

The title also invokes the state. Skeptics about bringing the state back in—and I am one—can be reassured that Shefter quickly reduces the state to its empirically observable components: institutions, processes, and people. There is very little here of the maxitheories of the state in which it becomes an autonomous actor. So why invoke a concept that has little meaning or analytical usefulness beyond the sum of its parts? Perhaps as a deserved rebuke to the political scientists who in their preoccupation with individual and group behavior have forgotten the importance of institutions.

So, this is a book about political parties—machines, if you will—in the older American cities. The author's concern is clearly for urban life and politics; for the rich interplay of class, race, and ethnicity within that politics; and for the struggle of workers, the poor, and all outsiders for a voice in them. Readers who share those concerns are the natural audience for this book.

FRANK J. SORAUF
University of Minnesota

Westminster's World: Understanding Political Roles *by Donald D. Searing. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1994. 498 pp. $49.95.*

One need not be committed to methodological and theoretical conceptions of role analysis to appreciate the significance of this impressive book. Donald Searing of the University of North Carolina provides a remarkably rich portrait of the self-described motivations of members of the British House of Commons during 1970–1973. Drawing on long tape-recorded interviews with over four-fifths of the serving MPs but also on mail-back questionnaires, documentary records, and close personal observation, he describes seven parliamentary roles, with subtypes, and he tabulates the numbers of MP's who primarily but not exclusively perform each role. Quotations vividly illuminate their activities. Searing's analysis reflects a sophisticated understanding of British institutions, and his exceptionally well written book is embellished by earlier descriptions of parliamentary behavior, notably from Lewis Namier's monumental study of eighteenth-century members and Anthony Trollope's nineteenth-century political novels.

Of the seven roles, four are those of backbenchers effectively identifying themselves as policy advocates, ministerial aspirants, constituency members, or parlia-

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ment men. The other three roles constitute designated positions: parliamentary private secretaries, whips, and ministers. A limited number of MPs, particularly former Labour ministers serving in the opposition's shadow cabinet of 1970–1973, do not fit any of the seven roles. Omitting them is a reasonable editorial judgment. The study is not short of data. Its wealth of material on backbenchers is most informative. For example, policy advocates (who may be ideologues, generalists, or specialists) are the largest single category. Because they seek to influence from outside of ministerial ranks, they are the most potentially troublesome for governments. They seem less eager to please their leaders than do ministerial aspirants, and more active at Westminster than constituency members who focus predominantly on the services that virtually all other MPs also perform to some degree. Plainly, too, policy advocates differ from the much smaller cluster of parliament men—status-seekers, spectators, and club men.

Of the backbench roles, the constituency member's is intriguingly marked by a satisfaction in helping or in just listening to individual citizens, and even by a sense of duty in serving, in the words of one interviewee, as "a priest in a post-Christian society . . ." (p. 152). Yet constituency members are aware that service activities have little prestige at Westminster, and they not only occasionally resent the suspected contempt of their colleagues but also utter self-belittling views of what they do—role distance, in Searing's discussion.

For those interested in how British parliamentary parties maintain a degree of cohesion that eludes American congressional parties, the chapter on whips is decidedly relevant. Using interviews from both Conservative and Labour chief whips, deputies, and assistants, Searing shows the difficulties and strains that accompany the ordinarily regular party voting in the House. His findings confirm the well understood belief that parliamentary discipline is neither automatic nor achievable by overtly threatened sanctions. Instead, the important tool is persuasion combined with appeals to party loyalty.

The author makes few explicit comparisons to American or other non-British experiences, and he wisely refrains from universalizing British parliamentary roles. Implied, however, is the usefulness of comparing British findings with any similar research on other national legislatures to help explain how roles have emerged in Britain and elsewhere in response to varying political cultures. Eventually, it may also be useful to replicate Searing's work in a later British parliament, if only to learn whether tendencies he discerned in 1970–1973 (increased professionalization, for example) have continued and whether the results include more policy advocates and still fewer parliament men. Searing's portrait is as yet unlikely to have been altered greatly despite institutional innovations of the last two decades. Better staffing and the expansion of select committees are late twentieth-century developments whose beginnings Searing takes into account. Still, it would be good to know their subsequent impact and also to learn how, if at all, the nature and distribution of roles may be changed by the presence of more women MPs (sixty in 1992 compared to twenty-six in 1970), the election of more third-party MPs (forty-four in 1992 compared to twelve in

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1970), the expected diminution of working-class backgrounds among Labour MPs, and the recent telecasting of House proceedings.

LEON D. EPSTEIN
University of Wisconsin–Madison

Congress, the President and Policymaking: A Historical Analysis *by Jean Reith Schroedel. Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1994. 233 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $22.95.*

Attacking the theory that the modern presidency has become the "chief legislator" is by now old hat, but Jean Reith Schroedel brings to it an exhaustive study of a single policy area. She focuses on the banking laws enacted by Congress between 1823 and 1986, looking at a total of 312 different policies embodied in multiple bills considered by banking committees in both chambers. After a brief history of the politics of banking legislation through American history, Schroedel gets down to cases, specifically three case studies of important legislation: creation of the postal savings system, the Depositors' Guarantee Fund, and the Federal Reserve system. Each demonstrates the limited role of the president in banking legislation. These demonstrate the importance of Congress and the limited role of the president.

Schroedel then moves to her quantitative study, which involves sophisticated mathematical modeling of the factors that determine why bills that are introduced do or do not get through banking committees and are or are not passed into law. Her findings lend support to her thesis that America's is a system of "dynamic constitutionalism" (p. 6) in which the formal powers of Congress to legislate are matched by the actual specialization of political activity, and that Congress continues to play the more significant role. In particular, she demonstrates the limited importance of the president in initiating banking laws, getting them through committees, and winning final passage. Far more important, according to her data, are the roles of committee and party leaders: when they agree on the outlines of a bill, it is most likely to pass. While the modern president plays a somewhat greater role than the pre-modern president, most banking legislation is not presidentially initiated or dominated, and there is little support for the modernization theory that Congress and the president have exchanged legislative roles. There is some support for the notion that a regime change leads to greater legislative activity, but Schroedel's data indicate that the president is also more active in periods of regime disintegration, limiting the utility of "political time" analysis for this policy arena. Her data also indicate that when the president and Congress are of different parties, there is little difference in the quantity of banking legislation passed, further undercutting the discredited gridlock theory. The most signif-

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icant external factors in new banking laws turns out to be the number of bank failures in the preceding years, a conclusion that will not surprise anyone who has studied American political history.

Schroedel's propositions about congressional dominance are amply supported by her data and methods. Her findings are not all that surprising, however, considering the significant role assigned to Congress in banking and currency matters, and the political strength of members of the committee, who are beneficiaries of the PAC system. Her approach can profitably be adopted by researchers in other policy arenas. My only regret is that she did not supplement her methodological argument with an analysis of the substance of banking laws. It would have been useful, perhaps, to link up her findings about how banking bills run the legislative gauntlet with the public policy literature, so that we could find out if the patterns uncovered in this regulatory arena are similar to or different from patterns in redistributive and distributive politics.

RICHARD M. PIOUS
Barnard College

Hard Choices, Lost Voices: How the Abortion Conflict Has Divided America, Distorted Constitutional Rights and Damaged the Courts *by Donald P. Judges. Chicago, Ivan R. Dee, 1993. 334 pp. $25.00.*

In this action-packed book, Donald Judges takes the reader on a wide-ranging tour of the abortion issue. Drawing upon his considerable experience as a lawyer, law professor, and clerk for the U.S. Court of Appeals, he provides information relevant to the abortion issue from a fascinating array of perspectives—legal, social, medical, and historical.

His analysis begins with an assessment of the very nature of the abortion debate. Recognizing that it is "one of the most divisive issues of our time" (p. 4), he acknowledges its almost intractable dimensions. For some, the right to choose whether or not to terminate a pregnancy is fundamental to the very essence of one's personhood and one's fundamental right to bodily integrity. For others, exercising the right to terminate a pregnancy is akin to becoming a murderer of an unborn child.

He reviews the demographic and social contexts of abortions; medical dimensions of fetal development and viability, complete with diagrams, photographs, and a review of abortion procedures; the legal history of abortion; the many criticisms directed toward *Roe*, including the views of Ronald Dworkin, Robert Bork, and John Ely; and an analysis of post-Roe abortion cases, particularly those dealing with abortion funding and regulation.

For this reason, Donald Judges's book provides an excellent survey and is an important contribution to the vast literature on the abortion issue. It will be of

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interest to scholars as well as a very valuable teaching tool for a wide range of courses in political science, sociology, law, and public policy because of its unusually well developed interdisciplinary approach to a complicated and critically important topic.

Yet, most now view abortion rights as a secure constitutional guarantee with the 1992 *Casey* decision, the addition of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to the Court, and a pro-choice presidential administration in the executive office. Attention has begun to turn, therefore, to ways to obtain abortion funding for women. More important than the Freedom of Choice Act, what we need from Congress is a public health policy that guarantees abortion funding. Judges's book, while offering an excellent overview of the right to an abortion, does not point toward the new debates centering on abortion funding.

Rather, Donald Judges's book exhibits a common weakness, which all but undermines new ways to analyze abortion funding, which is to depict pro-life and pro-choice advocates as existing in two separate worlds, one of which is based on the assertion that the fetus is a person and the other based on the assertion that the fetus is not a person. Arguments for abortion funding, however, may require assertion of a third view, one that synthesizes fetal rights with obligations of the state to protect women's bodily integrity and reproductive health. While Judges's book covers much ground, it fails to address adequately the future contours of the abortion funding debate that is sure to be the focus of attention in the immediate future. This one reservation aside, however, I strongly recommend *Hard Choices, Lost Voices* as a superb overview of the foundations of the abortion debate from which the next phase will take off.

EILEEN L. MCDONAGH
Northeastern University

The Resurrection of Rights in Poland *by Jacek Kurczewski. New York, Oxford University Press, 1993. 462 pp. $69.00.*

An analyst, a witness, and a participant. Or a participant, a witness, and an analyst? Jacek Kurczewski himself probably would have hesitated to elevate any of these roles above the other. A scholar with a remarkable record, since the late 1960s Kurczewski has been one of the elite Polish sociologists. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Kurczewski presided over the Warsaw branch of the Polish Sociological Association. Its meetings were regularly frequented not only by sociologists or political scientists, economists, psychologists, and historians, but also by journalists, lawyers, political activists, and yes, members of the security police. A learned society turned into a major political club. Throughout the 1980s an adviser to the Solidarity leadership, after 1989 Kurczewski entered the political arena directly, won a seat in the *Sejm* (on the Liberal-Democratic Congress ticket) and became for the 1991–1993 term its deputy speaker.

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In this book Kurczewski is at his best when he combines his analytical skills with an insider's access to information. His account of union democracy in Solidarity (Chapters 7 and 8) adds a new twist to Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin Trow, and James Samuel Coleman's criticism of Michels's Iron Law of Oligarchy. In Chapter 9 the author provides a fascinating account of the 1980–1981 negotiations on the law on censorship, during which a paradoxical reversal of roles occurred: the Communist authorities preferred very vague regulations (that would give the censors more discretionary powers), while the experts representing Solidarity (Kurczewski among them) insisted on introducing specific and precise limitations on freedom of expression (to make possible judicial control of censors' decisions).

Equally impressive is the author's analysis of processes and events, of which he was a witness and (not always voluntary) participant. In Chapter 4 he presents an original interpretation of the Solidarity phenomenon as an outcome of the rise of the new middle class. This point of view was widely debated—and generally accepted—by Polish sociologists in the 1980s. Kurczewski gives another original interpretation to the system of food rationing in Poland between 1976 and 1989. He sees popular support for these measures stemming from a determination to subject distribution of scarce resources, which gives decision makers enormous powers, to public control.

Kurczewski seems less comfortable when he reports on data collected in various survey studies. His analysis seldom goes beyond mere reporting on the distribution of answers in the whole sample and breakdown by crude occupational categories. However, many readers will appreciate this lack of statistical (over) sophistication, and Kurczewski's interpretation of data is always penetrating and provocative.

In short, Kurczewski's book is a first-hand and first-class account of the end of the old and emergence of the new social and political order in Poland—a true must for any student of Polish and Central European affairs. It would deserve even more praise were it not for certain shortcomings in editing. Some Polish names are hopelessly mispelled; others—too obscure to be known to most non-Polish and nonexpert readers—should have been briefly identified in footnotes. Also, there are no references identifying the previously published (in Polish or in English) parts of the book. The reader has been deprived of an opportunity to check out the original versions of these writings and to find out that Kurczewski's work is not a post-factum reasoning, but the ideas of an analyst, a witness, and a participant, developed as the actual events were unfolding.

KRZYSZTOF JASIEWICZ
Washington and Lee University

Malan to De Klerk: Leadership in the Apartheid State *edited by Robert Schrire. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1994. 312 pp. $45.00.*

As this book was being published, its subject matter, the apartheid state, passed into history—with most who knew it fervently hoping never to look on its like

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again. Robert Schrire and his seven collaborators have put together a highly informative study of executive power in South Africa since 1948, which well brings out the idiosyncratic nature of rule under the National Party, its similarities with executive power elsewhere, and its legacy for the new South Africa.

The book breaks up the study of the head of government by chapters on that office's relations to specific functions, institutions, or population groups. Lawrence Boulle examines constitutional issues; Annette Seegers deals with the head of government and the state apparatus; Nic Olivier examines relationships with the ruling party; Hermann Giliomee and David Welsh look at relations between the state and the South African people, Giliomee taking the "citizenry," Welsh taking the African population; Louwrens Pretorius examines relations with organized business; and Deon Geldenhuys takes on foreign relations. In a brief concluding chapter, Schrire and Welsh speculate on the future of the presidency in a radically transformed South Africa. Each chapter proceeds chronologically, thus covering the same historical sequence as its fellows, but with a different substantive focus. Though it took this reader a few chapters to overcome impatience with the inevitable repetition, the format succeeds in producing a richly refracted, multifaceted picture of political leadership in operation.

Aside even from the central horror of apartheid, it was an unusual political system. It demonstrated exceptional political stability and continuity: the National party won every national election and referendum from 1948 to 1993, a period during which there were only six different heads of government. All the heads of government (white, Calvinist, Afrikaans-speaking men) were strong, decided leaders, some (like Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd) touched with charisma; others (like P. W. Botha) irascible and tough. All could count on, or insist on, cabinet solidarity behind major initiatives. As has been the case elsewhere in the world, executive power has increased, leading some to speak of P. W. Botha's imperial presidency. Yet, increased executive power coincided with the reduced ability of the state to achieve its basic aims, a paradox explicable in terms of South Africa's specific peculiarities, yet common to many other political systems in the 1980s. As F. W. De Klerk warned his successor, "'Mr. Mandela, when you join me, you will realise I do not have the power which you think I have'" (p. 200).

For all the regime's stability at the top, it underwent great changes in policy and tactics. The first three prime ministers (D. F. Malan, Hendrik Gert Strijdom, and Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd) built the edifice of apartheid, enforcing white *baaskap* (domination) over blacks and preference for Afrikaners over English-speakers. The next two (B. J. Vorster and P. W. Botha) saw themselves as pragmatists who grappled with the internal contradictions of apartheid, the rising hostility of the outside world, and the revolt of apartheid's victims, in part by employing violent repression and in part by reaching out to English-speaking whites and non-African blacks. It fell to De Klerk to negotiate the end of the system, yielding domination for a significant role as a leader of a minority in what he sees as a nation of minorities. The constant element in this, the various

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chapters suggest, is the preservation of the Afrikaner *volk* as a self-conscious and politically cohesive entity, if no longer through *baaskap*, then through vigorous insistence on minority rights. As Giliomee in particular warns, the new South Africa may be yet another stage on which powerful subnational groups will challenge the integrity of the state.

This work of some of South Africa's most accomplished political analysts is no primer on South African government and politics. For the serious student of South Africa or for the comparativist who has done her or his homework, this is an essential source of information and reasoned interpretation of a failed political system whose legacy and analogs remain of more than historical interest.

WILLIAM J. FOLTZ
Yale University

Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia *by Walter Laqueur. New York, Harper Collins, 1993. 317 pp. $27.50.*

During the years of *perestroika*, comparatively little attention was paid to the right-wing nationalist part of Russia's political spectrum. More recent developments have reminded us that this neglect was unwarranted. Laqueur's book is the first systematic attempt to analyze the ideology and politics of the emerging Russian Right in historical perspective.

The first two parts of the book trace the historical development of right-wing nationalist ideas and groups roughly until 1987; the last two analyze the ideological and organizational evolution of the new Russian Right up to 1993. This rough chronological order is somewhat deceptive, for the book is organized thematically as much as chronologically.

The historical part of the book is easily the better one. Here Laqueur is able to build on his earlier book *Russia and Germany* and his commanding historical knowledge of the interwar European Right. There are many enlightening comparisons between the pre-revolutionary Russian Right and its European counterparts, the *Action Francaise*, and the early Nazis. Also, Laqueur masterfully treads in the mine field of Russian émigré right-wing politics after the revolution. While much of this material is known to specialist historians, it is less well known to social scientists studying contemporary Russian politics, who can profit greatly from Laqueur's statements.

When it comes to the contemporary Russian Right, however, Laqueur is sometimes off the mark. Perhaps the greatest problem here is the difficulty, even for specialists, of distinguishing the truly important from the less significant.

To take just one example, while Laqueur realizes the marginality of groups like *Pamiat'*, he nevertheless devotes a whole chapter to the internal politics of this extremist group. In comparison, only three pages are devoted to the *Soiuz*

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group of deputies in the Union parliament which forced the resignation of Eduard Shevardnadze and prepared the terrain for the January 1991 Vilnius coup attempt, none to the conservative movement with strong nationalist overtones in the Party (Russian Communist party), and none to the nationalist factions in the Russian parliament that so dramatically contributed to the legitimacy crisis of Russia's fragile democracy. However, Laqueur does trace some of the activities of the deputies in the formation of right-wing groups.

In the crucial chapter on the "new nationalist establishment" (Chapter 15), there are a number of unwelcome editorial mistakes. Sergei Baburin's nationalist party becomes the "Russian Liberation Union" (p. 261). It is the "Russian All-People's Union." The right-wing journalist Aleksandr Nevzorov becomes "Aleksei" Nevzorov (p. 268), while Gennadii Ziuganov is prematurely promoted to "general secretary" of the Russian Communist party (RCP) (p. 248); Ziuganov became the head of the renewed RCP in February 1993, not July 1991.

In all fairness, it should be stressed that the chapters on the Cossack movement, and the politics of the Orthodox Church and extremist groups draw on much new material. Some of it, as Laqueur points out himself, is exceedingly rare. Nevertheless, there is a tendency to underplay the importance of conservative party structures in promoting nationalism during *perestroika*.

The last point is perhaps the most significant. Despite Laqueur's attention to the Stalinist phenomenon and the presence of nationalist ideas within the party during the 1960s and 1970s, there is little analysis of the way in which the Russian idea merged with orthodox communism in the closing years of *perestroika*. In view of the collaboration of the extreme left and right in contemporary Russia, the problem begs explanation.

In conclusion, Laqueur's is a welcome introduction to a highly understudied thematic in Russian politics. The historical synthesis is very useful, but some of the conclusions about contemporary events must be read with a grain of salt.

VELJKO VUJACIC
University of California at Berkeley

The Japanese Power Elite *by Albrecht Rothacher. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1993. 311 pp. $69.95.*

Japanese politics is like the child's game of paper, scissors, and rock. The politicians control the bureaucrats. The bureaucrats control the businessmen. The businessmen control the politicians. I used this simile to open a book on Japanese politics I wrote in the mid-1960s. But I was hardly the first to describe Japanese politics as ruled by a triumvirate. That was the broadly accepted interpretation.

Albrecht Rothacher resurrects this well tested paradigm to organize his book. In his opening chapter, he says Japan is ruled by 50 core elite, undergirded by

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350 second-tier elite, in turn supported by 1,600 elite at large. In three subsequent sections of three chapters each, he describes the business, the bureaucratic, and the political communities who make up The Two Thousand. He uses his last chapter for conclusions. In the last sentence of the book, he predicts the elite will continue to rule "well into the twenty-first century."

How does Albrecht Rothacher fare? Alas, his paradigm proves outdated; his ultimate prediction is already wrong.

The politicians about which Rothacher writes are all drawn from the Liberal Democratic party (LDP), which ruled Japan for thirty-eight years. But in July 1993, in a general election, it failed to maintain a majority in the House of Representatives, which chooses the prime minister, who selects the cabinet, whose members run the ministries. Replacing the LDP government have been two coalition governments led by prime ministers whose names Rothacher does not mention, made up of political parties that Rothacher describes not at all.

The businessmen are said to influence the politicians because they finance them. The *Keidanren*, a peak association of the nation's largest businesses, has been the largest single source of funds. In the wake of the 1993 election, the leader of the *Keidanren* decided not to finance politics anymore. So far, his decision has stuck, in part because the *Keidanren* no longer can judge where best to lay its bets. Nobody suggests the *Keidanren* voice is less stentorian. But it must be.

The 1993 general election had a lagging effect on the central bureaucracy. The first coalition prime minister, Hosokawa Morihiro, announced that he supported both a downsizing of the administration and the reduction of regulation. Hosokawa also said that he supported strengthening the powers of local government—which would come at the expense of the central administrative powers. Finally, Hosokawa reduced by half the bureaucrats who had the authority to participate in Diet debate. A majority of the respondents in a national *Yomiuri* newspaper poll, taken in June 1994, say they support reform of the bureaucracy.

Political commentators argue that with coalition governments frequently changing, the bureaucrats are probably stronger now than they have been since the end of World War II. The bureaucrats respond they are besieged, hence weaker. Either way, the relationship with the businessmen and the politicians is new.

Albrecht Rothacher fails, then, in telling us how the members of the triumvirate interrelate to rule. Does that mean the book has no value?

From 1987 to 1991, Albrecht Rothacher was a diplomat with the European Community (EC) commission, posted to Tokyo. A lot of good, well-researched information passed over his desk. From it he has fashioned some lively descriptions. The chapter on business conglomerates contains some revealing quotes from conglomerate leaders on how they exercise leadership. In his chapter on the civil service, Rothacher points out that the Japanese bureaucrat relies on oral communication. "There are no written position papers, few inter-office memos. Most letters . . . will never receive a reply in writing" (p. 138). I know

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of no other author who elaborates on this oral bureaucratic tradition. These insights will survive.

NATHANIEL B. THAYER
The Johns Hopkins University

Japan's Political Marketplace *by J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances McCall Rosenbluth. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1993. 262 pp. $39.95.*

Ramseyer and Rosenbluth start by pointing out that voters acting as "principals" choose legislators as their "agents" and that legislators then choose bureaucrats and judges who will "mitigate [the voters'] problems." They then state the following set of propositions: "(1) that the institutional framework of government—the rules of the game among political players—decisively shapes the character of political competition in Japan; (2) that the players in this competitive political market try to build organizations adapted to that framework; and (3) that these players also try to manipulate the framework to their private advantage" (pp. 2-3). They then conclude that "the institutions which endure are those that solve the problems of the political players" (p. 187).

This approach tends to view the Japanese state as a dependent variable responding to dynamics in civil society, and it defines out of existence autonomous state power. In the case of the United States, where individual rights and liberties have been central to its ideology and institutions since 1776, the assumption that individuals continuously redefine political institutions through their rational, self-interested behavior might be useful. In the case of Japan, however, this simplifying assumption is too reductionist and ahistorical. Under the authoritarian Meiji state, individual Japanese were not citizens. They were subjects—or in rational choice terms, agents of the only principal in the Meiji state, the emperor. Women could not vote; children were educated by the state to worship the emperor; and the the state defined and punished thought crime. This was not fertile ground for the presumed dynamic of individuals redefining their political institutions. It is equally difficult to explain the postwar constitution (imposed on Japan by American occupation authorities) or the postwar bureaucracy (which maintained continuities of structure, personnel, and ideology with the pre-war civilian bureaucracy) as artifacts of choices made in postwar Japanese civil society. The fact that the authors' presumed agent of popular will, the Liberal Democratic party (LDP), was not even created until a decade after Japan began rebuilding the state and economy, does not slow the authors' rush to conclude that Japanese political institutions are the product of individual demands.

The notion that institutions such as the state are generated by a society of atomized individual utility maximizers may make for good social contrast theory, but as an empirical proposition it is not self-evident and should be treated cau-

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tiously, particularly in the case of Japan. Ramseyer and Rosenbluth do not really deal with the large body of social science literature that suggests other factors such as culture and ideology, class interests, international events such as wars and depressions, charismatic leadership, and institutional legacies explain the creation and evolution of institutions.

The theoretical assumption in this book is: if institution X, then behaviors a, b, c, . . . n. Their hypothesis is: if behaviors a, b, c, . . . n, then institution X. This latter proposition cannot be established deductively. This would be the fallacy: if A then B; therefore, if B then A. It must be established inductively. The authors looked for and found evidence that the LDP serves the interests of younger backbench Diet members, and they also argued that the bureaucracy followed LDP dictates.

The fall of the LDP in 1993 provides a timely and powerful test for Ramseyer and Rosenbluth's argument. Unfortunately, events contradict their interpretation of Japanese politics. It was predominantly frustrated younger back bench members who defected from the corrupt and ossified LDP and brought about its downfall. And the bureaucracy successfully pushed its fiscal stringency and consumption tax agendas onto the new parties in power, even as the latter tried unsuccessfully to impose bureaucratic reform and consumption-oriented measures on an unwilling bureaucracy. This book should serve as a cautionary example to those who would mechanically apply to Japan or to other nonwestern societies theoretical approaches currently popular in the analysis of American politics.

DAVID ARASE
University of London

Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy *by Lucien S. Vandenbroucke. New York, Oxford University Press, 1993. 257 pp. $35.00.*

This book should be read by everyone in the CIA, the State Department, the Pentagon, and especially in the White House. In a calm gathering of the facts and a convincing analysis of them, the book shows that only one of the four principal special operations in the last thirty years was justified. Special operations, the authors convincingly concludes, are "truly operations of last resort."

The four operations are John Kennedy's Bay of Pigs landing, Richard Nixon's raid on the Sontay POW prison camp in North Vietnam, Gerald Ford's attempt to free the crew of the *Mayaguez*, and Jimmy Carter's attempt to free the American hostages in Iran.

Castro's Cuba posed no threat to American lives or, unlike the missile crisis yet to come, to the American homeland. But there *was* reason to believe that

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the POWs held in North Vietnam were at risk, and the raid was well planned and executed. But the prisoners had been moved some time earlier.

The Ford administration assumed that seizing the *Mayaguez* was a deliberate attempt to humiliate the United States. But in the preceding weeks Cambodian gunboats had captured several Thai fishing boats and a Panamanian freighter in the same waters, and had tried unsuccessfully to stop a South Korean freighter and a Swedish merchant ship. The only threat to the safety of the *Mayaguez* crew was that they would be caught in a crossfire if the Americans tried to free them. The ultimate irony is that just as the U.S Marines were landing on what turned out to be the wrong island, the crew members were released. But eighteen marines were killed and forty-nine were wounded.

The attempt to free the American hostages held in Teheran was clearly inspired by the Israeli's successful 1976 raid to free hostages held at the Entebbe airport. But freeing hostages held at an airport is quite different from feeing hostages held in the center of a city. The mission never got further than a desert rendezvous point, where a helicopter crashed into a C-130 and eight crewmen were killed.

Vandenbroucke's book contains only a few minor errors. He says that Fidel Castro's worry that the United States might invade again caused him to bring Soviet arms, including nuclear missiles, to Cuba. In fact, it was the Soviets, worried about the missile gap in reverse, who took the initiative.

More serious is the author's overall conclusion that since intelligence for all four missions was faulty, the United States should put more emphasis on espionage (HUMINT for human intelligence), since technical intelligence provided by air and satellite photos and radio interception cannot look inside buildings. But the fact is that since World War I, espionage has been successful only in ferreting out technical and scientific secrets and almost never plans for offensives and the like. Thus espionage in World War I discovered that the Germans had succeeded in putting poison gas in artillery shells, and espionage obtained a copy of the manual the Soviets used in deploying IRBMs and MRBMs, a great help to the photo interpreters in the missile crisis. But when espionage did turn up a major offensive, it had already been identified by air reconnaissance and the interrogation of POWs.

ROGER HILSMAN
Columbia University

China's Transition from Socialism: Statist Legacies and Market Reforms, 1980-1990 *by Dorothy J. Solinger. Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1993. 246 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $22.50.*

This welcome addition to the rich literature on socialist reform by one of our most astute observers of contemporary Chinese political economy consists of a

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compilation of articles written over the course of the 1980–1990 decade and spanning the field. The overall theme is that notwithstanding the tugging and hauling of various interests limned so clearly in the various chapters, the "guiding theme is the *statism* behind the reform effort" (p. 3). Reform is merely a means to such statist ends as a balanced budget and economic modernization. This form of nationalist functionalism is a broad enough pavillion to encompass the wide range of interests covered in the book's eleven chapters. A secondary theme is that the reform decade should be understood not as a revolution, but rather as an historical continuation of the revisionist innovations introduced in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The chapters are subsumed by four sections: the first is an analysis of the central policy process, the second is concerned with urban administrative reform, the third with the problematique of center-regional relations, and the fourth with the management of the emergent private sector. The sections are topically homogeneous, each section then being arranged chronologically.

The discussion of the national policy process introduces at least two interesting new ideas: first, policy disputes within the leadership should be understood not in terms of a bimodal "two line struggle" between "radicals" and "moderates," but rather as a triangular conflict among three factions. This is an important point, and Solinger is certainly among the first to call attention to the distinction between reform and adjustment. Her method of assigning elites to their respective factions, based on the assumption that whoever presents the report is then (rightly or wrongly) held responsible for the policy, has the advantage of being empirically measurable, and she proceeds to do so systematically, with findings that range from subtle to completely ambiguous. The role of the National People's Congress (NPC) in the policy process has usually been ignored hitherto under the assumption that it was a rubber stamp body, which Solinger proceeds to belie by tracing the evolution of policy to a series of key 5th NPC sessions. But I think her point is not really secure until a more detailed comparison is made between NPC documents and the policy output of the immediately preceding party forum.

Whereas the first section was largely concerned with the early reform period, the second seems to be involved with middle and late reform, dealing with issues of more or less reform rather than reform vs. command planning. The chapters in this section include discussions of the competitive interplay between bureaucratic and "marketeering" reformers (chapter 3), administrative decentralization as a form of "privatization" and cryptopluralism (chapter 4), the shift from centrally prescribed industrial supply and marketing lines to "relational contracting" (chapter 5), and the introduction of bankruptcy and pro-merger legislation to reform unprofitable large-scale urban state enterprises (chapter 6). This section is a veritable catalogue of urban reform measures, including discussions of the stock market, property rights markets, bidding market management offices, trade associations, and trust investment companies. Solinger is particularly good at capturing the seamless elision from plan to market that is the Chinese answer to shock therapy—"groping from stone to stone while crossing the river."

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In the third section Solinger returns to the issue she took up in her first book. *Regional Government and Political Integration in Southwest China* (1977): what is the relationship between center and various regional governmental levels (city, province, region)? Based primarily on research conducted in Wuhan, she finds that central revenue tends to be lost in the context of administrative decentralization, but that decentralization is often nominal or half-hearted.

The fourth, relatively short section on the "petty private sector" reprises themes first taken up in *Chinese Business Under Socialism* (1984, chapter 4). Much of this sector seems to be commercial, and Solinger traces its development from policies articulated at the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Central Committee (December 1978) up to the late 1980s, while analyzing the bureaucratic and radical opposition it has elicited. But the central finding of this section seems to be that reform has broken down the once sharp boundary between state and society; on the one hand, cadres become involved in the economy via trading companies and other such ventures, and on the other hand, business people find it necessary to solicit bureaucratic cooperation through "bribery, extortion, corruption and bargains" (p. 258). Rather than the rise of an autonomous private sector, Solinger finds extensive collusion between public and private spheres.

As an anthology, this lacks the analytical coherence of Solinger's previous books, which more careful editing might have ameliorated somewhat. The statist theme used to integrate the numerous subthemes is not tautological; Solinger is, after all, implicitly denying the emergence of a fully autonomous market or civil society. But it does seem a bit truistic, in the sense that the state can be said to dominate even when it introduces policies that reduce its own budget or political control. The book is unified not only by its too general thesis but by its ability to illuminate the ironies of reform.

This anthology is surely a noteworthy and valuable contribution to our understanding of the Chinese political economy. It is based on solid research and innovative conceptualization. The wide range of topics addressed and the precision with which they are analyzed serves to define the contours of that still inchoate but fertile field.

LOWELL DITTMER
University of California, Berkeley

Intervention: Guides and Perils *by Leonard W. Doob. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1993. 269 pp. $30.00.*

Designed for those tempted to act as mediators and interveners in situations of social, political, and international tension and conflict, Leonard Doob's latest book focuses on many types and modes of third-party intervention. In a tone of speculative, somewhat wry skepticism, he considers a range of examples–

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from the passerby, who seeing a child about to drown, rushes to his aid through the labor-management mediator, to the statesman considering whether and how to intervene between quarreling states. For Doob, the concept intervention is "all-embracing" and "like the German word *weltanschauung*, alerts us to a universal attribute of human relationships" (p. 27). Some event produces unresolved problems for a person or group of individuals who, in his vocabulary, are the "Principals." The persons or person who seek to resolve or help cope with it are the "Interveners." "Bystanders" may or may not make a significant difference.

By correctly stressing the uniqueness of each episode of intervention, he justifies the modesty of his endeavor. He does not seek formulas, generalizations, or metatheories, but merely "guides" that might help those drawn into intervening and "perils" to be avoided if possible. He illustrates his speculations by examples drawn from this full spectrum of interventions. Any generalization is quickly qualified by contrary examples.

On this spacious terrain he risks superficiality, a danger he moderates by the generic questions he poses, the illustrative detail he evokes, and the contrasts he draws between the roles performed by the Principals and the Interveners. The interveners should be flexible and ever ready for surprises. They should possess "the patience of Job" (p. 47). Power or influence in some form is often necessary for consequential intervention. However, in interstate conflicts, at least, power often contributes to distrust, though it may also induce hope that the course of events at last can be changed for the better. In a chapter on Rationale, Doob speculates about the critical importance of "alacrity" or readiness to intervene when the time is right. Of course, one never can be sure when the time is right: to intervene early is perhaps to reduce conflict but may ensure rejection of the intervener; to intervene late may help the intervener seem indispensable to both principals, but meanwhile conflict may have intensified beyond resolution until each has exhausted the other in protracted and costly conflict.

In his chapter on Method, his well-known experience in Cyprus and the Horn of Africa inconspicuously contributes cautionary tales for the overenthusiastic. Yet, he reminds us, despite our expectations, Berlin Walls do come down and he might now add that Apartheid has been dethroned.

No two cases are alike. Contexts differ, personal chemistries matter but are by no means predictable. Since different cultures approach coping with conflict in diverse ways, interveners must be fully sensitive to these deeply embedded and often unexamined differences. Specific reality issues, such as mutually acceptable site and arrangements, reliable and confidential communications, adequate funds, and time for unhurried consideration must be assured.

Doob's examination of the morality of intervention, in its different forms and circumstances, once again reveals the range of his concerns and his moral sensitivity.

Specialists in any one of the fields he daringly intrudes upon will be disappointed that he didn't focus more on their specialty. Students of international politics may wish that he had emphasized the contextual peculiarity of their field.

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But all concerned with third-party intervention in its many forms will have their perspectives broadened. For practitioners and analysts he includes a neat check list of variables and questions to be asked.

W. HOWARD WRIGGINS
Columbia University

Facing Up: How to Rescue the Economy from Crushing Debt and Restore the American Dream *by Peter G. Peterson. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1993. 411 pp. $22.00.*

Over the past decade, no voice railing against the pernicious effects of budget deficits in America has been more persistent, prominent, and indefatigable than that of Pete Peterson. A former cabinet member and successful investment banker, Peterson has written books, articles in places like *The Atlantic*, and op/ed pieces; he has testified before Congress and appeared frequently on television to talk about deficits and his ideas for bringing the federal government's imbalances back into kilter. Recently, he was instrumental in forming the Concord Coalition, cochaired by former Senators Warren B. Rudman and Paul E. Tsongas, to carry the message and a program out to the country and in a renewed way into Washington.

Peterson's newest book, *Facing Up*, is a major element of his renewed effort to reshape American public, especially fiscal policy. Part personal account, part serious analysis of a range of social policy problems, part laundry list of proposed solutions, and part jeremiad, *Facing Up* is designed to reach as large a public audience as possible, while also appealing to the policy community and politicians.

Facing Up has an introduction by Rudman and Tsongas, followed by a personal look back at Peterson's Greek immigrant father's American dream. It sets the stage for an appeal to reclaim the values embodied in that traditional American dream, while also reminding readers that Peterson's calls for sacrifice and discipline come not from the smugness of his own affluence but from the values of his working class background. Peterson then moves to a series of chapters discussing the roots of our deficit problem, the vast expansion of entitlements, the problems of health care, energy, litigiousness, and post-cold war national security. The next section of the book presents his action plan, a detailed set of proposals leading to a balanced budget, and an appeal for action.

Facing Up does not have the usual problems of books about budgets, economics, or fiscal policy—turgid prose and dreadful jargon. His writing is easy going and understandable to the interested lay person, and his insights and ideas are stimulating and provocative. If Peterson's accounts of the entitlement and energy policy problems are familiar to any close observer of public affairs, it is

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still useful to review the bidding and to put our fiscal dilemma into that sort of context. Of course, there are many potential readers who are unfamiliar with or haven't thought at all about the basics.

One of the most useful parts of the book, designed to broaden its appeal and impact, is a concluding section made up of slick, multicolored, and eye-catching charts, called "A Visual Guide to America's Real Leading Indicators." Publishers do not ordinarily go to the heavy expense required to put together a collection of charts like this; it is a testament to Peterson's clout that he got them added to the book. For teachers and students, the charts, showing things like trends in home ownership, household net worth, taxes, savings and consumption, along with the usual on deficits, budgets, and debt, are extremely valuable. Fifteen minutes spent studying the pictures can tell one a great deal about the key trends in America's economic and social picture, probably leaving a more lasting impression than reading a couple of hundred pages.

Many of Peterson's suggestions are useful and imaginative; his approach to phasing in a form of means testing for the main entitlement programs may well have serious appeal to Congress, especially through the commission on entitlements and tax reform co-chaired by Senators Bob Kerrey (D-NE) and John Danforth (R-MO) of which Peterson is a member. But the specificity of the recommendations makes *Facing Up* more time bound; its projections and recommendations will fade as time and events pass.

Facing Up has one other problem: it largely takes a pass on the major controversies surrounding budget reform that have increasingly—and unfortunately—dominated recent debates on deficits. He has two pages on the Balanced Budget Amendment to the Constitution, sliding away from any firm position on it despite the tremendous impact it would have—overwhelmingly negative, in my view—if it were implemented. Although he shows no hesitation to offend senior citizens groups with his calls for entitlement cutbacks, or conservatives with his calls for more taxes, he is loathe to offend political friends and his Concord Coalition colleagues on the Constitution. He comments, "I'll leave it to sincere advocates of a balanced budget amendment like Senator Paul Simon of Illinois to figure out whether a realistic and enforceable balanced budget amendment for the federal government can be devised and implemented. Certainly I wish them success" (p. 227).

He likewise passes the buck on other proposed "reforms" like a line-item veto or term limits, saying "I'll leave it to legal scholars to explore whether other constitutional means of redress can be employed on behalf of future generations" (p. 227). His comrade-in-arms Paul Tsongas has been less reluctant to jump into the reform fray, albeit by adopting wrong-headed positions in favor of term limits, a balanced budget amendment, and a line-item veto. To be sure, it would be worse if Peterson had embraced a collection of panaceas rather than ignore or fudge them, but a book like *Facing Up*, dedicated to making hard choices and making clear that there is no panacea, calls out for a tough-minded examination of the limits that structural reform can have when hard choices are necessary.

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Even so, this book has some value. For anyone who wants to understand the state of play in the budget, the nature of the choices that Washington will have to make in the next few years, like it or not, and the role and direction the entitlement/tax commission might take, *Facing Up* is recommended reading.

NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN
American Enterprise Institute

Community Power in a Postreform City *by Robert F. Pecorella. Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1993. 232 pp. $45.00.*

This book creates a new paradigm called a "contextual approach" to analyze New York City politics. Pecorella argues that urban regimes are shaped primarily in response to urban fiscal crises during which the power of locally elected officials is usurped by financial interests working in collaboration with state government officials. These emergency regimes cut spending for nonelite groups and guarantee returns for elite city investors. As memory of the crisis fades, financial interests gradually relax and politicians once again cater to active nonelite constituencies. Pecorella thus identifies the central conflict in cities as one between community-based nonelites and city financial interests.

Pecorella does not systematically examine why financial elites have been so successful in dominating local government, even in an increasingly democratic city governance structure. Such an analysis would require examination of the various components of what Pecorella calls "attentive nonelites" such as municipal unions, community organizations, local political organizations, ethnic organizations, activist groups, as well as the media and public culture. Pecorella narrows his empirical analysis to New York's fifty-nine Community Boards, interesting but limited institutions. He quotes an article by a New York City assistant comptroller, for example, stating that union pension funds make city workers co-financiers of the city along with the banking community. This creates a conflict between the long-term interests of city workers for retirement income and their immediate wage demands. How has this conflict been expressed in the municipal unions' response to fiscal crisis? Why have the unions not played an assertive role in fiscal politics comparable to the financial community? Pecorella does not tell us or even explore his lead.

Likewise, there is surprisingly little analysis of the impact of ethnic and racial conflict on New York city politics. Some authors have suggested that ethnic and racial conflict have been the primary focal points of political organization in New York City over the last century. While such arguments may be overstated, ethnic and racial conflict are more important to New York politics than Pecorella indicates. Pecorella portrays African-American community activism as beginning in the 1960s as a spin-off of the Civil Rights movement, thus ignoring

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Harlem's powerful movements in the 1920s and 1930s and minimizing the role of race/ethnic conflict historically in the city.

The most interesting part of Pecorella's analysis is his implication that the state of the national economy may be uniquely changing the way the city government operates. He maintains that financial jitters are such that since the fiscal crisis of the 1970s New York's banking community has for the first time maintained its interference in local government through the institution of the Emergency Financial Control Board and the Municipal Assistance Corporation. He suggests that this explains why former Mayor David Dinkins was unable to deliver to his constituents because of the unusual demands of the banking community for fiscal conservatism. Pecorella also states that similar to other postcrisis regimes, Dinkins was forced to pursue elite development interests. To the contrary, however, the national economy and declining federal spending severely limited development during Dinkins's term, particularly for elite real estate interests. This is also unusual for a local government influenced by financial interests.

Pecorella has an obvious command of urban literature, to the point where his frequent literary commentary distracts from his major argument. His contextual approach astutely highlights important continuities in New York politics. In overemphasizing his model, however, Pecorella reduces the complexity of city politics and misses the opportunity to develop distinctions between current and past trends that could have important implications for understanding urban America.

PHILLIP THOMPSON
Barnard College

Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century *by Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler. Westport, CT, Praeger, 1994. 367 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $22.95.*

As the world has witnessed a string of "people power" victories, in the Philippines in 1986, and then across Eastern Europe after 1989, this book can certainly claim to be in step with the times. A logical follow-on to earlier works by Gene Sharp among others on nonviolent conflict, this book confronts at least some of the doubts that have always been raised about such approaches, although the skeptics about civil disobedience will most probably remain unconvinced.

The authors offer a strategic focus on nonviolent approaches, disassociating themselves from any grand win-win interpretation whereby everyone feels that they have come out ahead. They argue instead that nonviolent approaches are to be applied to strong and real conflicts of interest, where one side indeed wins and another loses. Building upon a series of well researched and well written historical case studies, Ackerman and Kruegler attempt to lay out some principles

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of strategic nonviolent conflict, which contribute to victory when correctly applied and which explain stalemate or defeat when they are ignored.

Having squarely addressed the problem that such analyses have in the past sometimes not acknowledged the reality of conflicts of interest, the authors stipulate at least two other problems, but they may not be as successful as they would like in responding to them:

First, as with the same kinds of principles developed by authors like Liddell Hart for violent warfare, there is a risk of tautology in the formulations offered. The causal linkages outlined may be unfalsifiable as the words are used, and the policy advice may be something that made sense automatically, or advice that we can not tell whether it has been applied until we see whether the struggle was successful. This is, of course, a problem with many books on ordinary military strategy, the very books that this work on nonviolent strategy seeks to imitate. In the end, this book makes the general case that wise policy can make the difference between defeat and victory, a difficult argument to refute.

Second, the authors are clearly trying to be less doctrinaire and more open minded than some earlier books on nonviolent approaches. Thus they make some motion toward conceding that something depends on the liberality of the regime against which such tactics are being applied and on the comparative resources of regimes vs. protesters in the endurance contest of strikes and sit-downs, etc. Yet in the end, the toughest case introduced is that of the Danes against the Nazis, which is rated a "success" mainly because the world was defeating Hitler elsewhere in Europe by violent means. Little mention is made of the Danes' comparative exemption (because they were blue-eyed Aryans) from the more normal Nazi violent responses to resistance. In short, there is still a tendency to treat nonviolent approaches here as a morally imperative absolute, rather than as a tactic appropriate only where it is effective. Thus the authors dodge discussing the cases where it would be least effective.

The authors are to be congratulated for having engaged the normal how-to-win debate as much as they do, for the book thus makes for interesting and provocative reading. Yet more would have to be offered in discussions of Rwanda and Bosnia as well as Poland and the Philippines, in discussions of Hitler's rule and Stalin's rule over Eastern Europe as well as Gorbachev's, if the categorical arguments are to be persuasive.

GEORGE H. QUESTER
University of Maryland

Persona Non Grata: A Memoir of Disenchantment with the Cuban Revolution *by Jorge Edwards. New York, Paragon House, 1993. 294 pp. $27.95.*

This is a difficult book for me to review. In 1971, just after the election of Salvador Allende, Jorge Edwards went to Havana to reopen the Chilean embassy.

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He left three months later and in 1973 published this memoir. I read it then and reread it now in this belated but welcome English-language translation. In the early 1970s, *Persona Non Grata* was one of several testimonies of disenchantment: the Cuban revolution no longer seemed to offer the resplendent hope it once did to left-leaning intellectuals.

Indeed, in the aftermath of disastrous economic policies, Cuba turned to the then-extant model of state socialism and forged closer ties with the former Soviet Union. As Edwards notes: "spontaneity was inevitably and perhaps necessarily being supplanted by premeditation" (p. 66). The aura that had shielded the revolution quickly dissipated, and Cuba (almost) became just another communist country.

I remember my reaction at the time: Edwards is an arrogant Southern Coner who does not understand the complexities of a revolution at the doorstep of the United States. Then I buried the concerns his account raised. I was a graduate student, groping with issues of identity and politics, a young Cuban-American who sympathized with the revolution, and an aristocratic Chilean had but a slim chance of derailing me from the course my life was taking.

Rereading *Persona Non Grata* two decades later evoked in me a panoply of sentiments and thoughts. It stirred a sense of nostalgia for a different era. Chile under Allende and revolutionary Cuba together constituted an alternative for Latin America; the great Cuban writer, José Lezama Lima, was alive; Raúl Roa, a pugnacious, acerbic, and fiercely nationalistic intellectual, headed the Cuban Foreign Ministry; Ché Guevara and Régis Debray were household names; debating the merits of moral and material incentives made sense; many of us snickered with Fidel Castro when we read his words to Edwards—"We may not be very good at producing, but we're great at fighting" (p. 23). Now the Cuban revolution is dead, its dreams turned into a nightmare with no dawn quickly in sight, and I can no longer harbor the same illusions.

This second encounter with Edwards underscored a question I have increasingly asked myself over the past seven or eight years and for which, unfortunately, I lack a fully satisfactory answer. Was it legitimate to have and pursue those dreams? Undoubtedly, much of what Edwards narrates was true: the constant intrusion of state security; the irrepressible and autocratic energies of *el Commandante*; the harshness of everyday life—"Now you can't even find a guava," said a poor black woman (p. 83); the arrogance of power—"In Cuba we don't need critics. Criticizing is easy. We need doers, builders of society," pronounced a close Castro associate (p. 185). And yet, many of us dismissed this ugly underside because we had our sights and our hearts set elsewhere—and we hoped.

My answer is that the Cuban revolution was legitimate, even though today I am painfully aware—personally, politically, and intellectually—of the complexities and costs involved. As an individual who continues to confront issues of politics (not of identity anymore) and as a scholar who attempts to understand and interpret the Cuban experience, I cannot transpose today's irrefutable conclusion to the distant past when the reasons for hoping were still alive. And that

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is why *Persona Non Grata*—a book that evidently has withstood the passage of time—was difficult to review.

MARIFELI PÉREZ-STABLE
State University of New York, Old Westbury

Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia *by Lenard J. Cohen. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1993. 299 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $16.95.*

One of the notable features in the discussions of Yugoslavia's demise has been a lack of adequate literature. Scholarship was late in analyzing the meaning of new ideologies and the implications of wholesale carnage. There is a reason for this omission. The so-called Yugoslav specialists, with only a few exceptions, have for a long time excelled in benighting sundry manuscripts with the rosy picture of Titoist "self-management" and nationality relations. When the prism of history turned to contention and then war, the journalists and itinerant pundits were quicker than the Yusoglav specialists and frequently produced better and more intelligent interpretations (Mark Thompson, Roy Gutman, Alain Finkelkraut).

The shelf is now crowded with all sorts of products, including rank propaganda, coffeetablers (Warner Books' *Sarajevo: A Portrait of the Siege*), and even child diaries (Zlata Filipović). But there is a bit of space left for the academic guild. Lenard J. Cohen is the first of the old Yugoslav specialists to step into this crack. His volume is calculated to avoid making a noise, lull us into forgetting his earlier books, and have us accept the old trivialities in new garb. It is a tedious and lazy book, written with the help of the ubiquitous and underpaid research assistant who goes under the name of FBIS-EEU. There are plenty of wordy and busy sentences. There is a cornucopia of historical howlers, especially when Cohen attempts to negotiate what he imagines to be the credits and demerits of yesteryear. In fact, his use of historical literature is so languishing that I was obliged to retake notice of various texts that are best forgotten.

Cohen's intention, it seems, was *not* to provide an interpretation. He has no thesis, unless one credits various banalities about the impact of the past, "interelite mistrust" and "heroic value orientation" (the latter borrowed from Vera Erlich's research on a qualitatively different war). He wanted to provide an analytical chronicle, a modest and important goal in which he doubly failed. First, Cohen has no imagination to understand or explain new political and ideological phenomena. For example, what is the meaning of Slobodan Milošević, his apartheid policies in Kosovo, his incendiary opportunism, new ideological concoctions, and war policies in Croatia and Bosnia? Second, Cohen genuinely believes that everybody is equally guilty in the Yugoslav meltdown, leading to a trimmed chronology of events with a vast potential to mislead.

Two dramatic instances will suffice to demonstrate the last point: Cohen devotes less than a sentence to the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy, a key

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document in the revival of Serbian nationalism (p. 53); he downplays and relativizes the meaning of "ethnic cleansing" and concentration camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina (p. 239). In a word, Cohen is incapable of seeing the design behind the "spontaneity" of events. His world of cabinet theories has no connection with the real Balkan developments, including the abstract world of conflicting ideologies. Wittingly or not, his anemic narrative will be a great comfort to those who believe that the current Balkan war is too complex to understand or address. This book is too costly a platitude by anybody's standards.

IVO BANAC
Yale University

The End of Communist Power: Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis *by Leslie Holmes. New York, Oxford University Press, 1993. 358 pp. Cloth, $57.00; paper, $16.95.*

"[C]orruption, and public reaction to it, was a primary factor leading to the collapse of communist power in the USSR in 1991, Eastern Europe from 1989, and to the Tiananmen incident . . ." (p. 214). Such is the thesis of *The End of Communist Power* by Leslie Holmes, a pioneer in the field of comparative communism.

Holmes develops two arguments in support of his ambitious thesis, the first heuristic, the second empirical. In an imaginative synthesis of Max Weber and Jurgen Habermas, he argues that the sources of authority in communist systems follow a predictable life path. Whereas communist systems in formation rely heavily on coercion and charismatic authority, mature communist states seek support in what he terms the "new traditionalism" (right to office comes with length in office) and "eudaemonism" (the material bond between state and citizenry). But eudaemonism has a serious, and potentially fatal, flaw. When a growing dependence on eudaemonism coincides with an economic crisis, as it did in most of the communist world in the 1980s, the result is a loss of support of the masses, who view the state as breaching its share of the social contract.

To regain mass support, reform-oriented leaders adopt two tactics. Cautiously at first, they move the basis of regime authority toward legal rationality as a means of invigorating the economy. At the same time, they expose parts of the system's corruption to public view, thereby venting mass frustration and weakening their elite opponents, who are more closely tied to the existing order. Both tactics have their dangers, however. The trend toward legal rationality, if pursued far enough, provokes a vigorous backlash by orthodox leaders and bureaucrats, who fear loss of their traditional power over words and things (ideology and the economy). Campaigning against corruption, for its part, can lead the masses to generalize their critique from official to officialdom to system.

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It is this conundrum that faces elites during communism's crises of production and legitimation. Unless communist leaders are willing to fall back on coercion or primitive nationalism as sources of authority (and Holmes argues that such efforts are, at best, temporary), they will stumble toward legal rationality and, in so doing, bury communism as a system.

When Holmes shifts ground to empirical analyses, the sure hand is no longer apparent. Although the author briefly surveys recent anticorruption campaigns throughout the communist world, the focus here is on reports of corruption in China and the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s. By tracking the incidence and character of publicized corruption in the two communist giants, he seeks to reveal the uses of anticorruption campaigns in the search for regime and system legitimacy. Unfortunately, methodological problems abound. Corruption is a very "rubbery" concept, to borrow Holmes' term, but when it is stretched to cover twenty categories, from turning a blind eye to smuggling to treason, it begins to lose coherence. More seriously, the author has uncovered only a fraction of the reported cases of corruption, which in turn represent only a minute portion of investigated cases of corruption. (Soviet authorities investigated 30,000 cases of smuggling in 1980 alone.) Rather than reading runs (or samples) of Russian and Chinese language newspapers, he has relied largely on articles selected and translated for publication by the monitoring service of the British government. As a result, his evidence from the mid-1980s consists of only some twenty-five articles annually from the Soviet press and forty-five annually from the Chinese press. For the Soviet materials, a fuller and more representative sample could have been obtained by using the weekly index of newspaper articles (*Letopis' gazetnykh statei*). While his evidence is certainly sufficient to provide illustrative anecdotes—used to good effect here—it cannot sustain the conclusions reached by the author on the scale and character of the anticorruption campaigns. Finally, because of what the author calls a lack of funds and time, the research stops in 1986 for China and 1987 for the Soviet Union, the very moment when a fuller picture was emerging of corruption and anticorruption campaigns under communism.

As a heuristic work, *The End of Communist Power* makes an important contribution to the ongoing debate about the sources of authority in communist systems. As an empirical study, it offers a useful, though impressionistic survey of anticorruption campaigns as an instrument in communist politics. Readers interested in fuller and more systematic treatment of the struggle against corruption under communism will need to turn to country-specific studies, two of the best of which are Nicholas Lampert's *Whistleblowing in the Soviet Union* and William A. Clark's *Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom*.

EUGENE HUSKEY
Stetson University

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How Navies Fight: The U.S. Navy and Its Allies *by Frank Uhlig, Jr. Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 1994. 455 pp. $34.95.*

One of the more neglected areas of political-military studies is that of how navies fight. Certainly there are many books on the history of naval warfare, but few that systematically attempt to tie the tactics of naval art to overall military and political objectives. Frank Uhlig, editor emeritus of the *Naval War College Review*, has published a well researched and extremely thought-provoking book on this very subject.

Since the majority of the people of the world tend not to go to sea routinely, it follows that a majority of the political-military decision makers who order about navies have no practical experience in their day to day operations, let alone actions in combat. Uhlig has taken the trouble to think about how navies fight and then to summarize his findings using some twenty-two illustrative historical case studies, each with an excellent summary at its conclusion. Using these case studies, Uhlig then presents a list of some forty-three individual tasks that are performed by navies, of which five really matter: first, the support of the strategic movement of troops; second, the acquisition of advanced bases; third, the landing of an armed force on hostile shores; fourth, blockade; and fifth, the struggle for mastery of the local sea.

Uhlig ends with a concluding chapter entitled "How Navies Fight and Why." This chapter should and hopefully will appear as a separate journal article or chapter in an edited book. Frank Uhlig further argues that there are three underlying justifications for warfare at sea. First, navies fight to ensure "that friendly shipping can flow"—a stated reason for a number of American wars. Second, they fight to ensure "that hostile shipping cannot"—an actual aim of American combat at sea a number of times. Third, having accomplished the former, "navies can risk landing an army on a hostile shore, supporting that army with fire and logistics" (p. 399).

Uhlig is no died in the wool naval supporter advocating a fleet to sweep the seas of the enemy fleet. Indeed, there will be sections not to the liking of many concerned with current naval programming. *How Navies Fight* is instead a balanced assessment of the warfighting conduct and value of naval combat and its ultimate worth to the larger military objectives and political goals of warfare. It is a serious book that should be included in the reading assigned to any students of political-military affairs.

Uhlig's cases include a mix of global conventional wars, major, and lesser regional contingencies. Commenting on the use of navies in more recent times, Uhlig concludes that, "allies have been able to land troops on a hostile shore, supporting them then and thereafter with fire and logistics without first having to fight an enemy fleet" (p. 413–414). With a few exceptions, the purpose of the U.S. Navy's campaigns have been to support troops ashore until they triumphed, sometimes well inland.

The author does not seriously address the use of navies in military operations other than wars, requiring the scholar to go beyond this book and consult the

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rich menu of other offerings dealing with the non-warfighting aspects of sea power. This would, naturally, include the naval diplomacy and forward presence of naval forces to support foreign policy objectives.

There are only a few minor criticisms that this reviewer offers. Although the title *How Navies Fight* might lead one to assume that the book has an international flavor, the historical case studies reflect the author's Eurocentric and Anglo-American bias. Additional case studies – specifically how the Austrian, Chinese, French, German, Italian, and Japanese navies fought in past naval engagements such as the Battles of Coronel, Lissa, Tsushima, Yalu – would have been welcomed. Admittedly, the book is large enough, but frankly some of these might have contributed more than a few of the cases selected. On the other hand, Uhlig's treatment of Britain is often biting. For example, he states that "While on the whole, the British Navy succeeded in its main missions during these years [initial stage of World War II in the Atlantic], except for grand events, such as Taranto, Cape Matapan, and the *Bismark*, it did not perform them particularly well" (p. 132).

The book's final chapter is followed by a table entitled "How Navies Fight 1775–1991," which tabulates the magnitude of the tasks performed in each historical case. This concluding table is both a major strength and a source of controversy. All of the historical examples in the table are presented equally, yet in reality not all of these wars or campaigns were as important as others. For example, if we were to draw conclusions on how ground forces fight, one would expect that some weight be given to the various and colorful campaigns in which the U.S. Army has engaged. Are the lessons of the Indian wars equally as important to learning how armies fight as are the lessons of World War II or Desert Storm?

Rather than tabulate the amount of effort put into war or campaign, Uhlig assesses the result of those efforts in terms of success or lack thereof. Unfortunately, the book lacks any published explanation of the criteria used by the author to assign his evaluation of either activity or success.

Despite these few minor problems, *How Navies Fight* makes a major contribution to the literature and is strongly recommended for courses dealing with military history or strategy. Before navies can fully contribute to the development of joint and multinational doctrine, they first need to understand individual service doctrine. *How Navies Fight* will help navies do just that. Strongly recommended.

JAMES J. TRITTEN
Naval Doctrine Command

Making and Remaking Asian America Through Immigration Policy, 1850–1990 by Bill Ong Hing. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1993. 231 pp. $45.00.

Historically, American immigration policies aimed at insuring the entry of desirable human resources and safeguarding the self-defined national character of

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the republic. Chinese, one of the first "free colored laborers" to arrive during the middle of the nineteenth century, prompted the passage of the 1882 Chinese Labor Exclusion Act, the first immigration law of exclusion at the federal level. And as successive groups of Asians, who were recruited as cheap laborers, entered, laws were enacted for their restriction—the Gentleman's Agreement of 1907, which curtailed Japanese laborers; the 1923 Supreme Court decision that determined that Asian Indians though "Caucasians" were not "free white persons" and were therefore subject to embargo; and the 1924 National Origins Act, which created an "Asiatic barred zone" by extending the Chinese exclusion laws to all other Asians. Even Filipinos, who were colonial subjects and U.S. nationals, were excluded by the 1934 Tydings–McDuffie Act.

In detailing this history, Bill Ong Hing shows that Asians played a significant role in the evolution of U.S. immigration policies. Before World War II, America was successful in using immigration laws to maintain racial uniformity, even though these laws had tremendous impact on the daily lives of the Asian population, causing stagnant population size, limited employment opportunities, ghettoized settlements, and gender imbalances.

The new Immigration Act of 1965, which was designed to encourage European immigration, replaced the racially based 1924 National Origins Act. However, its more egalitarian provisions had the unintended effect of dramatic increase in Asian and Latino immigrants. Its powerful racial and social consequences turned America into a multiracial society. These unexpected demographic changes caused national anxiety, particularly heightened during the recent years of economic recession. As a result, new state and federal laws are been contemplated to restrict immigration, aiming specially at the undocumented and the refugees.

Hing notes that the policy makers, scholars, and media pundits who are calling for immigration reforms have little command of basic demographics. Precisely because of their inattentiveness to the formation of Asian communities before 1965, they had failed to anticipate the Asians' spectacular inflow. Had the policy makers studied Asian-American family needs, economic ambitions, residential patterns, and connections to Asian homelands, they could have avoided the surprise. Now the policy makers are embarking on the next round of restrictions, before having assessed how the 1965 law has affected Asian and other immigrant communities.

In reality, the 1965 law drastically transformed the nature of America's Asian population. Hing patiently details developments in the six largest Asian American communities since the 1965 act. For each, he offers specific information on gender ratios, age distributions, foreign versus native-born ratios, geographic settlement, employment profiles, income and poverty. Asian-American communities are not homogeneous, but Hing argues convincingly that the roots for understanding Asians in all their diverse complexity can be found in the immigrations laws that shaped them. He therefore urges the policy makers to devote considerable effort in understanding the demographics of Asian-Americans before initiating new immigration reforms. His passionate voice advocating for an

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intelligent and responsible policy making is admirable. As a nation, Americans would do well to heed his advice.

Hing, however, is so anxious to have us know more about Asian-Americans that he ventures into areas beyond relevance to immigration issues. In his fifth chapter, he engages in a discussion of Asian-Americans' educational performance, political participation and identity. As these topics lie beyond Hing's expertise, he can only point out his disagreements with conventional analyses, without offering clear alternatives. His clinical-legalistic style of discourse, laden with fragmented details, may in fact be counter-productive when it comes to facilitating our understanding of Asian Americans.

PETER KWONG
Hunter College

Private Choices and Public Health: The AIDS Epidemic in an Economic Perspective *by Thomas J. Philipson and Richard A. Posner. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1993. 264 pp. $29.95.*

Private Choices and Public Health by Thomas Philipson and Richard Posner is a bold and iconoclastic attempt to understand AIDS from an economic point of view. Challenging the assumptions of liberals who believe that not enough is spent on prevention and research, it also targets the demands of cultural conservatives who would further burden gay people and impose harsher restrictions on drug users. Most importantly, it seeks to challenge what it takes to be the hegemonic paradigm of epidemiology and public health.

It is a central analytic element of Philipson and Posner's perspective that sexual encounters and relations can be thought of as "trades,"—"in the standard economic sense of an activity perceived as mutually beneficial to the persons engaged in it" (p. 5). Thus when people behave in ways that place them at risk for HIV infection, it is because they believe there is a benefit in assuming the risk that exceeds the potential costs.

Philipson and Posner are not so foolish as to suggest that all sexual or drug using behavior is rational or predictable, given a model of marketplace behavior, any more so than every purchasing decision is a rational one. "Common sense—not always, but here, a reliable guide—teaches that impulsive, compulsive, forgetful, illogical, self-deceptive, weak-willed, short-sighted, even crazed behavior is found in most domains of human activity, notably including the sexual and the addictive (and sex may have addictive characteristics)" (p. 7). But they do believe that an economic approach is far more effective than others in predicating "average behavior and central tendencies."

Building on this conceptual perspective, Philipson and Posner go on to propose some striking theses: encouraging voluntary HIV testing may speed the spread of

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HIV infection; publicly funded AIDS education will play little role in modifying behaviors linked to the transmission of HIV; efforts to reduce groundless social anxiety about the ease with which HIV can be transmitted may "reduce the demand for safe sex" (p. 165). Intriguing, unsettling, put forth by theoretical argument and demonstrated through mathematical formulas, these theses all suffer from one problem: there is no body of evidence that even begins to suggest that they are true.

At the conclusion of *Private Choices*, Philipson and Posner acknowledge the limits of their work. They admit that they have "largely" ignored "evidence of systematic, nonrational elements in human decision making." In addition, they admit to having slighted the "ethical issues raised by the AIDS epidemic and responses to it" (p. 225). Such omissions are, however, close to fatal. As a consequence, there is virtually no discussion of rights that have been so crucial in the political struggles over AIDS; no discussion of the role of social solidarity in the face of an epidemic that has so profoundly affected groups that have historically borne the burden of stigma, racism, and irrational discrimination; no discussion of the obligation of the state in an epidemic like AIDS to foster altruism rather than to take as an immutable given the relative presence of altruists and egoists in the communities we live in. Because they fail to address these issues in their analysis and because they so remarkably avoid contact with the rich, confusing, but informative debates and struggles over AIDS policy, their analysis of the politics of the epidemic is particularly thin.

For all the elegance conveyed in its mathematics and all the boldness conveyed in its heterodoxy, *Private Choices* falls short of its promise to provide "a useful contribution to the scientific and policy literatures on the epidemic" to serve as a "source of fresh and interesting data, insights, hypotheses and research proposals" to illustrate "the power of economics to explain social phenomena occurring outside explicit markets" (p. 225). The problem rests not with Philipson and Posner, two able and respected practitioners in the fields of law and economics. Perhaps the example of AIDS underscores the limits of the approach they have embraced with such fervor.

RONALD BAUER
Columbia University

The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War *by Cynthia Enloe. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993. 326 pp. Cloth, $38.00; paper, $15.00.*

This most recent of Cynthia Enloe's feminist studies of international politics and the military sets an agenda for research that begins with a compelling assumption: militarism is a cultural phenomenon that has an enormous impact on civil society,

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and it is a gendered one. Militarization shapes what is acceptable masculinity. In so doing, it also creates femininity, for the latter must sustain and develop the former.

Enloe argues further that militarism has an impact on these social constructs both during times of war and during times of apparent peace: those periods we call postwar or later, perhaps, "pre-war" (thus signifying the centrality of military action to our historical understandings). How countries are demilitarized, as during the present ending of the cold war, shapes notions of manhood and womanhood; when men are no longer soldiers, they "must be persuaded to change their ideas of what is right and natural—and even pleasurable—to do as men" (p. 25). This new manhood, or the refusal to adopt the new definitions of manhood, will be played out with women—in families, in the workplace, and elsewhere.

The women will be counted on to adjust as well, but they too may not go gladly. We should not assume that demilitarization will necessarily grant women greater autonomy or privilege. Some women "may rebel against the sorts of expectations leaders will try to impose on them in the name of post-Cold War 'political stabilization'" such as leaving a job, having a child, or donning a veil (p. 26). And while "it is conventionally presumed that demilitarization automatically widens the political space . . . it could also shrink it" (p. 134). In one example, Enloe casts a critical eye on the return to the "politics-as-usual of patriarchal parties" (p. 134) in Central America. A militarized era, for all that it opresses women, can also provoke the creation of new political spaces for women, particularly in the opposition.

Enloe does not merely look to changes in gender relations as an *effect* of militarism's waxing and waning; more controversially, she also sees gender politics as militarism's primary cause. In so doing, she rejects the hypotheses that it is capitalism or the bureaucratic state that inevitably creates militarism. And she begins an exploration of the role of gender in creating and sustaining militarized cultures worldwide. The book asks more questions than it answers, which is a worthy enterprise. Still, I found most compelling those chapters that rely least on speculation and most on specific documentation.

One of these is entitled "Beyond Steve Canyon and Rambo: Histories of Militarized Masculinity." Enloe describes how notions of masculinity and femininity are spread to formerly colonized countries through specific military training (the teaching methods of the United States and Britain are discussed), and more broadly through cultural references, such as Rambo. These concepts are, however, not static. Much of the chapter (and other parts of the book, notably the excellent "The Politics of Constructing the American Woman Solider") are devoted to an analysis of the problem modern states have in determining the proper roles for women and for gay men and lesbians in the military. Enloe argues this is far more than a combat issue: in the case of the United States, it is part of a struggle to determine "what sort of relationships between women and men will provide the basis for a unified, confident, legitimized society now

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that comparison with a demonized Soviet Union no longer provides that sense of confident, legitimate unity" (p. 93). The chapter contains a brilliant deconstruction of the "idiosyncratic definitions of combat" developed by militaries so as to allow female personnel to serve, while still maintaining the masculinity of combat.

Another strong chapter details how governments have engaged in the management of prostitution for their soldiers' benefit and calls our attention to some of the "kinds of myths, anxieties, inequalities and state policies" that are required "to fight a war or to sustain a militarized form of peace" (p. 144).

While more data is offered throughout about the United States than any other country, the book is notable for its integration of the experiences of a wide range of states into its theorizing. *The Morning After* is written in accessible, jargon-free prose, and the author has a lively, biting sense of humor that will no doubt irritate some but amuse many. It contains very informative notes and an excellent bibliography. It is a book that will spark considerable discussion and will rightly help to expand the scope of the field of international politics.

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Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest Received

Bill Clinton's Pre-presidential Career: An Annotated Bibliography *compiled by Allan Metz. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1994. 235 pp. $59.95.*

Control of Dual-Threat Agents: The Vaccines for Peace Programme *edited by Erhard Geissler and John P. Woodall. New York, Oxford University Press, 1994. 265 pp. Paper, $39.95.*

Gerald R. Ford: A Bibliography *compiled by John Robert Greene. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1994. 148 pp. $59.95.*

Index to International Public Opinion, 1992–1993 *prepared by Survey Research Consultants International. Wesport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1994. 749 pp. $225.00.*

Leaders from the 1960s: A Bibliographical Sourcebook of American Activism *by David DeLeon. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1994. 601 pp. $75.00.*

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 69, 1918–1924 *edited by Arthur S. Link. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1994. 449 pp. $69.50.*

Social Indicators of Development, 1994 *by The World Bank. Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. 409 pp. Paper, $24.95.*

Uniting Germany: Documents and Debates, 1944–1993 *edited by Konrad H. Jarausch and Volker Gransow. Oxford, England, Berghahn Books, 1994. 282 pp. Cloth, $64.00; paper, $18.95.*

The World Factbook: 1994–95 *by the Central Intelligence Agency. Washington, DC, Brassey's, 1994. 489 pp. $32.00.*

World Resources, 1994–95: A Guide to the Global Environment *by the World Resources Institute. New York, Oxford University Press, 1994. 400 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $21.95.*

World Tables, 1994 *by The World Bank. Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. 750 pp. Paper, $35.95.*

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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